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“Together with Commissioners Monti and Reding, I have strongly and repeatedly encouraged 
the clubs to start or pursue social dialogue with trade union representatives of the football 
players since the outcome of discussions in March 2001 between the European Commission 
and FIFA/UEFA on football transfers. The establishment of a structured European sector 
social dialogue in football could be an effective method to manage the impact of the different 
European policies in a pro-active way. These policies do not only affect the regulatory 




     Anna Diamantopoulou, Member of the European Commission, 2003. 
 
With this statement, the search for a Social Dialogue solution to some of football’s on-going 
problems began. Social Dialogue is a mechanism in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) allowing representatives of management and labour to conclude a 
range of agreements pertaining to the employment relationship between both parties. In 2008, 
a Social Dialogue committee for European professional football was established and in 2012 
it concluded its first agreement on minimum requirements in standard player contracts. This 
thesis explores the origins and operation of this committee and explains its significance in 
terms of the search for legal certainty in European football and the impact on football 
governance and industrial relations more generally.  
 
 
Bosman and the Revision of the Transfer System: Legal Uncertainty 
 
In 1995 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in the Bosman case
2
 that FIFA’s 
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) formed a restriction on the free 
movement of workers. Elements of the RSTP were prohibited due to an infringement of 
Article 39(1) of the EC Treaty (now Article 45 (1) of the TFEU). Accordingly, the transfer 
system was abolished. Consequently, FIFA and UEFA looked for alternatives to safeguard the 
                                                 
1
 Letter of Commissioner Diamantopoulou of DG Employment and Social Affairs to Mr. Gerard Slager, chair of 
the European Federation of Professional Football Clubs (EFFC), 4 February 2003. 
2
 Union Royal Belge des Société de Football Association ASBL v Bosman (Case C-415/93) [1995] ECR I-4921. 
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(re)distribution of revenue in football and the promotion of the stability of contracts and 
competitions. FIFA altered the system but restrictive elements remained in place.  
 
According to the Commission there was still no balance between the players’ right to free 
movement and the necessity of having stability of contracts and championships. FIFA and 
UEFA were forced to change this system in accordance with the requirements of EU law. 
Years of negotiations followed before FIFA finally presented an alternative system. In 2001 
the European Commission informally agreed to this alternative transfer system proposed by 
FIFA and UEFA. The Commission did so by means of an exchange of letters between 
competition Commissioner Monti and FIFA president Sepp Blatter. This informal method of 
settlement left space for interpretation and legal manoeuvring by the stakeholders and since 
then there has been academic legal debate about the illegality of the system
3
 and concern 
expressed from stakeholders about the absence of a settled legal environment. In this regard, 
the Dutch Employers Organisation in Professional Football (FBO) has been instrumental in 
assessing if the European Social Dialogue could contribute to a solid foundation for the 
international transfer system and employment relations in EU professional football. 
 
 
Creation of Awareness of the European Social Dialogue in European Professional 
Football 
 
The words of Commissioner Diamantopoulou in 2003 encouraged the FBO to create 
awareness about the European Social Dialogue amongst football employers in the European 
Union. The FBO received funding from the European Commission to carry out a project in 
collaboration with the T.M.C. Asser Institute in the Hague.
4
 A second project in 2004 was 
targeted towards the Member States that joined the EU in 2004.
5
 I managed both projects in 
                                                 
3
 See for example  the contributions in European Sports Law and Policy Bulletin, “Contractual Stability in 
Football” edited by Colucci, M., European Sports Law and Policy Centre, Rome, Italy; Drolet, J. (2006), Extra 
Time,: Are the New FIFA Transfer Rules Doomed?, International Sports Law Journal, 2006 Vol. 1-2, p. 66-73, 
The Hague: T.M.C Asser press; Dabscheck, B. (2004), The Globe at their Feet: FIFA’s New Employment Rules 
– I, Sport and Society, Vol. 7, p.69-94 ; Dabscheck, B. (2006), The Globe at their Feet: FIFA’s New 
Employment Rules-II, Sport and Society, Vol. 9, p. 1-18; Parrish, R. (2011), Social Dialogue in European 
Professional Football, European Law Journal, Vol. 17 (2), p. 213-229. 
4
 T.M.C. Asser Instituut (2004), Promoting the Social Dialogue in the European Professional Football Sector, 
Project supported by the European Commission under Budget Heading B3-4000. 
5
 T.M.C. Asser Instituut (2004), Promoting the Social Dialogue in European Professional Football, Candidate 
Countries, Project supported by the European Commission under Budget Heading B3-4000. 
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my capacity as Manager of European Affairs of the FBO.
6
 The FBO expected that the 
European Social Dialogue could be the appropriate platform to introduce the desired legal 
certainty and stability to the European Union professional football sector. The stakeholders in 
football desire legal certainty in order to optimize the functioning of the sector. In a well-
functioning sector the stakeholders are able to rely on the validity of the rules that govern 
their business. In such a case all stakeholders can organise their business or manage their 
careers in accordance with their personal objectives. 
 
 
Importance of the Need for Legal Certainty in European Union Professional Football 
 
The importance of legal certainty in football must be seen from a broader perspective than 
purely restricted to the stakeholders in the sector. It can comfortably be concluded that 
football is the EU’s most popular sport. Football as an individual sports discipline is a major 
contributor to the economic development of the industry of professional sport.
7
 The popularity 
of football serves as a motivator for the general public to get involved in sport, as consumers 
and in terms of social benefits. The contribution of sport to the economic growth and 
employment in the EU has been researched in 2012.
8
 The researchers use a harmonised 




The outcome of the study was the proof that sport is an important economic sector in the EU. 
The share of sport in the national economies of the Member States is comparable to 
agriculture, forestry and fishing combined. This share is expected to rise in the future. Sport 
accounts for 3% of the overall gross value added in the EU.
10
 The contribution of sport-
related employment on total employment in the EU is 2.12%.
11
 Next to the economic impact, 
sport plays a considerable role in health promotion, education, training and social inclusion 
                                                 
6
 From 2003-2005. 
7
 There are no studies identifying the total economic contribution of the professional football sector to the sport 
sector as a whole. However, the yearly report by Deloitte gives a solid indication of the value of the professional 
football competitions in the ‘Big 5’ leagues: England, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The 20 top clubs in 
Europe have generated €4.8 billion turnover in the season 2011/2012. Deloitte (2013), Captains of Industry, 
Football Money League, Sport Business Reports. 
8
 SportsEconAustria, project lead (2012), Study on the Contribution of Sport to Economic Growth and 
Employment in the EU, Study commissioned by the European Commission, Directorate-General Education and 
Culture, Final Report, November 2012. 
9
 Supra, p.7. 
10





and networking in the European Union.
12
 Legal certainty in football is therefore necessary to 
maximize the benefits for the stakeholders but also for the position of sport in the EU. Court 
cases and disputes between sport stakeholders may have a negative effect on the football 
sector, and as a consequence on sport as a whole, whilst undermining of the economic and 
policy benefits of sport for the EU. 
 
 
The Social Dialogue Committee in Professional Football (FSDC) 
 
In 2008 a FSDC in professional football was created. The first tangible result of the FSDC 
was the conclusion of an Autonomous Agreement on the minimum conditions for 
employment contracts for professional football players in the EU (Autonomous Agreement). 
At the time of writing this thesis the Autonomous Agreement is being implemented in the 
Member States of the EU. The implementation could in the near future also entail the non-EU 
members of UEFA. After implementation the Autonomous Agreement will introduce legal 
certainty in relation to the topics that form the minimum standards. However, a number of 
issues remain unsolved and are, as such, still a source of legal ambiguity. The thesis has as its 
objective the identification of these issues and seeking to assess if the European Social 
Dialogue could also serve as the forum that brings legal certainty to these unsolved themes.  
 
The timing of the thesis is logical if one takes into consideration that the issues that are under 
analysis in the research are under concrete legal threat. First, the world representative body of 
football players, FIFPRO, has announced that it will challenge the legality of the RSTP.
13
 
Second, the lawyer who advised Jean Marc Bosman in 1995 has filed a complaint at the 
European Commission and at a Brussels Court concerning the legality of the UEFA 
Regulations on Financial Fair Play.
14
 Third, a study commissioned by the European 
Commission concluded that UEFA’s Home Grown Player Rule (HGPR) goes beyond what is 
                                                 
12
 European Commission (2007), The EU and Sport: Background and Context, Accompanying document to the 
White Paper on Sport, SEC(2007) 935, 11 July 2007. 
13




 Inside world football, 3 October 2013: Striani and Dupont in court today to start financial fair play challenge, 




proportionate for the objectives that it aims to achieve.
15
 Less restrictive alternatives are to be 
introduced in order to prevent a potential overhaul as a consequence of legal challenge. 
Fourth, UEFA publicized its intention to completely ban Third Party Ownership in European 
football.
16
 Fifth, the English Association of Football Agents (AFA) is studying the possibility 
of legally challenging the draft FIFA regulations on Intermediaries, the intended successor of 




The thesis will make a contribution to knowledge by examining if the FSDC could be the 
forum for a negotiated settlement on these disputes concerning the FIFA RSTP, the UEFA 
FFPR, the UEFA HGPR, TPO and the activities of player’s agents. A consequence of the 
inclusion of these topics in the FSDC could be the creation of legal certainty by means of 
negotiated settlement as an alternative for litigation. If the thesis concludes that the FSDC 
could indeed include these unsolved issues in its scope of negotiations another positive 
element comes to the surface. At the time of writing there are initiatives undertaken to 
introduce a sectoral Social Dialogue Committee for Sport in general.
18
 Positive perspectives 




Due to my involvement in the European Commission funded projects dealing with Social 
Dialogue, I realized that at that stance in time, there were still a series of unresolved issues. 
The projects had brought to the surface that the Social Dialogue could influence the system of 
regulating football specific topics, but no answer had been given on the impact on the system 
of football governance as a whole. In addition, as the projects focussed on the football sector, 
the potential reverse impact on EU labour law was neglected. The last questions that remained 
unanswered was to what extent the Social Dialogue could bring legal certainty, via what 
means. 
                                                 
15
 Dalziel, M., Downward, P., Parrish, R., Pearson, G., Semens, A. (2012), Study on the Assessment of UEFA’s 
‘Home Grown Player Rule’, Negotiated procedure EAC07/2012. This is a research project carried out by the 
University of Liverpool and Edge Hill University, funded by the European Commission. 
16
 UEFA (2013), No Place for Third Party Ownership in Football, Published on: 
http://www.uefa.org/aboutuefa/organisation/generalsecretary/news/newsid=1931937.html.  
17
 World Sports Law Report (2013), Agents Prepare Challenge to FIFA’s Intermediary Rules, to be found at: 
http://www.e-comlaw.com/world-sports-law-report/article_template.asp?Contents=Yes&from=wslr&ID=1621.  
18
 On 11 and 12 December 2012 the Commission launched a two year test phase in order to allow social partners 
to make progress towards sectoral Social Dialogue level and to identify where potential problems lie, European 
Commission (2013), European Social Dialogue Newsletter, Social Europe, EU Social Dialogue Liaison Forum – 




These issues were then strengthened by the developments in the football sector that showed 
that legal uncertainty became visible due to the threat of legal challenges to the system of 
governance and regulation of football by rivalling football stakeholders. Therefore,  the 
general objective of the thesis is to assess if the negotiations in the FSDC may include the 
scope of topics that are under dispute and potential legal challenge in the current regulatory 
system in European professional football. The intention of the inclusion of these topics in the 
FSDC is to assess if legal certainty can be obtained. This assessment shall be divided into the 
following research questions: 
 
1) What is the impact of the European Social Dialogue on the governance model of 
European football? 
 
2) What is the impact of the European Social Dialogue in European professional football 
on industrial relations and collective bargaining in the European Union? 
 
3) Is the European Social Dialogue able to introduce legal certainty to the unsolved 
issues in European professional football? 
 
Research Question 1 
 
The governance model in European professional football is structured in a pyramid model. 
Decisions and regulations of football governing bodies at the top of the pyramid influence the 
activities of the actors that are positioned in a layer beneath the the governing body of the 
individual sport. The research question investigates whether the vertical method of 
governance can be expected to change in a horizontal model. In the case that the European 
Social Dialogue serves as a platform for negotiation about certain topics that are of value for 
the social partners, a potential shift from a vertical model of regulation to a horizontal model 
is expected. Such a shift in governance towards the empowerment of social partners impacts 
policy making in the football sector in the EU. Influence on the overall sport is likely to be a 
consequence. This question takes into consideration the nature of policy-making in the EU 
and the role of individual actors in this process. The assessment includes the origins for 




Research Question 2 
 
The European Social Dialogue is the fruit of a historical debate concerning the extent of 
influence of the European Union on labour policy of the Member States and employment 
relations between both sides of the industry. The analysis of the consequence of including the 
sector of football, with its recognized special characteristics, in the European Social Dialogue 
is valuable for understanding and the potential development of EU industrial relations and EU 
labour law in general.  
 
Research Question 3 
 
This research question seeks to identify whether the result of negotiations in the FSDC are 
enforceable on the level of the national Member States. It follows after a description of the 
potential topics for inclusion in the FSDC. It will be assessed whether the topics are suitable 





The thesis is based on empirical analysis combined with a mixed approach. The research 
provides strong evidence for the probability of the conclusions and is therefore inductive in 
nature. I have identified research questions after data collection. The thesis draws on some of 
the findings from the projects that I managed concerning the creation of awareness of the 
European Social Dialogue in professional football. However, these projects were carried out 
prior to PhD registration. 
 
The mixed approach consists of classic black letter methodology. This involves a descriptive 
analysis of legal texts found in primary sources. These sources are (EU and national) 
legislation, case law of European courts and sport arbitration courts, regulations of sports 
governing bodies and academic commentary on these primary sources. In addition to this 
methodology, a socio-legal approach has been employed. This approach relates better to the 
purpose and placement of the thesis in the area of policy-making in the EU. It looks at the 
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influence of law in policy and vice-versa. The thesis is not purely focussed on law as its 
conclusions impact on governance models and on the potential direction of EU sport policy. 
 
The research is of a qualitative nature. The origins for the legal status quo in sport is under 
research in the thesis. It deals more with how sport has reached this status quo and what the 
underlying reasons were. Quantitative analysis as well as comparative legal research are also 
used but only in relation to a small part of the thesis. 
 
The research parameters of the thesis can be categorized as follows. 
 
Time:  the research findings are restricted to February 2014. During the time of research 
potential legal threats became more realistic due to the announcement of FIFPRo that it would 
challenge the RSTP. In addition, developments concerning a challenge to the FFPR of UEFA 
and to the initiatives of FIFA to deregulate the player’s agents activities had to be included in 
the thesis. These issues took place during 2013 and the beginning of 2014. 
 
Scope: the sector under research is the sector of European Union professional football. 
However, the thesis’ conclusions might have an impact on football governance and regulation 
on a global level. The Autonomous Agreement can also impact on football governance and 
employment relations in the member associations of UEFA falling outside of the EU-28. The 
thesis deals with professional football and not amateur football. The criteria for inclusion in 
the thesis is if the activity that is carried out by the individual football player falls under the 
definition of a worker as provided by EU case law. Where ‘football’ is described it is used as 
a substitute for ‘professional football’. Some issues presented in the conclusions of the thesis 
are a source for further research. It will also become clear in the near future how the 






Chapter 1 explains policy change in the European Union. It describes macro and micro 
approaches to European integration. The chapter serves as an illustration of the scenery in 
which agenda-setting in the creation of football policy in the EU has occurred. It describes 
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which framework for further analysis is most suitable for the thesis and it helps to understand 
the bigger picture of the evolution of sports policy in the EU and in football in particular. 
 
Chapter 2 presents an analysis of the application of EU law to sport and the efforts carried out 
by the sport governing bodies, UEFA and FIFA in particular, to exclude sport from the 
application of EU law. The chapter explains the consequences of the introduction of the 
Treaty Article on sport in the TFEU. It concludes that the current legal framework in which 
sport in the EU operates enables a distinction into the intensity of EU law impact on sport by 
means of the Separate Territories Framework. However, the regulatory framework is not 
unambiguous and it is therefore unable to create legal certainty. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the football policy subsystem of the EU. It describes the actors of the 
sporting autonomy coalition and the football business coalition. An analysis of their beliefs 
and the origins of these beliefs is described. It is concluded that the actors grouped in the 
opposing coalitions favour a situation where there is legal certainty but that there is a need for 
a suitable forum for negotiations to reach enforceable agreements. The chapter contains an 
assessment of potential fora in which such a negotiation takes place. It concludes that the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and the European Commission are not the suitable fora 
and that it must be assessed if the European Social Dialogue could meet the criteria for a 
suitable forum. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on EU labour law. It places the European Social Dialogue in the context of 
the evolution of EU labour law. It serves to understand the creation of the FSDC and to 
position the creation of the FSDC within EU labour law. It enables the conclusion on the 
impact of the FSDC on industrial relations and collective bargaining in the EU. 
 
Chapter 5 first illustrates the route towards the creation of the FSDC in 2008. It then describes 
the Autonomous Agreement: its content, enforcement and method of implementation on the 
level of the Member States of the EU and potential implementation in UEFA member 
associations. It concludes by posing that there are other issues outside the issues contained in 
the Autonomous Agreement that may benefit from negotiated settlement through the FSDC 
negotiation procedures. The chapter also contains a literature review on the application of the 




Chapter 6 presents an historic overview leading to the creation of the current RSTP in 
professional football. It analyses what topics that are currently regulated by FIFA in their 
RSTP could be (better) placed in the FSDC in order to enable a more stable form of regulation 
and legal certainty for the actors in football.  
 
Chapter 7 performs the same function as Chapter 6 but in relation to key UEFA, as opposed 
to FIFA, regulations, namely Club Licensing, Financial Fair Play and the Home Grown Player 
Rule.  
 
Chapter 8 looks at two other issues that deserve a separate analysis due to their nature. The 
topic of TPO is currently under scrutiny of UEFA and FIFA. A total ban is proposed by 
UEFA. The chapter analyses the scope of the definition of TPO and its origins. It then 
assesses whether TPO could be placed within the FSDC. A similar approach is used with 
regard to the regulation of the activities of Player’s Agents. FIFA’s intentions to deregulate 
the profession are described. The FSDC as a platform for negotiation of future agent 
regulations will be analysed and elaborated upon. 
 
Chapter 9 contains the conclusions. A list of thirteen conclusions is provided and the 
contribution to knowledge is underlined. 
 
 
Contribution to knowledge 
 
The general contribution of the thesis is an addition to the under-researched area of the 
application of the European Social Dialogue in professional football. Except for Parrish the 
other authors of academic contributions concerning the topic have focused on a descriptive 
exercise or have used the European Social Dialogue to better position the main problem of 
their research.
19
 In Chapter 5 a literature review is given. This thesis is the only work in 
                                                 
19
 The literature overview contains the following authors and works: Meier, H.E.(2004), From Bosman to 
Collective bargaining agreements, The regulation of the market for professional soccer players, International 
Sports Law Journal, 2004, 3-4, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press; Parrish, R. and Miettinen, S.(2008), The 
Sporting exception in European Union Law, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008;  Parrish, R.(2011), Social 
Dialogue in European Professional Football, European Law Journal, Vol. 17, No.2, March 2011, p. 213-229; 
Geeraert, A., Scheerder, J., Bruyninck, H, (2013), The governance network of European football: introducing 
new governance approaches to steer football at the EU, International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, Vol 
5., Nr.1, p. 113-132.;  Geeraert, A., Colucci. M. (2012), The 'Social dialogue' in European professional football, 
Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 33, Nr. 1. 
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academic legal literature describing the application of the European Social Dialogue to 
football to this extent. The application of the European Social Dialogue to the unsolved issues 
is a novelty in the sense that an elaboration on these issues has not yet occurred. 
 
The thesis may be positioned as a further definition or as an example of the models for sports 
regulation presented by Foster.
20
 The application of the European Social Dialogue to football 
may be seen as a concretisation of the model of supervised self-government.  
 
The conclusions originate from the perspectives of: 
 
(I) the governance of sport and of football in particular; 
(II) the necessity for the creation of legal certainty; and from  
(III) the perspective of industrial relations and collective bargaining.  
 
Specifically, the conclusions represent a contribution to knowledge in the following areas, 
whereby the conclusions refer to one (or more) of the three areas in which a contribution is 
been made: 
 
1) The European Social Dialogue as a form of Supervised Self-Governance (I); 
2) The European Social Dialogue as a Forum for Negotiated Settlement (I); 
3) The Social Dialogue as Part of the Structured Dialogue in Sport (I); 
4) The FSDC as a Source for Legal Certainty (II); 
5) The FSDC and the Definition of the Boundaries of Article 165 TFEU: ‘fairness’ and 
‘openness’ (I), (II) and (III); 
6) The Evolution of EU  Labour Law by Promoting the Flexibility of Approach and 
Implementation and Enforcement of Negotiation Results through Association 
Regulations (I) and (III); 
7) The Evolution of EU Labour Law by Enabling Influence on Labour Relations in 
Candidate and Third Countries (I) and (III); 
8) Redefining the Separate Territories Framework (I), (II) and (III); 
9) Restructuring the Pyramid – Introduction of the Horizontal Model of Governance or 
Co-Negotiation (I) and (III); 
                                                 
20
 Foster, K. (2000), How can Sport be Regulated? In Greenfield, S. & Osborn, G. (eds.) (2000), Law and Sport 
in Contemporary Society, London: Frank Cass. 
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10) Connections with the US Model of Collective Bargaining (I) and (III); 
11) Introducing the Labour Exemption in EU Sports Law (I), (II) and (III); 
12) Enhancing the Debate on Lex Sportiva (II); 
13) The European Social Dialogue as a Venue for the Settlement of Unsolved Issues (I), 























Explaining Policy Change in the European Union 
Introduction 
This chapter serves to introduce the framework that is favoured for further analysis of the 
thesis. The thesis elaborates on the work of Parrish, the introduction of the Separate 
Territories Framework in EU sports policy.
21
 However, in order to determine if indeed this 
theoretical framework is most suitable, an illustration of the scenery in which agenda-setting 
in the creation of football policy, and regulation, in the EU has occurred. The Social Dialogue 
is presented as a potential tool for European integration. Therefore also micro and macro 
theories for European integration will be touched upon. 
Models of Sports Regulation 
 
Parrish’s study on EU sports regulation revealed tensions within the EU on how the EU’s 
legal order should relate to sporting activity.
22
 Is sport a business, the commercial value of 
which is being undermined by restrictive practices employed the governing bodies, or does 
sport require a strong regulatory steer from those governing bodies so that the specificities of 
sport can be protected free from the oversight of judicial bodies? Parrish described the 
emergence of a sports policy subsystem within the EU. It is characterized by two competing 
advocacy coalitions, one favoring the superiority of legal norms and market forces within EU 
sports policy (the single market coalition), the other supporting the promotion of socio-
cultural ideas within EU sports policy (the socio-cultural coalition). Each coalition is 
empowered or constrained by the institutional structure, both formal and informal, of the EU. 
Denied influence in one venue, coalition actors go venue shopping in order to achieve their 
goals elsewhere. Parrish applies an actor-centered institutional model to explain how 
subsystem competition was managed by the EU’s executive and judicial bodies. In particular, 
Parrish presented the separate territories framework in order to explain how the single market 
and socio-cultural tensions evident within the sports policy subsystem have been managed. 
The separate territories refers to the definition of a territory of sporting autonomy, an 
approach favoured by the socio-cultural coalition, and a territory of legal intervention, an 
approach broadly favoured by the single market coalition.  
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The thesis researches the sector of professional football. This sector is characterized by 
activities between actors that can be categorized in two types of rivalling coalitions. The 
football governing bodies are in favour of more autonomy to regulate and organize their 
activities. On the other hand, the football players and football clubs wish to have more 
influence on the governance of football. Parrish’s research seems to be best suitable to this 
thesis as the activities between the coalitions in football may trigger initiatives and actions 
that serve as initiators for policy change. The combination of an actor centred approach with 
an assessment on the suitability of available platforms and institutions for enhancing debate, 
within the geographical framework of the European Union, potentially makes Parrish’s work 
most suitable for application in this thesis. The thesis may serve to further develop his theory. 
 
 
Although his work outlined one of the earliest theoretical accounts of EU involvement in 
sport, it neglected to examine the contribution Social Dialogue could make to reconciling 
single market and socio-cultural tensions within the subsystem. The present thesis seeks to 
achieve this whilst adding to our theoretical understanding of where the boundaries of the 
separate territories framework lie.    
 
Reconciling these tensions within the framework of European Union law is problematic given 
that sport possesses both significant commercial and social characteristics. Foster’s study of 
models of sports regulation informs this debate.
23
 Foster examines five models of sports 
regulation. The first is the pure market model. Sport is seen as a business and it is subject to 
the same regulation as any other type of economic activity. Clubs and other competitors in 
sports are seen as profit maximizing entities and the application of ordinary laws helps 
safeguard their economic interests, particularly in relation to restrictive practices employed by 
sports governing bodies. A flaw with the pure market model lies in its failure to take account 
of the specific market conditions sports bodies operate within and the need for governing 
bodies to restrict individual freedoms so that the general sporting interest prevails. For 
example, mutual interdependence characterizes the sports market and clubs compete to retain 
an interest in the survival and strength of their competitors. If the pure market model were to 
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be applied, the weaker sporting participants would not survive and sporting competition 
would be eliminated.  
 
In order to ensure a monopoly does not result from the application of the pure market model, 
competition law is applied in the defective market model. The consumer welfare model 
protects the weaker parties in the sports market, particularly the fan and the players, two 
stakeholders who have historically possessed limited economic power in relation to the clubs. 
This can be achieved via the enactment of protective legislation. The current regulatory state 
of sport is best reflected in the natural monopoly model. A natural monopoly is characterized 
by a single seller with a unique product who is able to create barriers for the easy entry in the 
market by other sellers. Such a private monopoly ignores the application of competition law 
and the public interest. The governing bodies of sport operate as one such a single seller 
although this pattern of governance has attracted support from the Independent Football 
European Review.
24
 Foster argues that the need for regulation stems from the fact that 




At the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum to the pure market model is the socio-cultural 
model. The principles underpinning this model are essentially sporting in nature. In other 
words, sporting values predominate over commercial considerations with the social and 
cultural significance of sport being protected from legal interventions designed to release 
sports commercial potential. The governing bodies of sport strongly argue for the application 
of this model as it shields them from the application of law and allows them freedom to devise 
rules designed to promote and protect the specificities of sport.     
 
Foster argues that a form of ‘supervised self-government’ may reconcile these commercial 
and sporting interests.
26
 Supervised autonomy may be beneficial for a number of reasons. 
First, sports governing bodies have acquired in-depth knowledge of their respective sports and 
this wisdom should be respected. Second, the cost of self-regulation is borne by sport itself 
and is not the public. Third, self-regulation is likely to produce better compliance. However, 
Foster does not advocate total self-regulation for some formal state regulation within sport 
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serves the public interest. Modern sport has drawn in many stakeholders and traditional 
patterns of sports governance are increasingly being criticized by a growing number of these 
stakeholders who feel prevailing governance structures are not undemocratic and do not 
afford all stakeholders a more even share in the distribution of power within sports 
structures.
27
 The implication is that external regulation of sporting activities can impose good 
governance on sport. However, little attention has been focused on how stakeholders 
themselves can co-operatively transform governance standards without the need to resort to 
litigation or rely on external regulation. In this regard, the literature on sports regulation has 
tended to ignore the contribution of Social Dialogue in sport.          
 
The establishment of a Social Dialogue committee in European professional football has 
significantly advanced the debate as to which regulatory model for sport is favoured by the 
EU. Currently, EU free movement and competition law is applied to the sports market 
whenever sport is practiced as an economic activity, although the specificities of sport can be 
considered within the relevant tests applicable for both. If the current Social Dialogue 
committee works effectively and produces a series of binding agreements between 
representatives of clubs and players, the prevailing regulatory model will shift to one more 
closely related to Foster’s supervised autonomy model. This thesis not only explores the 
extent to which Social Dialogue has the potential to offer such a regulatory shift, but also how 
this informs and advances the current theoretical literature on policy change within the EU. It 





Communication theorists, otherwise known as transactionalists, focus on how a sense of 
identity within a political community can be forged.
28
 From this perspective, the greater the 
interaction between Europeans, the greater the likelihood that they accept as legitimate new 
and emerging bodies such as the EU. Despite lacking  competence to develop a sports policy, 
the EU has identified sport as a means through which the European project can achieve 
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greater legitimacy in the minds of its apparently disengaged citizens. EU policy interventions 
in sport have, since the Adonnino recommendations in 1984, placed faith in the ability of 
sport in ‘forging identity and bringing people closer together’.
29
 Sports policy initiatives are 
littered with symbolic references to common ‘heritages’, shared ‘values’ and European 
‘models’ (such as the European ‘model’ of sport). Communications theory may have 
application to sport in so far as sport, particularly professional football, now operates in a 
genuinely Europeanized labour in which players and even spectators cross national borders to 
work or consume sport. Nevertheless, transactionalism encountered criticism in the 1960s 
because despite the increasing communication between Europeans, the sense of a common 
European cultural identity had not emerged. It is reasonable to assume that sport can breach 
the modern gap between the EU and its citizens particularly given that sporting loyalties are 




Initially pioneered by Haas
30
 and later revitalized by Lindberg
31
, neo-functionalism stands as 
a leading theoretical explanation for European integration. Neo-functionalism assigns a 
crucial role to the state or a supranational central organisation within the integration process. 
This in contrast to its forerunner functionalism, which opposed the idea of a territorial 
authority and favoured a universal perspective or functionally based cross-national approach 
towards integration.
32
 For Haas, the central perspective is that economic rationale is the 
source for political integration in a process whereby political actors in several distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a 
new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdictions over the pre-existing national 
states. Haas established neo-functionalism as probably the most recognized, elaborate, 
ambitious as well as criticized theory of European integration.
33
 He described Western Europe 
of the 1950s as a living laboratory in which a wide range of sectors, traditionally under the 
control of nation states, required greater international collaboration. The emergent European 
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Union acted as the ‘agent of integration’ with the integrative dynamics being driven by 
functional and political spill-over. 
 
Functional spill-over refers to situations where ‘policies made pursuant to an initial task can 
only be made real if the task itself is expanded, as reflected in the compromises made among 
the states interested in the task’.
34
 Muttimer characterized this as ‘problems in one area will 
raise problems or require solutions in another’.
35
 Evidence supporting the logic of functional 
spillover was provided by the experience of the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community 
where the realization of the benefits provided by this organisation necessitated a wider, more 
general level of economic integration as embodied in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. More 
recently, proponents of neo-functionalism point to how the economic project of establishing 
the Single European Market, embodied in the Single European Act of 1987, established the 
terrain and drive behind the politically integrationist Maastricht project of 1992. As Pollack 
suggest, ‘the existence, timing and content of Community regulatory policies [such as sport] 
are explicable primarily in terms of functional spillover from the common market’.
36
  Others, 
such as Sandholz and Zysman claim that the Single European Act was only possible due to 
the failing domestic politics of the Member States, the relative decline of the US and the rise 
of Japan. These elements created an environment in which the European Commission could 





Complementing functional spill-over is political spill-over. Political spill-over is based on the 
idea of pluralist democratic societies within Member States that shift their policy making or 
policy influencing attention from focusing on the level of the member states  towards the 
supranational level. These societies consist of actors or interest groups that come to realize 
that the supranational level, as a newly formed institution or political arena, is a better 
medium to pursue their material interests than the previous platform of inter-societal conflicts, 
namely their national institutions or political arenas. Consequently, the loyalty of these groups 
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These twin spill-over effects are self-reinforcing. As competencies in one area are transferred 
to another, new spill-over is triggered and a feedback loop in favour of the integration process 
established. This gives neo-functionalism its teleological character.
39
 It also generates a third 
type of spill-over referred to as cultivated spill-over. Seizing on the force of functional and 
political spill-over, key supranational actors take the lead in supporting further integration. 
Whilst the logic of cultivated spill-over has been applied to the actions of the European 
Commission, less attention has been focused on the role of the European Court of Justice who 
has acted in a judicially active manner to advance economic integration into new fields. 
Burley and Mattli
40
 argue that the ECJ has constitutionalised the Treaty through a process in 
which law has spilled over from purely economic sectors to new (including social) spheres. 
Thus once the principle of freedom of movement had been secured, it became necessary to 
apply it to all economic fields in order to prevent the erosion of the principle. This approach 
provides an apparently persuasive explanation of the ECJ’s judgment in Bosman. 
Furthermore, once the Court decided that sport was as an economic activity and subject to the 
principles of free movement, then the linkage between sport and competition law became 
more likely. A series of high profile sports related competition investigations followed the 
Bosman judgment. Once the application of these areas of law became politically problematic 
in the social and cultural context of sport, further spill-over took place as the Member States 
intervened in order to provide political guidance on the relationship between sport and EU 
law. The hardening of these interventions via the insertion of a sports competence in the 




Neo-functionalism became contested by those who observed that the empirical data 
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contradicted the basic preconditions of this theory.
41
 Intergovernmentalism soon established 
itself as a counterweight to neo-functionalism. Intergovernmentalists criticize the importance 
attributed to the supranational state as a source for igniting regional integration. Within the 
framework of the EU, intergovermentalists are of the opinion that neo-functionalism failed to 
stress the importance of national Member States and the fact that they have continuously tried 
to protect their sovereignty and are at pains to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of 
competencies toward the supranational level.
42
 For Moravcsik, state preferences are 
negotiated and formed at the state level following interaction with societal interest groups. 
Economic interdependence then compels nation states to engage with other states through 
regional organisations such as the EU. The extent to which these state preferences are then 
altered or successfully defended at EU level depends on the states’ bargaining power within 
this organisation.  
 
Intergovernmentalists assert that the Member States only transfer or delegate powers or 
jurisdiction when it aligns with their own interests. Meier describes that Member States may 
be seen as ‘principals’ that transfer limited powers to the supranational level institutions and 
force them to act as their ‘agents’ in order to ensure that all interstate parties are committed to 
the result of their bargaining.
43
 A tool for the prevention of ‘agency drift’ is the fact that 
Member States have the ultimate voice in organizing and regulating the European Union and 
its institutions.
44
 In this connection, Member States retain the ultimate control function that 
can be employed to resist agency drift, Treaty revision. Ultimately, therefore, the Member 




Accompanying the macro theories of European integration is a body of literature seeking to 
understand the day-to-day dynamics driving policy change in the EU. This literature, and its 
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relevance to the debate on policy change within the sporting context, has been explored by 
Houlihan.
45
 Houlihan argues that, traditionally, general policy analysis focused on problem 
identification, agenda setting and policy formulation. This focus depended on the uncritical 
assumption of the separation of fact from value and it drew heavily on a methodological 
framework derived substantially from a neo-positivist and rationalist epistemology, the 
privileging of quantitative methods and the search for generalizable results. When it became 
clear that governments’ intentions combined with financial investments resulting in targeted 
programmes did not lead to the desired result, the attention of policy analysts turned from 
problem identification to a concern to better understand the process of policy implementation. 
Other groupings and actors became more important in the policy process. Instead of a top-
down approach, the bottom-up approach of policy making was stressed including the role of 





Houlihan explored three theoretical frameworks relevant to this thesis: the stage model, 
institutional analysis and the multiple streams framework. His selection of these frameworks 
reflect their illustration of the relationship of policy analysis to changing government 
preoccupations and the debates in the broader social sciences. They are also the most fully 
developed frameworks and they have already stimulated empirical application and critical 
evaluation. Houlihan argued that the frameworks should satisfy four essential criteria. First, 
the frameworks should have the capacity to explain both policy stability and change. For the 
analysis of changing policy in sports this element is essential as policy in sport changes 
rapidly. Houlihan argues that current policy change analysis tends to be expressed in terms of 
the differing weight given to structure, agency and ideas. Second, the framework must have 
the capacity to illuminate a range of aspects of the policy process. Especially in the sports 
sector, there is a need for a holistic approach that examines the inter-relationship between 
actors, aspects and  / or stages. The third criterion is applicability across a range of policy 
areas. Houlihan argues that any framework would benefit from having applicability beyond its 
own policy area. The comparison with other policy areas allows the researcher to acquire a 
better insight in the area under investigation. In addition, the applicability across a wider 
range of areas also allows for the identification and examination of the way in which sport has 
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been influenced by adjacent policy areas. Sport has been affected by activity from other 
policy areas such as health, education and internal market. Finally, Houlihan suggests that in 
order to avoid a mere snapshot of the policy development the framework should cover a range 
of time between 5 and 10 years. This timeframe allows the researcher to distinguish minor 
fluctuations in policy direction from actual change and to identify the significant explanatory 
factors for such change. 
 
The Stages Model 
 
The stages model dominated policy analysis between 1970 and the late 1980s. This model 
divides the policy process into a series of stages following the rational actor model.  The 
framework can be used to research the complete process of policy change but is more often 
used to analyse different segments in the policy process. The nine stages model has been 
introduced by Hogwood and Gunn.
47
 The nine stages are the following: deciding to decide 
(agenda setting), issue filtration (deciding how to decide); issue definition, forecasting, setting 
objectives and priorities, options analysis, policy implementations, evaluation and review, and 
policy maintenance, succession or termination. The stages model has been used in a number 




  and evaluation.
50
 
Houlihan employs the stages model in his research into public policy responses to football 
hooliganism in England and doping in Britain (1990, 1991). The major criticism of Hogwood 
and Gunn’s framework is its inability to map the policy process in detail. It goes beyond the 
fact of why an issue reaches an agenda and does not take the economic and political forces 
into consideration that compel governments or policymakers to act. Houlihan presents five 
criticisms of the stages model. First, the framework is too descriptive and does not provide a 
causal explanation. Second, it is inaccurate in its description insofar as it fails to capture the 
‘messiness of policy-making’
51
 and it implies a false degree of rationality in the policy 
process. Third, it has a top-down bias and often focuses on legislation rather than other forms 
of policy-making. Fourth, it theorizes parts of the policy process rather than the process as a 
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whole. Finally, it is too simplistic in its image of policy-making as a neatly sequential and 
linear or cyclical process.  
 
In relation to the adequacy of the stages model as a research framework for sports policy 
analysis, Houlihan argues that the framework is weak in its explanation of stability and 
change due to its failure to illuminate the underlying power relations that underpin the policy 
process. It is also weak in identifying patterns of policy making and agenda setting as it is 
more focused on capturing particular moments in the policy process. Despite of its ability to 
be applied to a cross range of policy areas, Houlihan is not convinced of the stages model as a 
suitable framework for sports policy research. 
 
This makes the stages model less suitable for application in this thesis. Here the focus is 
placed on actor activity leading to a stage and less on actor activity in a particular stage. The 
entire process leading to a particular stage, or from one stage to another (from the creation of 
the Social Dialogue Committee to the conclusion of an Autonomous Agreement) is of interest 
for the research. Also, the policy process in professional sports on the level of the EU is, due 
to the complex relation of governance interdependency and hierarchy of law, less linear than 




Due to the growing dissatisfaction with top-down models of policy analysis which adopt a 
strict focus on governments, policy analysts began to turn their attention towards the role of 
institutions in the policy process. According to Thelen and Steinmo,
52
 institutions shape how 
political actors define their interests and structure their relations of powers to other groups. 
Institutions are defined in two ways with reference often made in the literature to ‘old’ and 
‘new’ institutionalism.
53
 Old institutionalism stresses the formal administrative, legal and 
political dimensions of organisations. From this perspective, institutions are easily identifiable 
as physical entities such as agencies, departments, parliaments and so forth. Institutions 
impose constraints on actors and thus play an important role in either advancing policy 
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change or policy inertia. This is because institutions as organisational entities structure the 
rules of the policy making game. For example, formal decision making rules operating within 
the EU, such as qualified majority voting, impose constraints on how policy can be amended. 
Similarly, the EC Treaty confers certain competencies to the EU institutions and they may 
only act within the confines of those competencies. Until the entering into force of the 2009 
Lisbon Treaty, the EU did not possess a competence to develop a sports policy. Consequently, 
the EU’s influence on sport was indirect, coming by way of the application of established 
Treaty competencies such as free movement and competition laws to sporting contexts.
54
 
These institutional ‘rules of the game’ clearly affect the choices and strategies of actors 
wishing to pursue their policy agenda. 
 
Alternatively, from a new institutionalist perspective, institutions can be conceived of as 
cultural constructions possessing not only formal rules and procedures but also their own 
values, norms and beliefs. Armstrong and Bulmer 
55
 identify two schools within the new 
institutional literature. Rational choice new institutionalism stresses how institutions constrain 
or empower actors and affect their choice of action. By contrast historical new 
institutionalism asserts that the historical culture of an organisation can significantly affect 
policy choices. For example, whilst the EU may possess the formal decision making rule of  
qualified majority voting in the Council, an informal culture of unanimity may render this 
formal requirement less influential and result in policy becoming ‘path-dependent’ or ‘locked 
in’.
56
     
 
In sports policy research institutionalism can demonstrate a growing track record of 
application. In relation to the organisational infrastructure of UK sport acting as a significant 
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variable in shaping policy, Houlihan
57













Houlihan considers institutional analyses to have a number of clear strengths when applied as 
a framework for policy change analysis in sport.
63
 First, it draws attention to the behaviour of 
both actors and the structures within which they operate. Second, it does not ignore the role 
and significance of state institutions in the policy process. Third, the framework can be 
applied to a wide number of policy areas. However, Houlihan identifies the fact that 
institutional analysis is limited in the ability to explain stability and change and that it is 
limited in the capacity of illuminating a range of aspects of the policy process due to its focus 
on structure over agency. Houlihan concludes his assessment of the framework by stating that 
at best the framework is under theorized and at worst that it privileges institutions on the basis 
of weak evidence. 
 
Multiple Streams Framework 
 
Kingdon’s multiple streams framework has been widely employed in policy studies generally 
although it has received little attention with sports policy studies. Chalip
64
 used the 
framework as an element in researching New Zealand sport policy and Bergsgard
65
 analysed 
decision making in Norwegian sport. Kingdon employs the concept of a ‘stream’ to explain 
the processes involved in agenda setting.
66
 The problem stream is composed of indicators that 
demonstrate the existence of the problem, focusing events that call attention to the problem, 
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and feedback usually in the form of public opinion on existing programmes. The policy 
stream is composed of specialists in a given policy area, such as interest group experts, career 
bureaucrats, academics, staffers, or policy advocates, such as citizen advocates, who have an 
increased awareness of the problem and are striving for a solution. Potential solutions and 
alternatives to the problem emerge from this stream. Finally, the politics stream refers to the 
arena in which issues reach the agenda and decisions are potentially taken. It refers to the 
wider political environment of elections, government changes and public opinion. 
Occasionally, the streams align to allow a policy window to open. Policy change takes place 
within this window. 
 
Kingdon’s model has relevance for our understanding of EU sports regulation generally and 
issues of Social Dialogue specifically. The wider ‘problem’ with EU sports regulation centres 
on perceptions that EC law is not sports sensitive and this is having negative consequences for 
sport. Within the policy stream float possible solutions such as making wider use of the 
sporting exception in EC law, recognizing wider objective justifications for prima facie 
restrictive rules, making wider use of Article 81(3) and even granting sport an exemption 
from EU law through a Treaty revision. The two streams cannot necessarily be coupled unless 
there is movement in the politics stream. The Bosman judgment established the issue of sports 
regulation as an issue of high public salience. Two years following Bosman an 
intergovernmental conference met to discuss Treaty revision. Thus a policy window opened, 
the result of which saw the Amsterdam Declaration on the social significance of sport 
adopted. This established a political agenda on the question of how to safeguard the 
specificity of sport within the EU’s legal order. This agenda ultimately led to the Lisbon 




Applying Kingdon’s model to the Social Dialogue takes a similar form. First is the problem. 
Issues previously resolved by the sporting stakeholders themselves were instead reaching the 
courts and thus contributing to legal uncertainty in the sector. The private regulations of sports 
bodies were being challenged by litigants who cited inconsistencies with national and EU law.  
Furthermore, some stakeholders became dissatisfied with their representation within the sport 
and sought to challenge existing governance structures through recourse to the courts. Second, 
a range of policy solutions emerged including the possible use of a structured Social Dialogue 
                                                 
67
 Article 165 TFEU. 
 
 32 
facilitated by the EC Treaty to bring together representatives of clubs and players in order to 
create greater legal certainty between the stakeholders and remedy the perceived lack of 
democratic representation with prevailing governance structures. The politics stream arguably 
assists the establishment of a Social Dialogue. Since 1997, the Treaty has allowed for such 
developments, culturally the desire to see harmonious labour relations is rooted in European 
society, Social Dialogue in sport has official support from within the European Commission 
and employers and employees (clubs and players) are recognizing the potential benefits of 
Social Dialogue. Therefore a policy window may be opening in which Social Dialogue can 
lead to policy change within professional sport in Europe.  
 
Kingdon’s main contribution is his focus on the power of ideas and the focus on how 
solutions ‘search’ for problems rather than the focus on pressure and influence. Hence given 
certain propitious conditions, solutions within an organisation are joined to problems. The 
opening of a policy window increases the likelihood that the ‘solution’ will be adopted. 
Although appealing, Kingdon puts ‘too much distance between the policy and the political 
stream’.
68
 He therefore de-emphasizes the crucial role played by competing policy advocates 
and as such his work lacks an advocacy analysis. Sabatier’s ACF is an attempt to view 
Kingdon’s ‘streams’ as more closely related. Kingdon’s work also lacks an institutional 
analysis. Kingdon does note that ‘institutions, constitutions, procedures, governmental 
structures, and government officials themselves affect the political, social, and economic 
system as much as the other way around’.
69
 Furthermore, Kingdon notes that ‘federalism also 
enhances possibilities for innovation - if a new idea isn’t possible in one venue, it might be 
possible in another, and entrepreneurs can shop around for the most favourable venue’.
70
 
Kingdon’s work therefore reflects an old institutionalist tradition and perhaps pays 
insufficient attention to the insights offered by new institutionalism.  
The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 
From a pluralist perspective power within society is dispersed among interest groups who 
compete for the ear of the government. The government is either considered a neutral 
powerbroker in this process or, as we have seen above, a non-neutral actor with its own 
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objectives, privileging some groups within the policy process over others. The realities of the 
policy process tend to suggest that access to the decision makers is not as open as ideal type 
pluralist accounts suggest. For example, well resourced (economically, politically or in terms 
of knowledge) interest groups are advantaged. Houlihan
71
 (1991, 1997) recommends the 
policy communities approach as one such pluralist model which assists our understanding of 
UK sports policy. This approach asserts that sports policy is discussed within the context of a 
policy community. Such a community is constructed around a network of actors (including 
governmental officials and interest groups). The officials are the source of sports policy whilst 
the interest groups wish to influence it. A policy network implies a symbiotic relationship 
between these two players. In other words the decision maker needs the interest group for 
advice in order to produce better policy and the interest group needs influence in order to 
benefit from the eventual policy outcome. This approach therefore implies that policy 
emerges from bargaining between the parties rather than imposition by the state. 
Nevertheless, some policy areas are controlled by ‘insider’ groups at the expense of groups 
excluded (outsider groups). The status of ‘insider group’ being conferred on an interest group 
is increased if that group is well resourced in terms of the knowledge they bring to the 
network (as well as their finances). The experience of sports policy in the UK suggests that 
the sports policy community may have held tight control over some areas such as avoiding 
much statutory regulation of their activities. However, in other areas the sports policy 
community lacks cohesion. For example, Houlihan 
72
 examined conflict within the sports 
policy community over hooliganism, drug use and school-aged sport.  
 
Rather than focusing on stable networks of actors, Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF) places more emphasis on competition between actors who operate, not within one 
particular venue, but within a policy subsystem.
73
 These advocacy coalitions develop 
strategies to translate their beliefs into public policy. An important aspect of this is the ability 
of one group to topple the supremacy of another within the subsystem. By doing so, they can 
redirect public policy in a direction more favourable with their beliefs. Sabatier’s framework 
is based on three core basic premises.
74
 First, understanding the process of policy change 
requires a time perspective of a decade or more. Second, the most useful unit of analysis for 
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understanding  is to focus on activity within ‘policy subsystems’, these being created by the 
interaction of actors from different institutions interested in a policy area and seeking to 
influence policy in that given area. Third, that public policies can be conceptualized in the 
same manner as belief systems, i.e. as sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about 




The focus on the aggregation of interests within coalitions operating within policy subsystems 
is perhaps Sabatier’s main contribution. Sabatier argues that usually policy subsystems are 
composed of between two and four advocacy coalitions, each composed of actors from 
various governmental and private organisations who share a set of normative and casual 
beliefs and engage in a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time.
76
 Each coalition 
attempts to direct policy in a direction consistent with their belief system. These belief 
systems are structured into: deep core beliefs, which are basic values and convictions of 
coalitions and are less suitable for serving as a basis for compromise with other coalitions 
with differing deep core beliefs; policy core beliefs which consist of the strategies and 
preferences that are needed to translate the deep core beliefs into feasible policy initiatives; 
and secondary policy core beliefs, which are narrower beliefs concerning, for example, the 




By strategically using available resources, coalitions adopt various strategies in an attempt to 
influence and change policy in multiple venues. Weible states that actors often ‘venue shop’, 
looking for institutional access where they might have a competitive advantage.
78
 These 
venues include elections, decisions by executive bodies, votes in Parliament or litigation. 
Sabatier and Weible
79
 identify a set of resources available to actors: 
 
Access to legal authority to make policy decisions: Some coalitions may contain insider 
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members who are in positions of formal authority. If so, the coalition’s direct access to 
decision makers becomes a valuable resource.  
 
Public opinion: Coalitions can use positive opinion polls to their advantage, particularly as it 
increases the legitimacy of their cause.   
 
Information: Information is a key resource for coalitions as it provides an evidence base to 
counter the arguments of their competitors, a means of convincing decision-makers of the 
validity of their cause and a resource to influence public opinion. Knowledge of, for example, 
the political or legal process also makes for efficient and effective strategies.  
 
Mobilizable troops: Advocacy coalition’s will attempt to mobilize public support and expand 
the conflict as a means of imparting pressure of decision-makers to change policy. The use of 
the public, for example to write letters, raise funds or protest, is common among those 
coalitions who are under-resourced in financial terms. 
 
Financial resources: Clearly, a coalition that is well financed will stand a better chance of 
influencing policy than one who is not. Money is important as it can be used to acquire other 
resources, such as influence and research.   
 
Skillful leadership: Of critical importance to any coalition is the question of leadership. Whilst 
factors external to the subsystem can open a window of policy change, this opportunity can go 
unexploited if a coalition lacks leadership skills. Coalition leaders also articulate the belief 
system for other coalition members, thus helping to unit those members behind a common 
cause. They also play an important role in attracting additional resources to the coalition and 
they help define the most appropriate strategy to adopt and which institutional venue to 
exploit. 
 
Conflicting strategies from various coalitions are mediated by ‘policy brokers’ whose main 
concern is to find a reasonable compromise that will reduce conflict.
80
 The ACF predicts two 
precursors to major policy change: changes in beliefs of a dominant coalition or changes in 
available resources and venues. These are brought about by external shocks, policy-oriented 
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learning or a hurting stalemate. External shocks are events that take place outside the 
subsystem but which have the potential to affect policy within it, by altering the balance of 
resources within the subsystem, altering prevailing belief systems with a coalition or by 
opening or closing venues through which coalition strategies can be pursued. Examples of 
external shocks include major socio-economic changes such as economic recession or the rise 
of social movements; changes in public opinion; changes in the systemic governing coalition; 
and policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems.
81
   
 
Policy-oriented learning refers to ‘relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioural 
intentions that result from experience and/or new information that are concerned with the 
attainment or revision of policy objectives’.
82
 Such learning informs and can alter the belief 
system of a coalition.  
 
The third source of policy change is a scenario when ‘all major coalitions view a continuation 
of the current situation as unacceptable, they may be willing to enter negotiations in the hope 
of finding a compromise that is viewed by everyone as superior to the status quo’.
83
 This state 
of ‘hurting stalemate’ implies that each coalition has the ability to impose unacceptable costs 
on one another.
84
 Sabatier outlines the conditions for such a successful negotiated settlement. 
These are: (a) a stalemate wherein all coalitions view a continuation of the status quo as 
unacceptable; (b) the negotiations are conducted in private and last for a period of at least six 
months and; (c) there is a facilitator (policy broker) respected by all parties and viewed by 
them as relatively neutral.
85
 Sabatier refers to the outcome of this negotiation, not as a victory 
for coalition over another, but as a ‘power sharing’ arrangement among the coalitions.
86
 This 
arrangement will be sustainable if the parties to it consider the distribution of the benefits to 
be fair and if old coalition leaders are replaced by new blood.
87
  Within the context of EU 
sports regulation, it is observable that a number of venues have been promoted as source of 
this reconciliation including the staging of the European Sports Forum, the use of stakeholder 
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conference and public consultation exercises and even the creation by the sports movement of 
a ‘sports court’ – the Swiss based Court of Arbitration for Sport. The establishment of a 
Social Dialogue committee for professional football can also be seen in this light.  
 
The ACF has been applied to a large number of case studies.
88
 Its value lies in the emphasis it 
places on the subsystem as the essential unit of analysis and focus on the power of beliefs and 
strategic maneuvering by actors within the subsystem. It also highlights the circumstances in 
which rival coalitions compromise with each other in order to negotiate a mutually acceptable 
settlement. Nevertheless, as Schlager notes, the ACF does not explain ‘why actors holding 
similar beliefs form coalitions to collectively press their goals’ .
89
 In other words, what 
incentives are there for actors to act collectively when they can benefit from the efforts of 
others without having to pay their associated costs.  
 
Its sports related application remains limited. Green and Houlihan’s account of elite 
swimming and track and field athletics is one such example of a sports specific application of 
the ACF.
90
 The authors identify the emergence of such an advocacy coalition in UK 
swimming and athletics with the role of UK Sport and the growing dependency by the sports 
governing bodies on lottery funding being two key issues. A much weaker advocacy coalition 
is taking shape in recreational sport due to its limited access to funding. Therefore whilst a 
desire to shift governmental priorities and access funding may promote the growth of 
advocacy coalitions in the UK, in the EU the emergence of rival coalitions has been more 
associated with attempts to secure a regulatory environment consistent with the coalition’s 
beliefs.
91
 This reflects the regulatory as opposed to distributive nature of EU sports policy.  
 
Whilst Parrish’s description of the EU’s sports policy subsystem certainly informs the 
framework adopted in this thesis, his work is in need of an update. The sports policy 
subsystem presented by Parrish in 2003 has changed significantly in recent years. 
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First, the composition of the subsystem has changed with a number of new organisations 
emerging which have altered the balance of power within the subsystem. For example, in 
2008 the European Club Association was formed to replace the G14.   
 
Second, the range of available institutional venues for the coalitions to exploit has expanded. 
Major developments since 2003 include the 2006 European Court of Justice judgment in 
Meca-Medina, the first sports related competition law judgment of Court. In 2007 the 
European Commission published the White Paper on Sport and in 2009, the Lisbon Treaty 
entered into force which for the first time in December 2009 which established sport as a 
competence of the EU. 
 
Third, the subsystem has greatly matured since 2003 and evidence suggests that subsystem 
activity has contributed to legal uncertainty and the onset of a position resembling a hurting 
stalemate.   
 
Fourth, Parrish’s 2003 study did not assess the significance of Social Dialogue for sports 
regulation which at the time was not considered a viable option given the lack of a 
representative employer association to represent the interests of professional football clubs.  
 
Therefore, the framework that will be used for further analysis departs from Parrish’s 2003 





This chapter has provided an overview of macro and micro theoretical approaches to 
European integration. The macro approaches help to understand the bigger picture of the 
evolution of sport policy into a topic on the European agenda. The description of the 
Communications theory allows us to understand the efforts that have been made by the 
European institutions, such as the Council and the Parliament, to involve sport in the 
European Union’s field of policy making powers. This occurred mainly to create enthusiasm 
for a bigger unity in Europe. This approach has lost significance in relation to the evolution of 




It is this spill-over effect, characteristic for neo-functionalism, that has ignited other policy 
areas to influence sport. When sport is an economic activity the European Commission was 
able to exercise powers that were initially designed to shape other areas. The influence of the 
EU on sport raises issues when provisions on free movement and competition law become a 
reality in sport. As a consequence the sports governing bodies defend their autonomy by 
claiming their mandate for regulation on the basis of the protection of the specificity of sport. 
Neo-functionalism can also be connected to the evolution of EU labour law; economic 
integration spill-over to the social field, eventually leading to the creation of social partner 
participation in legislative initiatives by means of the European Social Dialogue. 
 
The interdependence between societal interest groups makes an intergovernmentalist 
approach useful for analyzing policy change. However, for research in the professional sports 
sector it is less relevant. As regards to the topic of the thesis there are little connections to 
activity that sources on the national level of the Member States with decisive impact on policy 
change on the supra level of the EU. On the contrary, it is the impact from an EU approach 
that has lead to actor activity and advocacy coalitions based on opposite beliefs. Hence, the 
impact of EU law has created legal uncertainty and has divided the sport sector in two 
different coalitions, striving for policy change in their desired direction. 
 
The focus on the actors and their role in the complex nature shifts the focus to micro 
integration theories. Institutional analysis focuses on the organisational structures and their 
impact on policy. As regards the thesis it can be argued that the role of the Commission in 
allowing social partner to participate in Social Dialogue if they meet certain criteria, has an 
impact from an institutional perspective. The stages model may also be of assistance in 
defining actor activity and policy influence on the level of one specific stage in policy 
making. However, the most suitable micro theories for the topic of research is the multiple 
streams framework of Kingdon and the ACF of Sabatier. 
 
Kingdon describes how policy problems originate, how these problems assess various types of 
solutions and, finally, how one policy window is open for the specific type of solution. This 
could be the route that the Social Dialogue may follow for topics that are being analysed in 
the thesis. By adding the ACF to this approach a more complete theory comes to the surface. 
A theory that places particular attention to actor activity. The combination of these theories is 
to be found in the method in which Parrish researches EU sports policy. His approach is 
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therefore applied and further elaborated because the changes in the regulatory landscape of 
professional football will be applied.  
 
In the following Chapter the application of EU law on sport shall be examined. It will be 
argued that the relation between the EU regulatory framework, based on EU competences, has 
left the sports movement in doubt about the boundaries of its autonomy. The search for legal 































Application of European Union Law to Sport 
Sport and the EU Treaty 
 
Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 7 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) stipulate that the institutions of the European Union can only act 
in accordance with the powers that are conferred upon by the Treaty. Treaty provisions have 
direct effect and are the source for the creation of secondary legislation, such as Directives 
and Regulations.  Article 2 of the TFEU sets out a three tier system of competences. Exclusive 
competences are those reserved exclusively for the EU. Member State action in these areas is 
only permitted if so empowered by the Union. The exclusive competences of the EU are the 
customs union; the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market; monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro; the 
conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy; and the 
common commercial policy.
92
 Shared competences are those shared between the Union and 
the Member States. The Union and the Member States can legislate and adopt legally binding 
acts in the shared areas of the internal market; social policy; economic, social and territorial 
cohesion; agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources; 
environment; consumer protection; transport; trans-European networks; energy; the area of 
freedom, security and justice; and common safety concerns in public health matters.
93
 In 
certain other areas, the Union only possesses the supporting competence to carry out actions 
to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States, without thereby 
superseding their competence in these areas. Legally binding acts of the Union adopted on the 
basis of supporting measures are not permitted to entail the harmonisation of Member States’ 
laws or regulations. The supporting competences are: the protection and improvement of 
human health; industry; culture; tourism; education, vocational training, youth and sport; civil 
protection; and administrative cooperation.
94
   
 
The sports competence is a new addition to the EU’s powers, granted by way of Article 165 
entering into force in 2009 following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Prior to that, the 
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EU did not possess the competence to develop a sports policy. Article 165(1) TFEU suggests 
that ‘The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking 
account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social 
and educational function’. Article 165(2) states that ‘Union action shall be aimed at: 
developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting 
competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the 
physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially the youngest 
sportsmen and sportswomen’. Article 165(3) states that ‘The Union and the Member States 
shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in 
the field of education and sport, in particular the Council of Europe’. Finally, Article 165(4) 
permits the EU institutions to adopt incentive measures and recommendations, excluding any 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’. 
 
The entry into force of Article 165 TFEU was welcomed by sports governing bodies who 
considered that it corrected the historic bias evident in successive EU Treaties towards 
economic integration. This bias, it was claimed, had the effect of subjecting sporting practices 
to other Treaty competencies that were not originally designed to be applicable to sport.  
 
The governing bodies of football claimed that this had the effect of undermining the 
autonomy and specificity of sport. Article 165, it is now argued, acts as a reminder to the 
Court of Justice of the EU and the European Commission that the specific nature of sport 
should be taken into account in the application of other Treaty competences. Of particular 
concern to the football authorities was the current and future impact on sport of the 
application of existing Treaty provisions on non-discrimination, citizenship rights, the right of 
freedom of movement for workers and competition law.    
 
Non-Discrimination and Freedom of Movement Rules 
 
The non-discrimination principle is enshrined in what is now Article 18 TFEU. It states that 
‘Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special 
provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited’. Article 20 TFEU suggests that ‘Every person holding the nationality of a Member 
State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not 
 
 43 
replace national citizenship’. According to Article 20, EU citizens have ‘the right to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States’. This right is given specific expression 
for workers in Article 45 TFEU. It argues that ‘Such freedom of movement shall entail the 
abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as 
regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment’. Article 
45(3) details a right, subject to limitations ‘justified on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health’ to ‘(a) to accept offers of employment actually made; (b) to move 
freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose; (c) to stay in a Member State for 
the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of 
nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or administrative action; (d) to remain in 
the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions 
which shall be embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the Commission. Article 45(4) 
provides that the provisions of the Article do not apply to employment in the public service. 
 
Article 49 TFEU governs the freedom of establishment. It argues that ‘Within the framework 
of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a 
Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited’. Freedom of 
establishment includes the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and 
to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms. Article 56 TFEU 
governs the freedom to provide services. It states that ‘restrictions on freedom to provide 
services within the Union shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are 
established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are 
intended’.  
 
Collectively, Articles 45, 49 and 56 are known as the ‘free movement rules’. When applying 
these rules to sport a number of elements must be satisfied. First, an individual can rely on EU 
free movement law as the Treaty provisions have a direct, vertical as well as horizontal 
effect.
95
 Rules concerning free movement are applicable when a citizen or party challenges a 
law or act of a public authority but there exists also an extension to rules of sports governing 
bodies such as the FIFA regulations on the status and transfer of players. Challenges can be 
heard before the European Courts but also before national courts via the preliminary reference 
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procedure of Treaty Article 267 under which national courts can seek guidance from the 
European Court on the interpretation of the free movement rules.  
 
The second element concerns the definition of a worker and the extent of the applicability of 
the free movement rules to athletes in sport. Under CJEU jurisprudence the term ‘worker’ is a 
matter to be defined by EU law and it means someone who performs services for and under 
the direction of another in return for remuneration during a certain period of time.
96
 This 
definition therefore includes professional and semi-professional athletes who perform their 
duties for (in)direct remuneration. Not only athletes that work under an employment contract, 
as is usual in the majority of European team sports, but also athletes that are considered to be 
amateurs according to sports governing bodies regulations or national laws, fall under the EU 
provisions for workers or services. Such was the case for judoka Deliége who carried out her 
sport while financed by grants and sponsorship income.
97
 The main element in the decision 
concerning the application of free movement rules is if the activity is economic in nature. In 
addition to this definitional issue of the term ‘worker’ one can add the element concerning the 
geographical scope of the free movement legislation. The EU has entered into bilateral 
agreements with a number of third countries. These agreements, mainly partnership 
agreements, association agreements or cooperation agreements, may contain non-
discriminatory provisions that are applicable to non-EU nationals when these individuals 





In order to clarify whether a sporting rule is in breach of the free movement rules in the 
Treaty a consistent EU methodology must be applied. The checklist first consists of 
examining if the rule laid down by a sport governing body constitutes a restriction of free 
movement. Second, it must be established if, under the specific individual condition, the 
contested rule is justifiable and proportionate. With regards the first question, it needs to be 
said that certain rules do not fall under the application of free movement rules to sport. Due to 
specific sporting interests inherent to the sport, certain rules may be incapable of being 
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defined as a restriction and they therefore fall outside the scope of the application of the 
Treaty
99
. The overview of case law will be illustrated in the following.  
 
Sporting rules that do engage the Treaty are not necessarily incompatible with it. The 
European Court has consistently held that direct discrimination in sport is forbidden and may 
only be justified on the grounds of public policy, public security and public health. However, 
in relation to rules that in principle have an indirect discriminatory effect, relief from the full 
application of the EU free movement rules is also possible. In O’Flynn the Court of Justice 
defined indirect discrimination as rules which, although applicable irrespective of nationality, 
only affect migrant workers, or the great majority of those affected are migrant workers, and 
which are indistinctly applicable but can more easily be satisfied by national workers than by 
migrant workers, or where there is a risk that they may operate to the particular detriment of 
migrant workers.
100
 As is outlined in the review of the case law below, the European Court 
has recognised that indirectly, or non-discriminatory, rules that restrict a workers freedom of 
movement can, subject to a proportionality check, enjoy open ended objective justification. 
The proportionality test seeks to verify that the contested rule is an adequate method of 
achieving a result without the possibility that less restrictive rules would be able to reach the 




Competition law is the instrument that safeguards the well-functioning of an efficient Single 
Market on the territory of the Union with equal opportunities for all undertakings operating in 
that market. The competition provisions in the EU Treaty are located in Article 101, 102 and 
107 TFEU. Article 101(1) provides that, ‘The following shall be prohibited as incompatible 
with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between member states and 
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the common market’. Article 101(3) allows for an exemption system to operate 
meaning that rules amounting to a restriction under Article 101(1) can be exempt from that 
provision if the agreement or concerted practice contributes to improving the production or 
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distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not impose on the 
undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these 
objectives and afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect 
of a substantial part of the products in question.  
 
Article 102 TFEU regulates the abuse of dominant market positions by providing that ‘Any 
abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it 
may affect trade between member states. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) directly 
or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) 
limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) 
applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; making the conclusion of contracts subject to 
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts’. A 
sporting association may hold a dominant position directly or through its members. A direct 
dominance is a likely situation because sports associations in the European Union hold a 
practical monopoly due to the structure of European Sports – in other words global and 
regional sports federations often hold a monopoly position in relation to the organisation and 
regulation of their sport.
101
 Clubs might also abuse a dominant position whenever they co-
ordinate activities amongst themselves. Other elements that need to be considered are the 
nature of substitutability and the geographical market. A specific sports discipline is not easy 
to be substituted by another. 
 
The state aid prohibitions are contained in Article 107 TFEU. These provide that ‘Save as 
otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects 
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market’. Article 107 has 
implications for sport if a state fund is directly used to benefit the sports organisation vis à vis 
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their competitors. State aid use for purely cultural, social, educational, public health or 




The application of Articles 101 and 102 to sport needs to respect some elements. The first 
element that needs to be considered is the application of the term ‘undertaking’ to the sports 
sector. The CJEU has defined an ‘undertaking’ as “every entity engaged in economic activity, 
regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed”.
103
 Inherent to 
this definition is the term economic activity which entails “offering goods or services on the 
market”.
104
 The aforementioned definitions indicate that a variety of actors in the sports sector 
may be considered as acting under EU law. This includes individual athletes (even if they are 
employees but, for example, enter into independent sponsoring agreements), sport clubs, 
national sports associations and international sports governing bodies (as an association of 
undertakings). As regards economic activity it has to be tested if the activity, in which a sports 
organisation is engaged consists of agreements of an economic nature. Since certain sport 
rules are not able to create a restriction of competition as they are of purely sporting interest 




However, and as discussed later, in Meca-Medina the Court stated that, “it is apparent that the 
mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing from the 
scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body 
which has laid it down”.
106
 The Court added that “if the sporting activity in question falls 
within the scope of the Treaty, the conditions for engaging in it are then subject to all the 
obligations which result from the various provisions of the Treaty. It follows that the rules 
which govern that activity must satisfy the requirements of those provisions, which, in 
particular, seek to ensure freedom of movement for workers, freedom of establishment, 
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freedom to provide services, or competition”.
107
 However, the Court found that the contested 
rule in question (anti-doping rules) still did not amount to a restriction because of the inherent 
connection between the rule and securing the legitimate objectives of ensuring fair 
competition.
108
 Competition law must also take account of the definition of the market in 
which a restriction on competition is identified. The restriction must have an appreciable 
effect on the relevant EU market, and the broader the definition of the market the less likely it 
will be that competition is restricted. 
 
In the 2007 White Paper on Sport, the European Commission presented a four-step approach 
to considering whether contested sporting rules fall foul of EU competition rules.
109
 First, is 
the sport organisation an undertaking or an association of undertakings and does it carry out 
an economic activity? Second, does the rule in questions restrict competition under Article 
101 or does it amount to an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102? The Commission 
argues that answering this question depends on the overall context of the rule and its 
objectives, whether the restrictions caused by the rule are inherent and whether the rule is 
proportionate in the light of the objective pursued. Third, is trade between Member States 
affected? Finally, can an exemption under Article 101(3) be granted?  
 
Free Movement Cases: The Sports Related Jurisprudence of the CJEU 
Walrave and Koch110 
 
The first sports judgment of the European Court of Justice was the landmark case of Walrave 
and Koch in 1974. Two Dutch nationals were the pacemakers on mopeds for cyclists who 
participated in cycling championships. The pacemakers were not of the same nationality as 
the cyclists, although they did form one team. They were denied the opportunity to participate 
in international tournaments on the basis of their nationality, leading to a complaint being 
lodged before a national court. The national court referred the matter to the European Court. 
In its ruling the court confirmed that sporting rules are subject to EU law in so far as the 
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sports discipline constitutes an economic activity.
111
 It added that the prohibition of 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality does not apply to rules of ‘purely sporting 
interest’.
112
 The Court also developed the principle that not only public authorities but also 
sports governing bodies may fall under the application of Treaty provisions when they govern 




Donà and Mantero114 
 
Shortly after Walrave, Donà concerned nationality discrimination in Italian football. The 
Court repeated the Walrave rule that any discrimination on the basis of nationality with regard 
to employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment as well as the 
freedom to provide services was prohibited. The contested rule of the Italian football 
federation was a prohibition of the participation of athletes who were not affiliated to the 
Italian federation. This discriminated against non-Italian nationals. An important addition to 
the Walrave judgment was that the Court recognised that rules that did restrict the 
employment of EU nationals could be allowed if the reason for the rule was not economic but 
related to issues of sporting interest only. 
 
Union Royale Belge Sociétés de Football Association and others v Bosman and 
others115 
 
The Bosman judgment is widely considered the landmark sports case of the European Court. 
Bosman played professional football for a Belgian club. After the expiry of his employment 
contract the club offered him a new contract with far less favourable terms. Bosman declined 
the contract offer. The player wished to move to a French club. However for this to take 
effect, the French club was required under the existing transfer rules to pay a transfer fee to 
the transferring club even though the player was no longer contracted to his former club. 
Bosman challenged this transfer system on the grounds that his freedom of movement was 
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impeded as a consequence of the transfer rules in force. He also challenged the rule that 
restricted the participation of non-nationals in football teams entering UEFA European 
competitions. The Court reiterated that sport is subject to EU law in so far as it amounts to an 
economic activity.  
 
The Court adopted a forthright view on the application of Article 45 (then 48 EC) to the two 
contested rules. Rejecting the arguments presented by UEFA, the Court found that players 
could no longer be discriminated against on the grounds of their nationality and clubs could 
no longer demand a transfer fee for a player who was no longer under contract with his club. 
However, the Court did acknowledge that sport was different to other industries by finding 
that ‘in view of the considerable social importance of sporting activities and in particular 
football in the Community, the aims of maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a 
certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results and of encouraging the recruitment and 




Lehtonen and Castors Braine117 
 
In 2000 the Court of Justice handed down its judgment in Lehtonen, a case concerning a 
basketball player from Finland, registered with a Finnish club, who transferred to a basketball 
team in Belgium. This transfer took place after a transfer deadline that was by the Belgian 
basketball association. Player transfers after such a deadline were prohibited from taking part 
in official games. Lehtonen’s club refused to field him on the basis of the regulations. 
However, he received a fixed monthly remuneration and bonuses and was therefore 
considered to be a worker performing economic activity. The Court observed that the transfer 
window operated as a restriction to a workers’ freedom of movement in so far as it limited the 
time a player could seek alternative employment in another Member state. However, it went 
on to find that late season transfers could substantially alter the sporting strength of teams in 
the course of the championship thus calling into question the proper functioning of sporting 
competition.
118
 Non-discriminatory transfer windows could, therefore, be justified on these 
grounds as long as the measure remained proportionate to this aim.  
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Deliège v Ligue francophone de Judo et disciplines Associeés Asb119 
 
In Deliège, the Court ruled on the compatibility of selection criteria of an international judo 
association in international tournaments. The participation in the tournament was restricted to 
a limited number of participants per participating country. Deliège, a Belgian judoka, 
contested the rule as she was not allowed to participate. She considered the rule to be contrary 
to one of the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty, namely, the freedom to provide services. 
She argued that, even if she was not carrying out her sport under the employment contract, 
she still fell under the scope of the Treaty because she was carrying out an economic activity 
as she was remunerated for her efforts and her activity was genuine and effective and could 
not be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary. 
 
In this case the Court widened the scope of sporting activities that fall under the Treaty’s 
fundamental freedoms. Amateur sport is an economic activity in so far as the activity involves 
competition organisers, broadcasters, sponsors and viewers. These actors create supply and 
demand and the key participants such as the athletes carry out an economic activity in that 
sense. However, the Court also recognised the natural task of sports governing bodies in 
selecting the participants for international tournaments. The Court argued that governing 
bodies have the knowledge and experience to do so and it is one of the fundamental aspects of 
their existence.
120
 In addition, the Court stated that the selection rules for international 
competitions may not in themselves be regarded as constituting a restriction on the freedom to 
provide services because the selection of athletes derives from a need inherent in the 
organisation of the sport.
121
 If rules are inherent for the conduct of an international high-level 
sports event they do not impose restrictions.  
 
Kolpak and Simutenkov122  
 
The Kolpak and Simutenkov cases deal with the employment of non-EU nationals on the 
territory of the EU that fall under the scope of a EU partnership agreement. In both cases the 
                                                 
119
 Déliege v LFJ et Disciplines ASBL (Case 51/96 and 191/97) [2000] ECR I-2549. 
120
 Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège, par. 68. 
121
 Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège, par. 69. 
122
 Case C-438/00 Kolpak , Case C-265/03 Simutenkov.  
 
 52 
European Court held that if the worker is legally employed he may not be discriminated as 
regards EU nationals in a similar working condition. 
 
In Kolpak, a Slovak national played professional handball with the German handball team 
TSV Ostringen. The player, Maros Kolpak, had agreed a valid fixed-term employment 
contract with the club for which he received a monthly salary and had a valid work permit 
Because the Slovak Republic was not a Member State of the EU at the time, he needed to 
have a specific license denoting him as an overseas player (A license). The German Handball 
Association introduced these licenses for non-EU nationals and the holders of such licenses 
faced restrictions on their ability to play in competitions as a fixed number of “A” license 
players were allowed to play simultaneously in one match. Kolpak challenged these rules on 
the basis of the Association Agreement that the Slovak Republic had signed with the EU. This 
association agreement entitles Slovak nationals to treatment that is equal to that of the 
nationals of the Member State in whose territory they reside. This equal treatment concerns 
working conditions, remuneration and dismissal. As Kolpak was legally employed and 
residing in Germany, the Court concluded that the Association Agreement precluded the rule 
from the association to be applied and Kolpak was authorised to participate in all the matches 
of the team. 
 
In a similar case, a Russian national, Igor Simutenkov, played as a professional footballer for 
Celta de Vigo in Spain. The Spanish Football Federation adopted a rule that limited the 
eligibility of non-EU players for clubs participating in the Spanish football competition. The 
conditions of Simutenkov were to a large extent similar to those of Kolpak. Simutenkov was 
lawfully employed in Spain but he found his trade restricted due to the rule of the Spanish 
federation. Simutenkov successfully relied on the Article 23(1) of the EU – Russia partnership 
agreement which “establishes for the benefit of Russian workers lawfully employed in the 
territory of a Member State, a right to equal treatment in working conditions of the same 
scope as that which, in similar terms, nationals of Member States are recognised as having 






This case concerned French football player Olivier Bernard who was confronted with an 
obstacle to his freedom of movement as a worker. The French charte du football 
professionnel makes a distinction in various types of contracts in relation to the age of 
players.
124
 Bernard played at the French club Olympique Lyonnais under an joeur espoir 
contract, which is for trainee players between the age of 16 and 22. Before the expiry of his 
contract Bernard decided not to agree on a one year extension of his liaison with Olympique 
Lyonnais, instead choosing to sign a contract with English Premier League club Newcastle 
United.  
 
The charte du football professionnel contained a clause stating that the club that had 
employed the player as a joeur espoir had a unilateral right to employ the player by means of 
his first professional contract. In the case that the player denied to agree to the extension the 
club could bring an action for damages before the French court, claiming that the contractual 
breach rooted on the charte du football professionnel constituted an infringement of the 
French Code du travail.
125
 Olympique Lyonnais started litigation before a tribunal in Lyon, 
claiming that Bernard should be ordered to compensate the club for the damages it incurred. 
The tribunal found a unilateral breach and required Bernard and Newcastle United to jointly 
pay an amount of €22 867.35 for damages to Olympique Lyonnais. 
 
Subsequently the case was appealed and the Cour d’appel in Lyon overturned the decision of 
the first instance tribunal. The appeal court judged that the rule in question constituted an 
infringement of Article 45 of the Treaty. Olympique Lyonnais appealed against this decision 
before the Court de Cassation. This tribunal made a preliminary reference to the European 
Court.
126
 The key issue was whether a system for the payment of damages, if a player refuses 
to sign his first professional contract with the club that trained him, fell within the scope of 
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the free movement of workers. If so, could this French system be justified with reference to 
the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young professional players? 
 
The Court indeed stressed that the charte de football professionnel discouraged the freedom 
of movement of the player.
127
 In analyzing the second question the Court confirmed the 
findings in Bosman, stating that an obstacle to the free movement of workers could only be 
justified in the case of a underlying legitimate objective, taking into consideration the 
proportionality of the method used. The issue therefore dealt with an acknowledgment of the 
justness of the end pursued vis-à-vis the proportionality of the means that were used to 
achieve that goal.
128
 As the French arrangements were based on the payment of damages due 
to non-fulfillment of contractual obligations and calculated on the basis of a financial loss for 
the club, they did not relate to a compensation of the actual training costs incurred by the 
training club. The Court decided that the French system in the charte du football 





Competition Cases: The Sports Related Jurisprudence of the CJEU and the Decision 
making practice of the European Commission 
Mouscron130 
 
The so-called home and away rule in professional football means that in competitions where 
two clubs compete against each other, twice in a given competition or league, the teams must 
play their home match at their own grounds. In Mouscron, Belgian club Excelsior de 
Mouscron wanted to play one home match against French side FC Metz at the stadium of 
French club FC Lille, a stadium locate close to that of Mouscron but in another country.  The 
UEFA regulations concerning the organisation of the competition prohibited Mouscron from 
staging its match in Lille. In a public enforcement proceeding, the municipality of Lille 
lodged a complaint to the European Commission against the UEFA rule on the basis of 
Article 102 of the Treaty. The European Commission rejected the complaint on the grounds 
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that the rule was a purely sporting rule that did not fall within the scope of Articles 101 and 
102. On the basis of guaranteeing equality between the clubs, and thus a fair competition, the 






ENIC concerned a rule adopted by 1998 UEFA rule on the integrity of sporting competitions 
which stated that if two or more clubs are under the common control of a single entity only 
one is entitled to be entered into a UEFA club competition. UEFA defended the rule on the 
grounds that it is important to protect the uncertainty of the results and ensure the public does 
not question the integrity of the UEFA competitions. If they did, this would undermine the 
proper functioning of the competitions. On the basis of Article 102, a complaint was lodged 
before the European Commission by ENIC who owned stakes in six clubs. ENIC believed 
that the object of the contested rule was to distort competition as UEFA was motivated by a 
desire to maintain its monopoly control over the European football market, including the 
lucrative broadcasting rights.
133
 The Commission rejected the complaint on the grounds that 
the object of the contested rule was not to distort competition and that the possible effect on 
clubs and potential investors was inherent to the very existence of credible pan European 
football competitions. As the rule was disproportionate to the aims pursued, the rule did not 
amount to a restriction and consequently it fell outside the scope of Articles 101 and 102.
134
   
FIA135 
 
In 1999 the European Commission opened formal proceedings against the Federation 
Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA). The FIA is the international association for motor sport 
with national associations as its members. The FIA is internationally responsible for 
broadcasting and organizing various competitions such as Formula One. The Commission 
issued a statement of objections on various grounds. First, the FIA gave away licenses to 
drivers and race teams to participate in FIA events. If these drivers intended to participate in 
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other, non-FIA events, their license could be suspended. This was a factual control by FIA to 
block circuits, drivers and teams with FIA licenses to participate in other then FIA events. The 
FIA had also entered into complex contracts when dealing with broadcasting rights of the FIA 
events. The FIA had unilaterally created a rule that it was the owner of the broadcasting rights 
of all the FIA events authorized by it. These rights were then transferred to one company 
directed by a former FIA vice-president for a period of hundred years for a one–off fee, thus 
foreclosing the market for any other competitor. In addition, the FIA imposed heavy fines on 
broadcasters if broadcast anything that would be deemed to be a potential threat for to the 
Formula One events. The Commission required the FIA to operate more transparently and 
solely as a regulator. The Commission disbanded the influence of the FIA on the commercial 
rights; it removed the anti-competitive elements out of the agreements with broadcasters and 
forced the FIA to open the market for other motor sport teams and circuit owners by allowing 




The 2001 Transfer System Agreement137  
 
Following the judgment of the Court in Bosman, FIFA did not immediately amend its 
international transfer system to bring it into compliance with the judgment of the Court. 
Therefore, in 1998 the European Commission issued a statement of objections after an official 
complaint by the Syndicat des Employés, Techniciens et Cadres from Belgium against the 
FIFA transfer system. In it the Commission identified a number of incompatibilities between 
the international transfer system and the EU competition law. First was the prohibition of 
players from transferring to another club following their unilateral termination of contract, 
even if the player had complied with national law governing the penalties for breach of 
contract. Second, allowing a club to receive payment for a player leaving a club if the contract 
has been terminated by mutual consent. Third, encouraging high transfer fees which bear no 
relation to the training costs incurred by the club selling the player, a practice condemned by 
the Court in Bosman and one which limits the ability of small clubs to hire top players. 
Fourth, allowing for a transfer fee to be demanded for the transfer of players (both in and out 
of contract) from a non-EU country to a member state of the EU and vice versa. Finally, the 
Commission objected to players being unable to have recourse to national courts in the event 









of a dispute arising out of the interpretation of the transfer regulations.
138
 FIFA introduced a 
new set of transfer rules embodied in the 2001 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer 
of Players. The key elements of the new system included new provisions on; the protection of 
minors; training compensation for young players; rules designed to ensure the maintenance of 
contractual stability; solidarity payments; the introduction of transfer windows and a new 
dispute resolution system. The new system satisfied the Commission that their concerns had 
been met and that the case could be closed.
139
 A further elaboration on the route towards the 




In 1996 of a complaint was lodged before the European Commission by Multiplayers 
International Denmark  concerning the compatibility of the FIFA player agent regulations 
regulations with EU competition law. In 1998 French agent Laurent Piau also lodged a 
complaint, adding that the Regulations were also contrary to Article 56 on the freedom to 
provide services. Following the Commission’s issuance of a statement of objections 
concerning various aspects of the regulations, FIFA introduced a 2001 version. Piau objected 
to the examination requirement and the requirement to take out professional liability 
insurance. He added that the new regulations introduced new restrictions by way of the rules 
on professional conduct, the use of a standard contract and the rules on the determination of 
remuneration. These, he argued, were in breach of the competition law provisions contained 
in Article 101 and possibly Article 102 although Piau appeared to have ceased his complaint 
relating to Article 49.  
 
Following the Commission’s rejection of Piau’s complaint in April 2002, the agent lodged an 
appeal before the General Court, formerly the Court of First Instance (CFI). The General 
Court found that the license system did not result in competition being eliminated, as the 
system resulted in a qualitative selection process, rather than a quantitative restriction on 
access to that occupation. This was necessary in order to raise professional standards for the 
occupation of a players’ agent, particularly as players’ careers were short and they needed 
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protection. According to the Court, the rule making authority of FIFA was justified as there 
was a near total absence of national rules regulating agents and there was no collective 
organisation for players’ agents which could be consulted.
141
 Although the Court disagreed 
with the Commission’s assessment that FIFA did not hold a dominant position in the market 
of services of players’ agents, the Court went on to find no abuse of market dominance. On 
appeal, the European Court of Justice rejected Piau’s request that the Commission Decision 
and the decision of the CFI be annulled. The Court did not explore the substance of Piau’s 
claim relating to freedom to provide services, but dismissed this as a new argument which it 
could not address insofar as the Commission acted on the basis of Regulation 17/62 and was 




In Meca-Medina, the Court of Justice severely restricted the ability of a sports body to rely on 
the purely sporting rules defence developed in Walrave. Two swimmers filed a complaint 
against the anti-doping rules of the International Swimming Federation (FINA) based on 
Article 101 of the Treaty. The Commission rejected the complaint
143
 and on appeal the 
General Court held that the anti-doping rules concerned an exclusively “non-economic aspect 
of that sporting action, which constitutes its very essence”.
144
 On final appeal to the CJEU, the 
Court upheld the ban for the swimmers but it also established the approach to be taken when 
considering the application of competition law to sport. The Court established that “the mere 
fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing from the 
scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body 
which has laid it down”.
145
 This means in practice that every sporting activity that constitutes 
an economic activity must be assessed in the light of its compatibility with the Treaty and 
especially those provisions that guarantee free movement of workers and services and 
competition law. There are no pure sporting elements per se that primarily fall outside of the 
scope of the Treaty. On the specifics of the case, the Court found that the anti-doping rules in 
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question still did not amount to a restriction because of the inherent connection between the 




Article 165 TFEU and EU Sports Policy 
  
The application of EU free movement and competition laws to the sports sector detailed 
above has not taken place in a legal vacuum sealed from the penetration of political debate 
and stakeholder lobbying. The relationship between sport and law, and the value of sport to 
the European integration project, has long been discussed in many policy documents of the 
EU institutions. The first occasion in which sport was specifically discussed was in the 
Adonnino report of 1984.
147
 The Member States mandated the Committee to explore how, 
amongst other things, sport could contribute to promoting European integration. The 
committee identified a range of options including organizing sporting events through various 
EU countries; the creation of EU teams to compete against other teams of geographical 
groupings; the wearing of the EU emblem on national teams sport outfits; exchange of 
sportsmen and the support of sporting activities for specific minority groups.  
 
Sports governing bodies have ever since been reluctant to acknowledge the intervention of EU 
law to sport as it was a direct threat to the autonomy of these sports bodies to organise and 
regulate their sector as they pleased, based on the connection of the participating member 
associations, clubs and athletes to the rules of association. Where the initial pressure coming 
from the sports governing bodies was targeted towards stressing that sports was of no concern 
to the EU Union and EU Courts, an interesting change of perspective took off in the 1980s 
where a shift in lobbying strategy was initiated by the then president of the European Olympic 
Committee (EOC) Jacques Rogge.
148
 The political turn that was effectuated by the sports 
governing bodies in the sense that instead of sheltering their territory from EU inclusion they 
sought to embrace explicit inclusion of their industry in the Treaty.
149
 This attempt was 
grounded on the rationale that the European Union had designed the Treaties to emphasize the 
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growth and development of the internal market, making it possible for the European Union to 
bring under its scope of application industries that were not prima facie falling under the 
Treaty but that were affected due to spill-over influence deriving from more general sources 
of EU law. More specifically, ever since the Walrave judgement the sports governing bodies 
were confronted with a general and “vague” veil of a potentially unlimited application of EU 
law to sport from the moment that sport constituted an economic activity; whereby the sphere 
of application of EU law could only be tempered by a justification why sport should be 
exempted from the pressure of EU law in every individual case.  
 
The sports governing bodies initiated lobby efforts to specifically include sports in the EU 
Treaty.
150
 By giving sport a specific place in the Treaty the boundaries of the application of 
EU law could be defined. Legal certainty for the sports governing bodies was strengthened if 
there would be an explicit recognition of the status aparte of sports in relation to the full 
application of EU law. The governing bodies targeted their lobbying activities towards the 
preservation of their autonomy and the specificity of sports federations to regulate their game. 
With this message they defined a strategy to influence EU policy makers by making 
maximum use of their resources such as their wide networks and their ability to penetrate in 
the various actors in the multilevelled framework of policy-making in the EU.
151
 A constant 
dialogue with the institutions and relevant actors in the EU was constantly nurtured in order to 
create as much autonomy for sport as possible by introducing sport as a territory within the 
sphere of the European Union. 
 
This lobbying of the Member States by the sports governing bodies took place in the run up to 
the Treaty of Amsterdam which amended the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities. The Member States could not agree on amending the 
Treaties to include an article on sport but a Declaration on Sport was annexed to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam which read: “The conference emphasises the social significance of sport, in 
particular its role in forging identity and bringing people together. The bodies of the European 
Union are therefore called on to listen to sports associations when important questions 
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affecting sport are at issue. In this connection special consideration should be given to the 




The Amsterdam Declaration was followed up in 1998 with the European Commission staff 
working paper entitled “The Development and Prospects for Community Action in the Field 
of Sport”.
153
 In it, the Commission stressed the educational, health, social, cultural and 
recreational functions of sport. It also stressed that sport fulfils an important economic role in 
Europe and that a general exemption of sport from European Law could not be allowed. This 
acted as the basis for the so-called Helsinki Report on Sport (1999) which was a Report from 
the European Commission to the European Council (of Heads of State and Government) 
“with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of 




In this landmark report the Commission stated its intention to give pointers for reconciling the 
economic dimension of sport with its popular, educational, social and cultural dimensions. In 
section 4 of the Report on “Clarifying the Legal Environment of Sport”, the Commission 
suggested that sport must be able to assimilate the new commercial framework in which it 
must develop, without at the same time losing its identity and autonomy, which underpin the 
functions it performs in the social, cultural, health and educational areas.  
 
The Report continued by stating that while the Treaty contained no specific provisions on 
sport, the EU must nevertheless ensure that the initiatives taken by the national State 
authorities or sporting organisations comply with European law, including competition law, 
and respect, in particular, the principles of the internal market (freedom of movement for 




In this respect, accompanying, coordination or interpretation measures at Community level 
might prove to be useful. They would be designed to strengthen the legal certainty of sporting 
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activities and their social function at Community level. However, as Community powers 
currently stand, there can be no question of large-scale intervention or support programmes or 




If it is advisable, as wished by the European Council and the European Parliament, to preserve 
the social function of sport, and therefore the current structures of the organisation of sport in 
Europe, there is a need for a new approach to questions of sport both at European level and in 
the Member States. In compliance with the Treaty, especially with the principle of 




The Report further proposes the acceptance of a new approach which involves preserving the 
traditional values of sport, while at the same time assimilating a changing economic and legal 
environment. In terms of the economic activity that it generates, the sporting sector is subject 
to the rules of the EC Treaty, like the other sectors of the economy. The application of the 
Treaty’s competition rules to the sporting sector must take account of the specific 
characteristics of sport, especially the interdependence between sporting activity and the 
economic activity that it generates, the principle of equal opportunities and the uncertainty of 
the results.
158
 The Report continues by stating that with a view to an improved definition of 
the legal environment, it is possible to give examples, without prejudice to the conclusions 
that the Commission could draw from the in-depth analysis of each case, of practices of sports 
organisations that could, or could not be, exempt from the application of EU competition 
policy. 
 
Three types of practices are distinguished in the Report: 1. Practices which do not come under 
the competition rules, 2. Practices that are, in principle, prohibited by the competition rules, 
and 3. Practices likely to be exempted from the competition rules. In the Report’s Conclusion 
it is observed that the system of promotion and relegation is one of the characteristics of 
European sport. 
 
This reference to the system of promotion and relegation is directly linked to the notion of the 
“European Model of Sport”. In 1998 the Commission’s DG X  (Education and Culture) under 









which sport comes, had published a consultation document regarding “The European Model 
of Sport” in which the organisation and structure of sport in Europe is described.
159
 Basically 
the structure resembles a pyramid with a hierarchy, it was said. The clubs form the foundation 
of this pyramid, including grassroots level and professional level. Regional federations form 
the next level, the clubs are usually members of these federations. National federations, one 
for each discipline, represent the next level. They represent their branch in the European or 
international federations. They form the top of the pyramid. The direct result is that decisions 
and regulations that have been created on the top level, trickle down to the level of the 
grassroots. 
 
A sports article was again discussed during the Nice Treaty negotiations but once more the 
Member States stopped short of inserting sport into the legal passages of the Treaty. However, 
in the accompanying Nice Declaration on Sport in 2000 which is annexed to the Presidency 
Conclusions of the Nice European Council Meeting, the Member States stressed “the specific 
characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which account should be taken in 
implementing common policies”.
160
 Part of the Declaration reads, “even though not having 
any direct powers in this area, the Community must, in its action under the various Treaty 
provisions, take account of the social, educational and cultural functions inherent in sport and 
making it special, in order that the code of ethics and the solidarity essential to the 
preservation of its social role may be respected and nurtured”. 
 
In the Nice Declaration on Sport it is said that sporting organisations and the Member States 
have a primary responsibility in the conduct of sporting affairs. Even though not having any 
direct powers in this area, the Community must, in its action under the various Treaty 
provisions, take account of the social, educational and cultural functions inherent in sport and 
making it special, in order that the code of ethics and the solidarity essential to the 
preservation of its social role may be respected and nurtured. The European Council also 
stresses its support for the independence of sports organisations and the right to organise 
themselves through appropriate associative structures. It recognises that, with due regard for 
national and Community legislation and on the basis of a democratic and transparent method 
of operation, it is the task of sporting organisations to organise and promote their particular 
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sports, particularly sporting rules and make-up of national teams, in the way which they think 
best reflects their objectives. It is noted in the Nice Declaration on Sport that sports 
federations have a central role in ensuring the essential solidarity between the various levels 
of sporting practice, from recreational to top-level sport. While taking account of 
developments in the world of sport, federations must continue to be the key feature of a form 





Both declarations attached to the Nice and Amsterdam Treaty are vague and non-binding. The 
sports movement, consisting of sports governing bodies, were still not content with the 
outcome as the declarations did not grant them enough protection from the inclusive attitude 
of EU law on their activities and policies and thus would continue to endanger the specific 
characteristics of sport. The sports bodies preferred a better control on the potential 





The opportunity to bring sport closer to an exemption arose during the Convention of Europe, 
a body established by the European Council in 2001 in order to pave the way for a 
Constitution for Europe. The final text that was presented by the Presidency in 2003 
163
proposed the inclusion of an article in the Convention of Europe, thus giving sport a formal 
status in EU laws for the first time in history. Sport was included as article II-282 of the 
Treaty Establishing a constitution.
164
 However, the final implementation of the article only 
occurred after the process of the establishment of the Constitution of Europe came to a 
standstill due to rejections by France and the Netherlands.
165
 It has to be noted that, in the 
meantime, during the process of awaiting formal Treaty recognition, the European 
Commission was working on the White Paper on sport
166
, published in 2007. This White 
Paper was the culmination of the previous European Commission and European Council 
documents, as described above, and it served as a guideline for further community action in 
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the field of sport.
167
 It placed emphasis on the social and educational values of sport and 
recognized the autonomy and specificity of sport, while establishing that the specificity was 




Eventually the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union was agreed in 2007 and 
came into force in 2009. The text that was introduced in the draft Convention was transposed 
to the new treaty in article 165: 
 
1. The Union shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging 
cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their 
action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of 
teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity. 
 
The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking 
account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social 
and educational function. 
 
2. Union action shall be aimed at: 
– developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching 
and dissemination of the languages of the Member States, 
– encouraging mobility of students and teachers, by encouraging inter alia, the academic 
recognition of diplomas and periods of study, 
– promoting cooperation between educational establishments, 
– developing exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the education 
systems of the Member States, 
– encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socio educational 
instructors, and encouraging the participation of young people in democratic life in Europe, 
– encouraging the development of distance education. 
– developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in 
sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by 
protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially the 
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youngest sportsmen and sportswomen. 
 
3. The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the 
competent international organisations in the field of education and sport, in particular the 
Council of Europe. 
 
4. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article,: 
– the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the 
laws and regulations of the Member States, 
– the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations. 
 
There is a growing body of academic literature suggesting that the scope of influence of 
Article 165 TFEU when it comes to the creation of the legal certainty that was so much 
desired by the sports governing bodies, is limited.
 169
 The main result of the inclusion of the 
article in the Treaty seems to be that the EU now has a source for funding sports by means of 




Article 165 lacks horizontal effect meaning that it does not require the EU institutions to take 
into account the specific nature of sport when other Treaty powers, such as those concerning 
freedom of movement or competition law, are at issue. But it does also not forbid them to do 
so.
171
 Therefore, despite the arguments of sports governing bodies, such as UEFA, that its 
specific policy interests (see Chapter 3) should fall under the specificity of sport or should be 
                                                 
169
 For example: Weatherill, S, (2012), EU Sports Law: The Effect of the Lisbon Treaty in A. Biondi, P. 
Eeckhout and S. Ripley (eds), EU Law After Lisbon  Oxford: Oxford University Press; Weatherill, S.(2010) 
'Fairness, openness and the specific nature of sport: does the Lisbon Treaty change EU sports law?', 
International Sports Law Journal 2010 3-4,, T.M.C. Asser Press, Garcia, B. and Weatherill, S.(2012) Engaging 
with the EU in order to minimize its impact: sport and the negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon, Journal of 
European Public Policy 19:2, March 2012:238-256, Routledge; Parrish, R, (2013), Article 165 TFEU, in Parrish, 
R., Siekmann, R., Smokvina, V., Bodiroga-Vukobrat, N. and Sander, G. (eds) ‘Social Dialogue in Professional 
Sports’, Shaker Verlag, pP.33-39; Bogaert, S, and Vermeersch. (2005), Sport in the European Union, all sound 
and no fury? A, Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper. 
170
 For 2014-2020 the Erasmus+ programme has been developed, see: http://ec.europa.eu/sport/  
171
 See also the conclusions of Parrish, R, Garcia, B, Miettinen, S., Siekmann, R, (2010) The Lisbon Treaty and 





embodied by the principles of “fairness” and/or “openness”,
172
 as mentioned in 165, the 
article will most probably not alter much the existing situation as defined by the case law of 
the ECJ. 
 
The article does place emphasis on the ability of the sports movement to self-regulate their 
issues. The European Commission leaves space in the Treaty article for the sport movement to 
self-define the vague terms that are key to the specificity of sport: “openness” and 
“fairness”.
173
 This could be done by means of discussions with other stakeholders and the 






This chapter has presented an analysis of the application of EU law to sport. Since the 
Walrave case in 1974, sport has been subject to the application of EU law whenever sport 
operates as an economic activity. Also, since this first impact on the autonomy of sports 
governing bodies, the sports movement has searched for a protection against too much 
influence on the application of EU law in their sector. 
 
The restrictions on the autonomy in the governance of the sport’s movement own business, 
were felt most significantly in the areas of competition law, free movement and non-
discrimination. The cases dealing with these areas have been discussed in this chapter.  
 
As the jurisprudence of the European Courts and decisions of the European Commission were 
taken on a case-by-case basis, and the sports movement feared a further hollowing out of their 
sovereignty, it decided to change its approach to the European institutions. Since the 1980s 
the sports movement has been involved in intense political lobbying in order to persuade the 
European institutions to recognize the specificity of sport in official legal texts and thus 
granting them clear guidelines on the boundaries of their autonomy. These lobbying activities 
have first resulted in soft law documents connected to the Treaties of the EU and in policy 
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documents where the specific characteristics of sport were acknowledged. In the 2007 White 
Paper on Sport, the actual specificity of sport was first recognized, moving away from 
focusing on characteristic aspects to a recognition of the specificity of the sector as a whole. 
The timing of the presentation of the White Paper on Sport was during the aftermath of the 
rejection of the Convention of Europe and before the entry into force of the TFEU of Lisbon. 
This Treaty introduced sport in the European official legislative documents in Article 165. 
 
The concrete gain for the sports movement deriving from article 165 has not been recognized. 
The article creates a basis for funding of EU sport programmes but it does not create legal 
certainty as regards the specificity of sport vis-á-vis to the influence of EU law on the 
autonomy of the sports sector. The wording of the article is vague, it lacks horizontal effect 
and it appears merely to corroborate the existing perspectives and case-by-case approach as 
presented and defended in the existing EU documentation. 
 
This perspective has basically been intact since the publication of the Helsinki report on sport, 
although it was further clarified after the impact of the Meca-Medina case. The policy views 
and guidelines in the White Paper on Sport are therefore still applicable. Judgments in the 
field of sport will still be made on a case by case basis because a proportionality will be 
applied to the issue in question. The source for legal uncertainty for the sports governing 
bodies remain as Article 165 is not the desired guideline for the application of EU law to 
sport. Also, this legal uncertainty may encourage litigants to test their cases before courts. 
 
A general distinction can be made regarding issues that are allowed under the Treaty (purely 
sporting issues) that are likely to be exempted (as the issue at stake is sport specific and that 
therefore a more flexible application of EU law is allowed) and that are forbidden under the 
Treaty (that go beyond the required proportionality test of Meca- Medina).  Parrish introduced 
in his 2003 research the Separate Territories Framework to chart these differences in 
regulatory approach.
175
 This distinction is still relevant for European professional sport. 
 
The purely sporting issues are issues that fall outside of the scope of the Treaty. The sport 
governing bodies have autonomy to regulate these issues under the conditions set at Meca-
Medina. The issues that fall under this conditional autonomy are rules preventing club 
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Issues that are likely to be exempted because they are justified under free movement rules or 
under competition law, can be placed in the supervised autonomy territory. The supervision is 
carried out by the European Commission as the guardian of the Treaty and by the European 
Court of Justice. Issues under this supervised autonomy are collective sale of broadcasting 
rights
180
, collective purchasing agreements
181





, in contract transfer payments
184





Issues that are incompatible with EU law have been gathered in the Judicial Intervention 
territory. Examples are periods of long exclusivity for sports rights
186





, out of contract transfer payments
189
 and rules maintaining 
commercial and regulatory dominance in a sport
190
.  
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With the introduction of Article 165, sport has not received a general exemption from the 
Treaty. The specificity of sport is recognized but it does not create legal certainty. That leaves 
the sports movement with the option to continue its lobbying with the EU and to await the 
outcome of further disputes before the European Courts in order to receive more certainty. 
Another option is that, in line with Article 165, an alternative method for is found for giving 
guidelines on how to apply the vague notion of sport specificity.  
 
The next chapter will analyse the search for legal certainty and for the right forum to come to 
this legal certainty. It will be illustrated that in professional football this search takes place 
within an arena that is called the sports policy subsystem. The actors in the subsystem will be 



















                                                                                                                                                        




The Football Subsystem 
Introduction 
 
The debate about the future of EU sports regulation takes place within an arena characterised 
as a sports policy subsystem.
191
 The sports policy subsystem took shape following the 1995 
Bosman judgment. This judgment resulted in dividing visions as to the future of European 
sports regulation, particularly as it significantly adjusted the labour relations balance of power 
in European football in favour of the player by granting players greater freedom to exploit 
new employment opportunities within the European Single Market. In the years following the 
judgment, the governing bodies of football, namely FIFA and UEFA, attempted to re-regulate 
the international market for players as witnessed by, amongst other initiatives, the reformation 
of the international transfer system in 2001,
192
 the development of locally trained player 
quotas
193
 and the introduction of Financial Fair Play as a means of controlling player 
wages
194
. Although their approaches to these issues have not been entirely consistent, FIFA 
and UEFA have acted as a coalition seeking to promote their core objective of maintaining 
regulatory control over football by promoting the twin objectives of the autonomy and 
specificity of sport – two features they considered seriously undermined by Bosman. In a 





The approach adopted by the sporting autonomy coalition caused concern within organised 
club and player interest bodies. Specifically, FIFPRo, the world players union, feared that re-
regulation of the player market would undermine contractual freedom and financial gains won 
in Bosman. The major clubs expressed concern that their interests were not sufficiently taken 
into account by the governing bodies, as witnessed by the player release dispute in Oulmers, 
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and this was affecting their commercial interests.
196
 The clubs and players therefore formed a 
coalition, referred to by Parrish as the football business coalition, to address these concerns. 
According to Parrish, each coalition possess the ability to impose costs upon one another and 
with post-Bosman litigation delivering uneven and uncertain results for the coalitions, Parrish 
suggests that a negotiated settlement is favoured by both coalitions as they acknowledge the 
existence of a ‘hurting stalemate’ – a state of legal uncertainty. A negotiated settlement is 




This chapter describes the construction, belief system and institutional resources of these two 
advocacy coalitions. Drawing on the findings presented in chapters 1 and 2, it explains how 
their activity has contributed to this ‘hurting stalemate’, how some venues have failed to 
deliver a negotiated settlement and how the European Commission has attempted to broker a 
negotiated settlement between the parties, including encouraging the use of Social Dialogue 
as a venue for negotiation.  
The Sporting Autonomy Coalition 
FIFA 
 
FIFA is the world governing body for football. It is an association according to Swiss law and 
registered in the Swiss commercial Register.
198
 FIFA has as its statutory objectives: to 
improve the game of football constantly and promote it globally, to organise its own 
international competitions; to draw up regulations and provisions and ensure their 
enforcement; to control every type of Association Football by taking appropriate steps to 
prevent infringements of the Statutes and to prevent all methods and practices which might 
jeopardize the integrity of matches and competitions or give rise to abuse of Association 
Football.
199
 According to the FIFA statutes, the association has national football associations 
(FA) as members.
200
 Except for the United Kingdom, every country is only permitted to have 
one FA that is a member of FIFA. Every FA, no matter what size or how many active football 
players it has as a member, has one vote to be cast at the Supreme legislative body of FIFA, 
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 The overall FIFA policy is voted by the Congress and the agenda of the 
Congress is composed by the executive committee of FIFA. The executive committee of 
FIFA is composed of 24 representatives, this is a president and representatives from the FIFA 
confederations. FIFA's administration is carried out by the General Secretariat, which 
employs some 340 staff members in Zurich, Switzerland.
202
 At its head is the FIFA General 
Secretary, who is responsible for implementing the decisions of the Executive Committee. 
The General Secretary is also responsible for FIFA's finances, international relations, the 
organisation of the FIFA World Cup™, and other FIFA football competitions. The General 
Secretariat is comprised of divisions dealing with development, competitions, football 





 and in specific cases ad hoc committees can be established to 
assist and inform the executive committee. 
 
FIFA stands on top of the organisational pyramid of football and ensures through its statutes a 
coherence of the underlying layers of the pyramid to its regulations and governance. The 
statutes oblige confederations and associations to comply with FIFA regulations and prohibit 
any interference, such as an interference of the state, in the organisation and composition of 
the national FA’s and the governance of the game of football.
205
 The confederations of FIFA 
are composed of members of FIFA that belong to the same continent.
206
 The confederations 
are allowed to organise international competitions and interclub competitions in accordance 
with the FIFA statutes. In addition, the member FA’s of FIFA are obliged to ascertain that 
leagues or groups of clubs shall be subordinate to and recognized by that Member. The 
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Member’s statutes define the scope of authority and the rights and duties of these groups. The 




FIFA rules have a profound impact on professional football clubs and players. A club and a 
player have, on the face of it, a simple contractual relationship between one another. 
However, this relationship is heavily influenced by FIFA regulations. According to the FIFA 
statutes, the executive committee of FIFA has regulatory powers over the status and transfer 
of players
208
 and the players’ status committee controls the adherence of players, clubs and 
associations to these regulations. In addition to that the executive committee decides on the 
international match calendar which is binding upon every layer under the FIFA.
209
 According 






UEFA, founded in 1954, is the confederation for Europe and has 54 member associations in 
the European continent.
211
 Like FIFA, UEFA is an association according to Swiss law and 
incorporated in the Swiss Commercial Register.
212
 The objectives of UEFA are laid down in 
the statutes of the organisation. These are to: promote football in Europe in a spirit of peace, 
understanding and fair play, without any discrimination on account of politics, gender, 
religion, race or any other reason; monitor and control the development of every type of 
football in Europe; organise and conduct international football competitions and tournaments 
at European level for every type of football whilst respecting the players’ health; prevent all 
methods or practices which might jeopardize the regularity of matches or competitions or give 
rise to the abuse of football; ensure that sporting values always prevail over commercial 
interests; redistribute revenue generated by football in accordance with the principle of 
solidarity and to support reinvestment in favor of all levels and areas of football, especially 
the grassroots of the game; promote unity among Member Associations in matters relating to 
European and world football; safeguard the overall interests of Member Associations; ensure 
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that the needs of the different stakeholders in European football (leagues, clubs, players, 
supporters) are properly taken into account;  act as a representative voice for the European 
football family as a whole; maintain good relations with and cooperate with FIFA and the 
other Confederations recognized by FIFA; ensure that its representatives within FIFA loyally 
represent the views of UEFA and act in the spirit of European solidarity; respect the interests 





The decision making process of UEFA is based on three corresponding layers. The congress 
consists of a gathering of all 53 member associations in which all associations have one vote, 
no matter what size or number of members of the association.
214
The Executive Committee of 
UEFA decides on matters that do not fall under the powers of the congress or any other organ 
of UEFA. The Executive Committee consists of 15 members composed of representatives 
from the national associations that are a member of UEFA. There can only be one committee 
member per association, the committee meets once in every two months. The President of 
UEFA has sole powers designated to him by the statutes of UEFA. He is able to represent 
UEFA in relation to other stakeholders in football and to collaborate with the UEFA secretary 
general. The latter is in charge of UEFA’s administrative bodies and is responsible for the day 
to day management of the organisation. Within the structure of UEFA, and according to their 
statutory objectives, many committees are active that deal with topics that fall under the 
regulatory control of UEFA. The committees report back to the Executive Committee and the 
President and eventually the committee’s findings are part of issues brought to the congress in 
order to seek for decision making.  
 
The committees that are active within UEFA are: National Associations Committee; Finance 
Committee; Referees Committee; National Team Competitions Committee; Club 
Competitions Committee; Youth and Amateur Football Committee; Women’s Football 
Committee; Futsal and Beach Soccer Committee; HatTrick Committee; Development and 
Technical Assistance Committee; Club Licensing Committee; Stadium and Security 
Committee; Medical Committee; Players’ Status, Transfer and Agents and Match Agents; 
Committee; Legal Committee; Marketing Advisory Committee; Media Committee;  Fair Play 
                                                 
213
 UEFA Statutes Article 3. 
214
 UEFA Statutes Article 13 and 18. 
 
 76 
and Social Responsibility Committee and the Football Committee
215
. The president, executive 





Next to these committees UEFA incorporates within its structures the professional football 
strategy council. This council consists of representatives from UEFA, the European Leagues, 
European clubs and representatives from the European division of the players’ unions. The 
tasks of the strategy council are to: identify solutions to improve collaboration between the 
various stakeholders of European football; deal with problems pertaining to the Social 
Dialogue in European professional football matters; and deal with questions related to the 
UEFA club competitions and their calendars. The Professional Football Strategy Council 
reports directly to the Executive Committee and exercises a major influence on the decision-
making of the Executive Committee. In relation to the influence of the Strategy Council as 
regards the decision-making of the Executive Committee, there is no concrete example on 
what can be used to define “major” influence. 
 
In terms of the organisation pyramid, UEFA forms the second layer below FIFA. The 
regulations of FIFA are directly applicable to UEFA and to the national associations that are a 
member of FIFA. These national associations are also a member of UEFA and through this 
membership of UEFA an extra source of governing influence is exposed to associations, clubs 
and players. One element that falls within the supervision of UEFA, and is a power granted by 
FIFA, is the composition and control of national and interclub competitions. UEFA has used 
this delegated power to tighten its grasp over European football and set standards for clubs in 








                                                 
215
 UEFA Statutes Article 35. 
216
 UEFA Statutes Article 39. 
217
 UEFA has specific regulations on the participation in the Champions League and in the Europa League 
http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/Regulations/competitions/Regulations/01/94/62/40/1946240_




The Sporting Autonomy Coalition: Beliefs 
 
A definition of sports autonomy was provided by Chappelet
218
 in his 2010 report on the 
autonomy of sport in Europe. According to Chappelet the definition takes account of the 
following aspects: 
 
The autonomy of sport is, within the framework of national, European and international law, 
the possibility for non-governmental, non-profit making sports organisations to: 
 
1) Establish, amend and interpret rules appropriate to their sport freely, without undue 
political or economic influence; 
2) Choose their leaders democratically, without interference by states or third parties; 
3) Obtain adequate funds from public or other sources, without disproportionate 
obligations; 
4) Use these funds to achieve objectives and carry on activities chosen without sever 
external constraints; 
5) Draw up, in consultation with the public authorities, legitimate standards 




Both FIFA and UEFA have sought to safeguard their autonomy to govern football, globally 
and in Europe, without the restrictive interference of European law. Both actors have aligned 
in the sporting autonomy coalition to defend their autonomy. The claim for defending their 
autonomy is based on the argument that sport has its specificities and that this status should 
act as a filter for the full application of EU law to the sector. In the opposite situation that EU 
law would be fully applicable to sport, the governing bodies would not be able to sufficiently 
pursue goals that are connected to fundamental principles that make sport special. The need 
for maintaining competitive balance in sport, to ensure the regularity of sport competitions, to 
educate and train young talent, to promote stadium attendance and participation at all levels, 
to safeguard the integrity of sport and to collect with local communities, are a number of such 
fundamental principles.
220
 Another ground for underlining the necessity of autonomy of the 
governing bodies is the preservation of the European Model of sport. This pyramid model of 
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 interconnects the world governing body in sport to the base that supports 
the pyramid: clubs and players. In between the top and the base of the pyramid the European 
governing bodies and the national governing bodies and / or leagues are placed. This structure 
allows the world governing body to take ultimate responsibility for safeguarding the 
characteristics of European sport that have been defined by the European Commission
222
 and 
that allow a monopolistic governance of sport because of the admissibility of only one 
federation per sport.  
 
FIFA and UEFA’s quest to protect their autonomy in the governance of football on the basis 
of the specificity of sport is reflected in the beliefs of both actors. FIFA and UEFA do not 
place sport above the law, but the fundamental characteristics merit a soft application of the 
law on sport. Both actors can be seen as moderate when it comes to the degree of influence of 
the EU on sport. They seek to have a clarification of the boundaries of the penetration of EU 
law in their sport resulting in legal certainty. This perspective of the governing bodies in 
football can be distilled from their communications and points of view. Chappelet charts 
various press releases, between 2003 and 2009, in which both FIFA and UEFA support the 
need for their autonomy in governing their sport and where they show support for the findings 




In the statutes of both bodies their objectives are defined and one of those objectives is that all 
members should avoid influence of third parties in the management of their affairs.
224
  The 
presidents of both actors have also expressed their views as regards the influence of the EU in 
football and the necessity to have a more relaxed approach from EU law. After the Bosman 
case, the then president of UEFA, Lennart Johansson, was quoted as saying that the EU was 
trying to kill football.
225
 In 2009 the current UEFA president Michel Platini expressed in an 
interview that “There is still a slightly perverse tendency within the European institutions to 
deny the unity of the football pyramid and to isolate the professional game at the top. And this 
is done in order to give substance to the false notion that professional football is an economic 
activity just like any other.” And, "Unfortunately, this refusal to recognize the specificity of 
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sport ... still exists in certain circles, in certain sectors, which consider competition law to be 
the fundamental law of Europe. We refuse categorically to be held in a straitjacket or tied to 
prefabricated models that are based on the false equation that professional sport equals a 
purely economic activity.”
226
 FIFA president Blatter was quoted as saying that “Observing the 
FIFA Statutes is imperative for every member association. These Statutes have proved their 
credibility, their usefulness and their strength for more than a century. Despite the 
undisputable respect that the world of football must show national legislation, it must be 
extremely vigilant with regard to attempts by governments - as well as supranational 
government organisations - to control the most popular sport on earth, and this is a trend 




As FIFA is the world governing body, being responsible for football on a global level, and 
UEFA deals with the European member associations, there do exist differences between the 
exact methods by which both actors approach a specific issue when defending their beliefs. 
This makes that when the two actors defend a specific objective in collaboration or on the 
basis of the same convictions than this collaboration can be regarded as a coalition of 
convenience.  
 
An example of such a concerted approach was the transfer saga after Bosman. Both 
organisations defended the necessity for a transfer system in order to safeguard the promotion 
of youth development and the protection of minors and to ensure competitive fairness and 
openness through rules leading to solidarity and redistribution mechanisms. In a joint task 
force they faced the European Commission when it issued a statement of objections on the 




After the Bosman case the football sector suffered from a concentration of finances that 
threatened competitive balance in the sport.
229
 As the players were free to join clubs after the 
                                                 
226




 As cited on the FIFA website, after a meeting of the FIFA associations committee on 18 October 2006, 
http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/news/newsid=106799/index.html  
228
 Supra, footnote 2. See also for an elaborate overview, Lembo, C. (2011), FIFA transfer regulations and 
UEFA player eligibility rules: major changes in European Football and the negative effect on minors, Emory 
International law review, pag. 539-585, Vol.25,  to be found at: http://www.law.emory.edu/student-life/law-
journals/emory-international-law-review/content/archive/Volume-25/Volume-25-issue-1.html  
229
 Institute of European Affairs (2008), Expert opinion on the compatibility of the 6+5 Rule with European 
Community law (Summary), study of 24 October 2008, p. 7-8,  
 
 80 
end of their contracts and because of the end of the limitations on foreign players FIFA and 
UEFA feared that clubs would no longer continue to invest in training players and that this 
phenomenon would lead to the weakening of national teams and the erosion of cultural 
identification.  FIFA and UEFA both defended a system whereby it was favoured for clubs to 
draft and train local players. UEFA eventually rejected FIFA’s proposal due to the fact that it 
lead to a direct discrimination under EU law. The European Commission eventually accepted 
the UEFA Home Grown player rule in the sense that a period of four years of analysis was 




A joint defence of their beliefs is also the battle to avoid third party influence in the policies 
of football clubs. Due to the international transfers of players the use of third party 
investments to acquire the services of football players became popular in Europe, where it 
initially was a trend in South America only.
231
 In 2007 FIFA included in its regulations a ban 
on the third party influence in a transfer
232
 and UEFA followed as a strong advocate against 




A similar approach of both UEFA and FIFA can also be noticed in relation to the content of 
Article 165 of the TFEU and the relation to the specific nature of sport. Both governing 
bodies promote the perspective of 165 to defend the specificity of sport as regards EU law. In 
communications to the media and in their general positioning, both FIFA and UEFA have 
expressed their views on Article 165. For example, FIFA president Sepp Blatter stressed the 
importance of Article 165 for the future of sport: 
 
“Recognition of the specificity of sport is about protecting its universality, the foremost 
characteristic of its specific nature, in a world which is increasingly divided, and about 
maintaining its structures, which guarantee balance at the heart of every sport, for example 
between amateur football and professional football, between club football and international 
football, and in terms of protecting the national identity of clubs, etc. It is also about the 
educational and social role of sport, and about safeguarding fair play and the openness of 
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After Blatter’s quote the news item goes on to mention that “.the reference to sport in the 
Lisbon Treaty, which also mentions the “specific nature of sport”, provides the necessary 
instrument to do so”. The Treaty should allow to be looked at  differently than other 
industries.
235
 According to Blatter, sport has in the past been confronted by several legal 
challenges, especially when it came to pure sporting rules. Article 165 should allow sport to 
be looked at not only from a purely economic point of view, but also from its voluntary 




UEFA’s view on Article 165 is in accordance with FIFA’s. In an elaborate reaction to Article 
165
237
 UEFA defended its activities against the impact of EU law and it called on the 
Commission to make a firm statement for sport specificity. In general, UEFA’s perspective is 




“...Under the TFEU, the EU has a supporting competence in the field of sport, meaning that 
its activities are limited to coordinating, where necessary, sports-related initiatives 
undertaken at Member States level. The EU may also adopt incentive measures, however, 
Article 165 expressly excludes any harmonising legislation. The new Article is clearly, 
therefore, not intended to prejudice the legitimate autonomy and discretionary decision 
making power of sports federations. 
 
However, where EU law does come into play and where it impacts on the activities of sports 
bodies, Article 165 now requires that the specific nature of sport must be recognised. In other 
words, while sport is not “above the law”, there is now a provision in the Treaty itself 
recognising that sport cannot simply be treated as another “business”, without reference to 
its specific characteristics (the ‘specificity of sport’).” 
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 Ibid, p. 2. 
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The resources that the sporting autonomy coalition may use to try to impose its beliefs upon 
other actors find their origin in the interdependence of the various layers of the European 
Sports Model. Due to the link of the members of both FIFA and UEFA through the statutes of 
these associations it is possible for FIFA and UEFA to impose disciplinary sanctions on 
members, being associations, clubs and individual players. Therefore, for example, if clubs do 
not implement a rule that is issued by FIFA, if they allow interference in the management of 
an association, or if they refuse to release a player for participating for its national team, FIFA 
can prevent the club or association from participating in the competitions organised under the 
authority of the governing bodies.
239
 Also, the FIFA and UEFA have extensive financial 
resources to persist in long legal procedures and hire the relevant consultants and experts. 
 
Football Business Coalition 
 
In his description of the two coalitions that are active in the EU sports policy subsystem 
Parrish illustrates the beliefs that are shared by the actors in the football business coalition.
240
 
The actors in this coalition claim that football is an economic activity, the commercial 
potential of which is eroded by the restrictive practices employed by the football governing 
bodies. In their deep core beliefs the actors are convinced of a free market ethos.  In addition, 
from a policy core perspective, the actors in this coalition seek greater representation in the 
governance model and decision making model of European professional football and in their 
quest for greater influence they rely on European Union law to protect their interests 
regarding the restrictions they encounter in the product and labour market of professional 
football. They are confronted with these potential restrictions because of the fact that the 
sporting autonomy coalition could see some primarily restrictive elements to be exempted 
under the heading of the special status of sport, on a case-by-case basis. 
 
From the perspectives of the actors of this coalition,  clubs are undertakings and employers. 
The players are workers and both sides of the industry support the concept of industrial 
relations. In addition to that, due to the importance of the influx of money in the industry 
deriving from commercialization of intellectual property rights, both sides of the industry, 
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workers and employers, regard themselves as the rightful owners of their share in the creation 




Parrish points to a variety of actors in the sphere of this coalition. He includes professional 
clubs, organised player interests, media companies, investors and agents. However, not all 
these actors share the same deep core beliefs, a conclusion easily drawn from the perspective 
that a distinction on the basis of industrial relations can be made. An example of opposite 
beliefs is the different perspective that the players, gathered in the Fédération Internationale 
des Joeurs Professionnels  (FIFPRo), have in relation to the transfer system as regards the 
clubs. Where the players favour a more liberalised system stressing the free movement of 
workers, the clubs are more likely to favour a system where contractual stability and freedom 




Their alignment in the football business coalition could therefore be characterized as a 
coalition of convenience in order to protect their joint interest in achieving greater influence 
in the regulation of the football sector. The actors in this coalition, for the sake of this thesis, 
are FIFPRo, the European Club Association (ECA) and the European Premier Football 
Leagues (EPFL). 
 
FIFPRo is the international body representing the national football players’ union on a global 
level. FIFPRo was created in 1965 and it now has 46 worldwide members, 9 candidate 
members and 9 observers.
243
 It has four divisions: Asia/Oceania, Africa, Americas and 
Europe.
244




 and has been granted a 
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  Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2006, to be found at: http://www.rdes.it/RDES_3_06_FIFPRO.pdf  
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 FIFPRo is part of UEFA’s professional football strategy council. 
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FIFPRo’s position as a stakeholder in this coalition can be evidenced on the basis of their 
objectives that are laid down in their statutes
248
 and reflected in the opinions about issues that 
are of influence in European football.
249
 The activity of FIFPRo in defending the interest of 
players as workers has also been illustrated in FIFPRo’s role in the 2001 Agreement on the 
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) The European Commission had 
gone so far as to grant FIFPRo a decisive role in the implementation of a new transfer system 
when the governing bodies refused to adjust the transfer system along the lines of the 
European Commission’s objections to it. However, FIFPRo’s role was undermined due to 
internal fragmentation within FIFPRo and it turned out to play a marginal role in the eventual 
agreement that was established between the governing bodies FIFA and UEFA and the 
European Commission.
250
 More recently, FIFPRo stressed its view on the impact of the 
transfer system in professional football and the necessity of taking players’ interests in 
consideration, when it commented on a study on the economic and legal impact of the transfer 
system, carried out by KEA and the CIES.
251
 In its criticism of the study, FIFPRo stated, 
amongst others, “that players and clubs should always be in a position to call upon normal 
courts in the case of disputes; this is with a view to guarantee proper implementation of EU 
Law”, and: “FIFPRo is of the opinion that it is not necessary to give both parties access to 




The ECA is the body representing the professional football clubs and is the successor of the 
G-14 European economic interest group and the European Club Forum.
253
 The ECA was 
created as a compromise between UEFA, FIFA and the clubs after the settlement in the 
Charleroi case.
254
  In the Charleroi case the clubs previously grouped in the G-14
255
 defended 
their position as a commercial right owner. The origin for the case was the fact that Sporting 
Charleroi player Abdelmajid Oulmers returned injured to his club after an international match 
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with his country Morocco against Burkina Faso. As his employer Charleroi did not take out 
any insurance they had to continue to pay the wages of the player for eight months while he 
did not play. As the Moroccan FA did not decide to compensate Charleroi decided to go to the 
Tribunal Commercial de Charleroi. The G-14 joined Charleroi in their litigation and 
eventually the case was brought for a preliminary ruling under the ECJ. 
 
The clubs claimed that FIFA was abusing a dominant position under the competition law 
articles of the TFEU. Through lobbying of the clubs and through the pressure connected to the 
threat of litigation, the clubs were eventually able to find a compromise as regards the 
compulsory release of players.
256
 FIFA and UEFA offered the clubs an insurance and 
compensation scheme when the players left their clubs to represent their national teams. The 
compromise on the side of the clubs was that they dismantled the G-14 grouping and that they 
formed the ECA. The ECA signed a memorandum of understanding with UEFA.
257
 In this 
memorandum of understanding the ECA,UEFA and FIFA officially recognized each other as 
sole representatives of their members. The ECA agreed to respect the international match 
calendar, the necessity to perform in international matches and to ensure that none of its 
members would be part of any legal proceedings against UEFA.
258
 In return, UEFA offered 
the ECA a place in their consultative structures
259
 and a share of the income generated by the 




Another source to evidence the legitimacy to place the ECA in the football business coalition 
can be found in the position paper with the perspectives on major issues impacting European 
football that the ECA issued in March 2011.
261
 The ECA acknowledged that sport has its own 
specificities but it also stressed that clubs are now enterprises and that they, like the 
federations, are subject to the laws and regulations which apply to other businesses operating 
within the EU. Thus, in deciding how, and to what extent, EU law should be applied, 
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acknowledgement should be made of the commercial realities faced by sport stakeholders.
262
 
The ECA agrees with the approach of the European Commission to deal with this assessment 
on a case-by-case basis as it would be ill-judged to provide a general exemption (or not) to 
certain rules prematurely. However, the European Commission should assist the stakeholders 
in defining the extent to which EU law applies to sport in order to create greater legal 
certainty. 
 
The position paper of the ECA also places clubs in the core of governance when it comes to 
issues that influence clubs. Indeed, according to the ECA, some progress has been made in 
granting clubs greater powers, like in the division of income out of the Champions League, 
but there still remains scope for an increase involvement of the clubs in the decision making 





The EPFL comprises 29 member leagues across Europe. It was created in 1997 as the 
association of European Union Premier Professional Football Leagues (EUPPFL). It was 
restructured to the EPFL in 2005, when its aim became: “To play a decisive part in the 
process of positively reshaping the organisation of the game in Europe, by consolidating its 
position, safeguarding the legitimate interest of the Members and implementing new 
initiatives for the good of the game. The EPFL is further committed to youth development, 




The EPFL has signed two memoranda of understanding with UEFA, the latest one in 2012.
265
 
Both organisations have recognized each other and each other’s objectives.
266
 The EPFL has 




The position paper of the EPFL contains the association’s view on topics dealing with the 
relationship between sport and EU law. The EPFL respects the specificity of sport, as 
recognised by the EU institutions and Member States and well reflected and consolidated in a 
                                                 
262
 Supra, p. 2. 
263
 Supra, p. 3 
264
 An overview of the history of EPFL can be found at: http://www.epfl-europeanleagues.com/history.htm.  
265






 EPFL is part of the UEFA’s Professional Football Strategy Council. 
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multitude of national laws and sport regulations as well as other national and international 
arrangements.
268
 However, the conduct and operation of sport must take place within the 
framework of European law as sport is neither above nor outside the law.
269
 These views can 
be placed within the perspectives of the football business coalition. 
 
As regards their desire to perform a stronger role in the governance of football, the EPFL 
believes that any key issue affecting professional football needs to involve the leagues and 
clubs as much as possible. The efforts to become a stronger organisation are evidenced by the 
EPFL’s initiative to create a “world league organisation”.
270





The shared interests of the EPFL and the ECA can be seen in their reaction to the Murphy 
case
272
 and in the defence of the collective selling of broadcasting rights. In Murphy a British 
pub owner broadcasted the matches of the British Premier league through a decoder system 
obtained from Greece instead of using the UK territory Sky Decoder card. This circumvention 
of the Premier Leagues exclusivity rule saved her £7,600 per annum. The ECJ decided that 
national laws or regulations that prohibit the import, sale or use of foreign decoder cards were 
contrary to the freedom to provide services. What remains under protection are the exclusive 
copyrights connected to the programmes around the live league matches. 
 
The three parties all defend their interests on the basis of their status as regards actors in 
industrial relations. This makes them different from the governing bodies of football as the 
governing bodies do not possess a role in the industrial relations in football in the status of 
employer. Therefore, the three actors have aligned in relation to a disproportionate effect of 
the transfer system on the basis of their connection to labour law. The sources may be based 
on different grounds, but a joint effort in affecting the change or creation of policy is the 
objective of their alignment.  
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The football business coalition has (the threat of) litigation as a resource for pushing their 
beliefs forward and to influence policy. The main cases are Bosman and Bernard, two cases 
that challenged the validity of the transfer system and of the training compensation 
regulations. In the Oulmers case the mere threat of litigation created a window of opportunity 
for a better bargaining position. However, the outcome of litigation is uncertain. The 
uncertainty has fuelled several challenges to the existing governance model in football.
273
 
Another resource is the potential of funding. The three actors all have accumulated enough 




Taking the current situation in the professional football industry into consideration, it can be 
said that there is a situation of a hurting stalemate. Sabatier described the hurting stalemate 
situation as a status quo in which rival coalitions have no more options to exploit due to the 
lack of resources or this inability to enter into new venues.
274
 In football there is a deadlock as 
the parties are able to impose almost unlimited financial burden on each other while in the 
meantime the threat of litigation remains. This situation of frustration and deadlock may push 
an actor or coalition to search for a compromise with the rival coalitions because the outcome 
of this compromise is superior to the status quo. In this search for compromise, policy 
oriented learning across coalitions takes place on the level of the secondary beliefs of the 
coalitions and mediation between the stakeholders can take place with the use of a policy 
broker that will search for a reasonable solution.  
 
The search for a solution that is supported by all coalitions should lead to a status of “power 
sharing”.
275
 This solution can only be found, according to Sabatier, if a professional forum is 
available for the stakeholders. Therefore the ingredients to find consensus are: 
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 A stalemate wherein all coalitions view a continuation of the status quo as 
unacceptable; 
 
 The negotiations are conducted in private and last a relatively long time, e.g. more 
than six months; 
 
 There is a facilitator (policy broker) respected by all parties and viewed as relatively 
neutral. 
 
Fora for negotiated settlement: European Commission and the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport  
 
In the following the focus will lie on two institutions that have been and are active in the 
search for a negotiated settlement between the stakeholders in professional football and 
finding legal certainty: The European Commission and the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS). 
 
The European Commission 
 
The European Commission has been involved in sport since sport has been recognised to fall 
under the scope of influence of the Treaty. The first landmark ECJ decision occurred in 1974 
in the Walrave case in which the ECJ decided that professional sport falls within the scope of 
Community law when it is carried out as an economic activity. From this perspective 
professional sport came under the attention of the European Commission due to its role as the 
guardian of the EU Treaties. 
 
Following the Bosman judgment of 1995, the FIFA rules on the transfer and status of players 
received criticism from the Commission as the restrictive effects were still de facto in 
place.
276
 The Commission considered that the rules needed to be adjusted according to the 
Treaty provisions guaranteeing a free movement of workers on the territory of the EU. Next 
to both of these sources of influence the European Commission used sport in order to support 
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policy in other fields, mainly education, culture and health. This was operationalised through 
various programmes such as the year of Education Through Sport, the fight against obesity 
and followed after the recognition of the non-economic values of sport in the annex to the 
Amsterdam Declaration in 1997.  
 
The attitude of the European Commission to sport was diffuse. Sport stakeholders used the 
European Commission as a venue for promoting their beliefs and getting policy issues on the 
agenda but no single entry point was available to the actors. Actors were able to go venue 
shopping on the basis of their beliefs thus leading to a situation where sports governing bodies 
would seek to be heard by Commission Directorate Generals mainly dealing with issues based 
on culture and the preservation of sports traditions, whereas other stakeholders would focus 
on the application of European law dealing with competition and free movement, with less 
emphasis on the specificity of sport as a source for exemptions of EU law. The attitude of the 
Commission to sport was, due to the lack of a Treaty basis for sport, a more reactive one. The 
Commission reacted to complaints or requests of stakeholders or created activity after 
decisions of the European Court of Justice. On the other hand, where the European 
Commission sought to bring extra power to its own existing policies it would use sport in 
order to promote other policies, such as the fight against obesity, education, forging identity 
and culture. Sport became an item for the Commission from a spill-over perspective based on 
both a reactive and pro-active approach. The pro-active approach of the Commission means it 
can be characterized as a policy entrepreneur, keeping sport on the agenda in order to use it as 
an alternative route for progressing other policy priorities or even as a stakeholder creating 
coalitions of convenience with other actors. The position of sport was unclear, let alone of 
professional sport. The fragmented approach by the various Directorates General, mainly 
Employment and Social Affairs, Competition and Education and Culture lead to a status quo 
where the Commission could not bring legal certainty to the sector of professional football as 
the exploitation of the European Commission as a venue would not bring stakeholders any 
further.  
 
In 1997 this approach towards sport was the reason for the start of a more structured approach 
towards sport. Within the DG Education and Culture the Sport Unit was created. A vice versa 
approach towards sport came to the surface leading to a situation in 2000, defined in the Nice 
Declaration, that the EU would now look to the impact of its decisions and policy on sport 
and seek to be sport-friendly. With the introduction of the White Paper in 2007 the European 
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Commission paved the way for a more structured approach towards sport. The Paper provided 
for a comprehensive vision of the European Commission towards sport. The role of the 
European Commission shifted after the adoption of the White Paper. The Commission  
introduced the notion of a structured dialogue with the sports movement on the basis of the 
following grounds: 
 
“European sport is characterised by a multitude of complex and diverse structures which 
enjoy different types of legal status and levels of autonomy in Member States. Unlike other 
sectors and due to the very nature of organised sport, European sport structures are, as a 
rule, less well developed than sport structures at national and international levels. Moreover, 
European sport is generally organised according to continental structures, and not at EU 
level. 
 
Stakeholders agree that the Commission has an important role to play in contributing to the 
European debate on sport by providing a platform for dialogue with sport stakeholders. Wide 
consultation with “interested parties” is one of the Commission’s duties according to the 
Treaties. 
 
In view of the complex and diverse sports culture in Europe, the Commission intends to 
involve notably the following actors in its structured dialogue: 
 
 European Sport Federations; 
 
 European umbrella organisations for sport, notably the European Olympic 
Committees (EOC), the European Paralympic Committee (EPC) and European non-
governmental sport organisations; 
 
 National umbrella organisations for sport and national Olympic and Paralympic 
Committees; 
 





 Other European and international organisations, in particular the Council of Europe's 




In order to foster this structured dialogue the Commission has organised many contact 
moments and professional fora where the stakeholders could discuss and promote their policy 
views in front of the Commission. The initiatives of the Commission are divided in three 
segments: (1) the (re)organisation of a European Sport Forum and thematic discussions with 
the stakeholders (2) the organisation of conferences
278





The European Sport forum intends to "provide for a more efficient dialogue structure on sport 
at EU level, including the organisation of an annual European Sport Forum and thematic 
discussions with targeted audiences, European sport stakeholders in particular".
280
 The forum 
takes place annually. Next to the forum the Commission organises conferences on specific 
topics, working groups and expert groups. In addition, the Commission is open to receive 
stakeholders in one-on-one talks or in closed meetings and ad hoc committees. 
 
Also, as regards the fostering of dialogue, the European Commission has stated in its White 
Paper on Sport that in the light of a growing number of challenges to sport governance, the 
Social Dialogue at European level can contribute to addressing common concerns of 
employers and athletes, including agreements on employment relations and working 
conditions.
281
 As such, the European Commission promotes and encourages social partners in 
sport to decide issues that affect them both amongst themselves. 
 
In 2009 sport was included in the Lisbon Treaty. The EU now has a competence for sport and 
that competence is very close to the role that was created for the Commission after the 
adoption of the White Paper. In Article 165 TFEU the Commission plays a role in developing 
the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting 
competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the 
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physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially the youngest 
sportsmen and sportswomen. 
 
Article 165 requires as one of the Commission’s duties the promotion of cooperation between 
sport bodies while safeguarding the EU’s basic policy goals. Therefore, the sport unit of the 
Commission can be seen as the opening for all sport stakeholders to the EU. The sport unit 
will continue to collaborate with other DG's if necessary, but its position as a gateway to 
Brussels for the sport stakeholders, became much stronger.  
 
So the balance between the role of the Commission as a broker or a more advocacy oriented 
approach, as well as being a mere venue, has switched more towards the broker role. Of 
course the Commission has a strategy based on its own objectives - that of pursuing the goals 
of Article 165 and bringing sport more in line with EU legislation - but this role is now 
targeted towards the facilitation of dialogue with the view to make an end to a deadlock 
situation.  
 
However, the Commission itself does not intend to impose rules or legislation on stakeholders 
in professional sport. It intends to leave the decision making to the sport movement itself. The 
power the European Commission has on the basis of Article 165 is to move the Council to 
make Recommendations or to create incentive measures through the ordinary legislative 
procedure together with the Parliament. Both instruments may be strong in pursuing 
stakeholders to carry out action but they are unable to force harmonisation as the authority to 
initiate the creation of laws remains at the level of the Member States. The European 
Commission remains a facilitator for change but on the basis of the Treaty it does not have the 
power to change or create sports policy by itself.  
 
The European Commission as a forum is suitable for starting negotiations, however the forum 
is not suitable to devise binding rules and regulations that establish legal certainty within the 
sector. Therefore, the European Commission itself cannot solve any problems, so as a forum it 
lacks the power to bring a solid solution. It can only enforce rules in sectors where it has the 
powers to do so on the basis of the Treaty, therefore, even after inclusion of Article 165, any 
issue would be referred back to the relevant DG by the sport unit if policy needs to be created 
or adapted. The Commission works therefore as a policy broker but is not the professional 




The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) 
 
In the 1980s the international sports organisations reflected on the creation of an independent 
authority that would be able to pronounce binding decisions in international sport disputes in 
a flexible and efficient, inexpensive procedure. Following the idea of the then president of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) Juan Antonio Samaranch, a working group was set 
up by IOC member Kéba Mbaye in order to create the statutes of the Court of Arbitration for 
sport, a sort of ‘supreme court’” for international sport. The statutes were officially ratified by 
the IOC in 1984 and the CAS became immediately active. In the early years of its existence 





At the start of the activities of CAS there were not many cases.
283
 The influx of cases grew 
when doping disputes started to be settled at the CAS,
284
 but in the early years of CAS there 
were simply not many cases, logically also due to a lack of doping detection instruments. The 
road to CAS was also not yet part of the mind-set of sports governing bodies. The federations 
used their own internal judiciary bodies to solve sport disputes. In addition to that, the CAS 
stemmed and was designed as a branch of the IOC, thus the IOC was having financial and 
regulatory control over CAS to this on. This situation lasted until 1993 when the equestrian 
Elmar Gundel appealed to the Swiss Federal tribunal in order to dispute the validity of an 
award.
285
His claim was that the original award
286
 was rendered by a Court that did not meet 
the conditions for impartiality and independent and that these basic principles of a fair trial 
impeded the CAS from being a proper arbitration court. The Federal Tribunal did recognise 
the CAS as a true court of arbitration but it also noted that if the IOC would be a party in 
proceedings before the CAS then the Court’s independence would be put into serious 
question.  
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The Gundel judgment ignited a new phase at the CAS. Gundel forced a process towards a 
completely independent Arbitration Court. This reform led to a structure of the CAS that was 
approved at a meeting in Paris on 22 June 1994. The agreement was signed by the highest 
authorities in sport representing the IOC, the Association of Summer Olympic International 
Federations (ASIF), the Association of Winter Sports Federations (AIWF) and the 
Association of National Olympic Committees (ANOC). Through this cooperation and 
consensus of a major part of the representative bodies in sport there was a serious adherence 
of individual sports bodies, clubs and athletes to the jurisdiction of CAS.  The latter two are 
bound to CAS arbitration via arbitration clauses, in individual contracts or in statutes or 
collective agreements. In addition to being the appeal body for these sport organisations, the 
CAS is also the appeal body in relation to doping matters judged on the basis of the World 




In 2003 in another case in which in the initial arbitration procedure the IOC was a party 
before the Swiss Federal Tribunal
288
 the CAS new administrative structures after Gundel were 
challenged. The essential question was if the links that the CAS has, especially its financial 
links, to the IOC, sufficiently guaranteed an impartial and independent trial for the parties in 
litigation.  The Swiss Federal Tribunal argued, in an extensive judgment, that the structure of 
the CAS, implemented after the Paris agreement, had the necessary independence to pass 
judgment in cases in which the IOC was a party and that there should be no fear for partiality 
or prejudice.
289




There are three types of activities
291
 that are carried out by CAS. The Court is the supreme 
court in sport arbitration cases that are brought before the case through specific arbitration 
clauses that exist between two parties, stemming from clauses in two-party contracts, a mutual 
choice for the CAS after a conflict has arisen or a link to CAS through the statutes and 
regulations of the governing body of a particular sport. This task of the CAS starts with a 
legal procedure and ends with the pronunciation of an arbitral award.  Another function of the 
CAS is that of a mediation tribunal. This function of the CAS helps parties to find an 
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amicable solution to their conflicts. And the last function of the CAS is to give Advisory 
opinions about sports matters.  The CAS is based in Lausanne and has a branch in New York 
as well. During major international sporting events such as the Olympic Games the CAS sets 
up ad hoc tribunals to deal efficiently with cases that pop up during these events. For every 
occasion specific procedural rules are made.  
 
The role of CAS in football-related cases has grown immensely since FIFA recognised the 
CAS as a tribunal to deal with the appeals of the FIFA’s own internal jurisdiction through its 
Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) and the Players’ Status Committee (PSC). In a circular 
letter of 2002
292
  FIFA expressed its acceptance of the CAS to this role to the member 
associations and it has grounded the function of CAS in its statutes.
293
 Since its adaption of 
this procedure the football cases before the CAS account for a large part of all the activities of 
the CAS. The CAS has thus influenced football in a significant way.  
 
In literature about the CAS there is a lively long-standing and on-going debate about the role 
of the CAS or about the potential role of the CAS.
294
 A returning focal point is the status of 
the CAS jurisprudence. Amongst these academics there is much discussion about the 
existence and / or extent of a Lex Sportiva based on the CAS decisions. On one side of the 
spectrum Nafziger describes Lex Sportiva as “The concept of a coherent and influential 
corpus of practice, has been identified with the lex mercatoria or law merchant, a venerable 
source of law that is said to form the foundation of international commercial practice and 
commercial arbitration
295
  On the other side, Anderson, reflecting on the work of Erbsen and 
Foster explains that “the concept of Lex Sportiva remains a nebulous one, and, certainly, one 
that should not be used to grant the institutional and regulatory mechanisms of international 
sport an autonomous legal character that is in some way elevated from state and public 
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 It can therefore be said that there is no clear definition about what a Lex Sportiva is or 
entails. Lex Sportiva in the overview above relates to decisions of sports governing bodies and 
awards in appeal procedures at CAS. For the sake of this thesis I will use the viewpoint that 
the idea of the function of a Lex Sportiva should be a uniform body of sports law that exists as 
an umbrella over the mosaic landscape of national sports laws or general laws that are applied 
to sport. 
 
If Lex Sportiva is regarded as a uniform body of sports law then it could be a basis for the 
creation of legal certainty in the field of sport and, as a consequence, also for football. In this 
sense, the ambiguity of the potential outcome of a conflict based on a difference in beliefs 
between the rival coalitions will be concluded by a binding award from the CAS arbitrators. 
The CAS could, as such, have a role in the creation of legal certainty. On the one hand this 
could be the consequence of a binding outcome in litigation that would in that situation be  an 
ultimate forum for rival coalitions to place their potential disputes. The award of the CAS 
would express the outcome of the dispute and hence a reconciliation between coalitions would 
be imposed upon the actors. On the other hand, if the CAS would produce binding Lex 
Sportiva then the threat of having a judgement that could lead to a binding outcome would 
bring parties closer together and serve as a source for an outcome in a hurting stalemate 
situation.  
 
In addition to these, the CAS also has a mediation role
297
 and it provides advisory opinions.
298
 
Actors within the coalitions could seek to reach a compromise by making use of these CAS 
powers and CAS could therefore emerge as a venue for the settlement of disputes. In order for 
the football policy sub-system to make use of the CAS as a forum, the CAS needs to be a 
place where there should be a stable, neutral and enforceable outcome of negotiations possible 
that would reconcile all actors and lead to fertile soil for policy oriented learning to take place. 
In order for a forum to be successful it needs, according to Sabatier, to meet the criteria of 
being prestigious enough to force professionals from different coalitions to participate and be 
dominated by professional norms.
299
 In addition, a condition for the professional football 
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sector to accept the forum are that an enforceable and consistent outcomes are possible, as the 
main issue at stake is the search for legal certainty.  
 
The CAS is funded by the ICAS and the parties to a procedure carry their own costs. This is a 
fair entry-level to the CAS as a forum for a settlement. An ordinary procedure at the CAS 
lasts between 6-8 months. This is the time of the settlement of a legal dispute and not of the 
time that negotiations would take place. If this duration comes on top of the negotiations that 
have forced a procedure towards CAS. 
 
The composition of the CAS can, in principle, be regarded as neutral and objective. In an 
arbitration procedure the parties choose their arbitrator from a list of 284 options.
300
These 
arbitrators are selected after applying for a position at the CAS in accordance with the CAS 
statutes: 
 
“In establishing the list of CAS arbitrators, the ICAS shall call upon personalities with full 
legal training, recognized competence with regard to sports law and/or international 
arbitration, a good knowledge of sport in general and a good command of at least one CAS 
working language, whose names and qualifications are brought to the attention of the ICAS, 




In an ordinary procedure there is one neutral president and two arbitrators each chosen by one 
of the parties. These arbitrators are forced to apply Swiss law if no choice for another 
jurisdiction has been made in the contractual relations between the parties that have brought 
their dispute forward to arbitration. Despite the fact that the arbitrators must have a 
background in sports this does not mean that there is a common ground for the approach to a 
problem.
302
 Due to the lack of an international coherent body of sports law and due to the 
difference in status of the sports sector in the European jurisdictions, it depends on the origin 
of the parties on how a dispute will be settled.  For example, the issue of third party influence 
is regarded differently amongst EU member states.
303
 For example, the approach in England is 
completely different to that in Portugal. If an award in relation to a dispute regarding TPI 
between an English and a Portuguese party in football is at stake and a decision of the panel 
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 Se for a more elaborate description further in  Chapter  8. 
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of arbitrators is the outcome of deliberations between the parties, then the outcome is 
probably to be different than the same problem, under the same factual conditions, if the 
parties come from another jurisdiction. 
 
Casini stresses that CAS has been relevant in developing new legal principles in such a case 
and thus constructing a new form of global sports law, consisting of principia sportiva. Also 
the role of CAS in the interpretation of sports law and regulations can be acknowledged and it 
can be a source for further harmonisation of sports law.
304
 Despite these positive effects, the 
CAS does not serve as a useful professional forum for reconciling difference in beliefs. 
Hence, the actors that compose the coalitions in the professional football subsystem have 
different EU backgrounds. The awards of the CAS are only binding upon the parties, 
therefore there is no creation of a binding precedent. This is a key element for the success of a 
professional forum in a process leading to policy change, the CAS lacks this element. In past 
cases, dealing with essential football topics that are the core of the difference in approach 
between the coalitions, it has turned out that the CAS awards lead to ambiguity and instead of 
providing legal certainty they create vagueness.   
 
In conclusion it appears that CAS may serve as an extra tool to provide legal certainty but that 
there is too much of a discrepancy between the outcomes of the awards. This inconsistency 
could refrain the actors in the coalitions from looking at the CAS as the forum for finalizing a 
negotiation between the coalitions. The CAS is more suitable for reconciling a conflict 
between two individual actors. The route to the CAS is also normally a negative one: it is 
chosen if parties are unable to reach a friendly settlement. This is another essential element of 




In this chapter the stakeholders in the football sector have been placed in a football policy 
subsystem composed of a sporting autonomy coalition and a football business coalition. The 
sporting autonomy coalition seeks to diminish the influence of European Union law on the 
governance of the football sector. FIFA and UEFA are the actors in this coalition. The actors 
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of the football business coalition have in common that they are involved in industrial relations 
as they represent employers or workers. The coalitions have opposite beliefs and the search 
for compromise and legal certainty has led to a status quo in which the rival coalitions have 
no more options to exploit due to the lack of resources or to the inability to enter into new 
venues. The actors may also, alternatively or in addition, consider the status quo 
unsatisfactory, time consuming, or expensive. Therefore, within the football international 
football sector, there is a deadlock as the actors are able to impose almost unlimited financial 
burden on each other while in the meantime the threat of litigation remains. 
 
In order to find a compromise the interests of the parties could be brought together in a forum 
that is prestigious enough to force them to participate and that is dominated by professional 
norms. The European Commission and the CAS have been analysed but both institutions 
cannot act as a professional forum. The Commission has a role more connected to that of a 
policy broker and the CAS is an arbitration tribunal that does not grant generally binding 
outcomes of disputes. Therefore, if both institutions are used as fora, the threat of litigation 
and thus legal uncertainty remains. 
 
In its White Paper the European Commission has promoted Social Dialogue as a source for 
the discussion of challenges between employers and athletes.
305
 With the lack of success of 
both fora described above, the remaining chapters explore the potential of Social Dialogue as 
a potential forum for reaching an agreement between the coalitions that leads to legal 
certainty. In the following chapter the background of Social Dialogue will be examined before 
the thesis explains of how Social Dialogue operates, and can continue to operate, within 
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European Union Labour Law and European Social Dialogue 
Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters have highlighted that legal uncertainty characterizes the European 
professional football sector and that rival coalitions are in a position of deadlock. It is also 
clear that the relation between a player and a club in European professional football can be 
characterized as employer and employee one, and the sector can be regarded as a truly 
European labour market. In the search for a possible forum that could introduce legal certainty 
within professional football, the thesis will now further explore the viewpoint that the sector is 
a labour market or industrial sector. In many European industrial sectors the existence of a 
Social Dialogue is a common feature. The European Commission has encouraged the social 
partners in sport to pursue a Social Dialogue to discuss issues that are of common concern to 
employers and workers. The main aim of the following two chapters is to assess whether a 
Social Dialogue, under the umbrella level of the EU, could serve the football sector as a 
source for the creation of legal certainty. The European Social Dialogue (ESD) will be 
embedded in the greater framework of European labour law. First, the evolution of EU labour 
law will be presented. Second, the focus will be on the European Social Dialogue, the 
preconditions for a Social Dialogue and the functioning of the ESD as a legal instrument. By 
doing this, the introduction of the application of the Social Dialogue in professional football 
will be better explained in Chapter 5. 
  
Evolution of EU labour law 
 
The main purpose of the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) was to secure 
peace by means of economic cooperation. The primary aim was to create a well-functioning 
common market with a free trade for goods, services and production factors within the 
borders of the territory of the EEC. Connected to the functioning of a common market is the 
movement of labour; a free economic market requires an efficient allocation of labour. This 
notion turned out to be the starting point for EU labour law as we know it today. However, in 
the period before the signing of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, it was thought that economic 
integration would create a spill-over effect to social and labour policy. The functioning of the 
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common market and the consequential economic growth would ensure an optimum allocation 





 combined with the general view of the Member States that 
social policy and labour law was a specific territory for the national Member States to 
preserve the integrity and political stability of their respective political regimes, led to little 
pressure for harmonisation of labour laws at the start of the EEC. The lack of pressure to 
harmonize was reflected in the Treaty of Rome, which contained a Title on Social Policy that 
only stimulated Member States to improve social conditions of workers and the standard of 
living by means of harmonisation. It did not contain any direct enforceable right for citizens. 
The provisions related to social policy that were to be included in the Treaty of Rome were all 
rather limited in scope, the only exception being Article 119 concerning equal pay for men 
and women. This article was addressed to the Member States and contained some substance 
for concrete action. The other social provisions were Article 117 (agreement upon the need to 
improve working conditions and standard of living for workers and to make possible their 
harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained); Article 118 (the promotion of 
close cooperation between the Member States and the coordination of action in all social 
policy fields); Article 121 (implementation of common measures, in particular as regards 
social security for migrant workers); Article 122 (requiring the Commission to include a 
chapter on social developments in its annual report to the European Parliament) and Article 
128 (the requirement for the Council to lay down general principles for implementing a 
common vocational training policy). 
 
The lack of a motivation for harmonizing social policy did not impede the creation of the 
pillar for the evolution of EU labour law: the free movement of workers. Prior to the signing 
of the Treaty of Rome the ministers of foreign affairs issued the important Spaak report.
308
 In 
this report it was stressed that, although limited action was needed in the field of social policy 
in order to create a well-functioning common market, the free movement of workers needed 
to be regulated. The Spaak report recommended that the right of free movement supposed that 
a worker should have the same rights and conditions as the nationals of the host state to take 
up and pursue employment in another Member State including the right to legally reside in the 
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host state if employment was found.
309
 These recommendations were introduced into the 
Treaty and laid down in the articles 45-48. In connection with Article 123, the establishment 
of the European Social Fund, these articles facilitated the employment and geographical and 
occupational mobility of the workers. 
 
As mentioned earlier, for the first years after the Treaty of Rome in 1957 it was clear that 
European labour law was based on an economic model. The precedence of economic 
objectives over social objectives led to a two-tiered approach. These developments were 
contrary to the usage on the national level of the Member States where economic and social 
policy were mostly interlinked. The EEC prospered in economic terms but the social situation 
of the workers was downgraded and with the lack of an institutional basis for concrete action 
the Member States ran the risk of destabilizing their own national systems. Even though the 
Commission recognised that the future of the EEC would be judged not only on economic 
prosperity but also on social progress,
310
 little activity came forth of the period after 1957. 
Only the free movement of labour served as a basis for law making activity, more specific the 
provisions of secondary law by means of Council Regulation1612/68 on free movement of 
workers.
311
 It was not until the 1970s that a change in this separation of economic and social 
approach came to the surface. 
 
The 1970s 
The end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s were characterised by social unrest in the 
EEC caused by a unparalleled growth between social standards and economy and the 
consequences of the oil shocks of 1970.
312
 It can be said that this collective feeling marked the 
turning point for social Europe. The realisation that Europe was on the eve of change became 
clear to the public in the period before the accession of three new Member States in 1973. On 
this day the heads of the governments of the EU Member States, gathered in Paris, stressed in 
a communiqué that vigorous action in the social sphere was to them as important as achieving 
economic and monetary union with participation of both sides of the industry in economic and 
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 Almost simultaneously the European Court of Justice judged in the 
famous Defrenne case,
314
 dealing with sex discrimination, that the equal pay provision of 
Article 119 EC “forms part of the social objectives of the Community, which is not merely an 
economic union, but at the same time intended, by common action, to ensure social progress 





The political change of viewpoint and the push of the ECJ towards workers protection 
earmarked the fact that the EEC was not reaching its objective of creating a social Europe by 
means of a laissez-faire approach in the social field. Mere incentives for social policy based 
on economic integration spill-over led to social suffering for individuals as well as companies.  
 
Social action was necessary to give the EEC a “human face”.
316
 The European Commission 
responded to these developments by drafting a Social Action Programme (SAP) in 1974. The 
SAP involved more than 30 measures to be adopted in the social field. However, these 
measures could be embedded within the three main objectives: the attainment of full and 
better employment in the Community, the improvement of living and working conditions, and 
the increased involvement of management and labour in the economic and social decisions of 
the Community and of workers in companies. The SAP was the starting point for intense 
legislative action related to social aspects.
317
 The word “related” opposes the idea that direct 
social legislation could be drafted and implemented in the EEC. In fact, legislation could only 
be directly related to employment law and not (yet) to a broader social sphere as envisaged by 
the 1973 communiqué. The reason for this was that harmonisation of laws in the field of 
labour was only possible under, or with reference to, Article 100 of the EC Treaty, hence if 
the establishment or functioning of the common market was in question. It is arguable that 
this change in the development of European Labour law of the 1970s brought a new model for 
legal policy to light, that contained social elements as an integral part of the establishment and 
                                                 
313
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functioning of the common market.
318
 In addition, due to the fact that initiatives that touched 
upon social issues needed to be adopted under general Treaty bases, it was ensured that 
Member States kept control over their national employment law systems; the bases for 
legislation required unanimous agreement of the Member States. 
 
However, the 1970s contributed to the development of EU labour law by passing three 
important directives: on the approximation of laws of the Member States relating to the 
principle of equal pay for men and women (75/117/EEC); on the approximation of laws of the 
Member States relating to collective redundancies (75/129/EEC) and the safeguarding of 
employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses 
(77/187/EEC). The directive on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion of 
working conditions (76/207/EEC) was based on Article 235 EC Treaty. 
 
By the end of the 1970s the end of a prosperous time of harmonisation reached its end. The 
expansion of EU labour law stagnated due to recession, high unemployment, competition of 
the unregulated labour markets of the Far East. These developments increased the motivation 
to deregulate labour markets and to introduce more flexibility in relation to workforce. The 
start of the 1980s were characterised by stagnation in the development of EU labour law. 
 
Thatcher vs. Delors 
The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was the personification of neo-liberalism in the 
EEC of the beginning of the 1980s. She advocated a reduction of socio-political intervention, 
which she argued was harmful for enterprises in industrial competition with the US and Japan, 
where there were less rigid social and working standards but stronger economies than in the 
EEC.
319
 As the Member States had a veto right concerning social, or socially connected, 
legislation, the European social movement came more or less to a standstill. However, the 
British influence appeared to have a French counterpart in the form of President Mitterand. In 
contradiction to the British perspective, the head of the French government promoted the idea 
of a European Social Area and submitted this as a memorandum to the European Council.
320
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Mitterand’s intention was to improve the cooperation between the social partners at 
Community level; the advancement of employment opportunities by the Community and an 
improvement in information and consultation procedures in the field of social protection. 
These views and recommendations appeared to be largely similar to the objectives set out in 
the 1974 SAP and it did not take a long time before these recommendations were put into 
practice. In 1984 the newly appointed European Commission was headed by Mitterand’s 
protégé, Frenchman Jacques Delors. One of his most important activities was the introduction 




The Single European Act 
In 1986 the contours of the Community became more defined as the first concrete steps 
towards the Single Market were taken. The Single European Act (SEA) had as its most 
important goal the creation of an area without obstacles for the free movement of goods, 
people, services and capital. By the end of 1992 this goal needed to be attained and the 
liberalization of trade would eventually lead to a new impulse for the economic growth of the 
Community.
322
 At first sight this seemed to be the only element that would have consequences 
for social development of the Community: a growing economy leading to more jobs. 
However, a more detailed look at the SEA shows that, at least, three landmark modifications 
were introduced. With the SEA the Social Dialogue was promoted by Delors.
323
 Both sides of 
the industry were involved in talks on how to improve the involvement of the Social Partners 
in the social development of the Community. Secondly, the SEA reformed the Communities 
structural funds. One of the beneficiary areas of these structural funds is social and economic 
cohesion within the Internal Market, the funds that could be liberated proved to be a helpful 
for the development of Community labour market policies. The third innovation, however, 
turned out to be the most significant: the extension of the instrument of qualified majority 
voting to include Article 118a EC Treaty (now amended article 153 TFEU) to adopt measures 
on health and safety of workers. Although this amendment only introduced the possibility to 
impose minimum harmonisation standards on the Member States, it had the important and 
revolutionary consequence that the veto right of the Member States concerning changes in 
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social policy of the EU on many social issues disappeared.
324
 This was especially of influence 
for the position of the UK, whose standpoint concerning social harmonisation had caused a 
standstill for social Europe. The circumvention of the UK’s veto power made that Article 




Nevertheless, the main focus of the SEA of 1986 was economic growth and the opening of the 
market. The social benefits of this objective were, at first sight, less clear than the obvious 
danger of the SEA: the fear for unemployment due to the shift of the production and the 
workforce to lower cost countries. It was for this reason that Delors stressed the importance of 
social cohesion in order to convince the citizens to support the SEA.
326
 He shared the vision 
of Mitterand, he was convinced that social improvement and economic development could 
perfectly co-exist and evolve in the same pace. There was a need for a true European Social 
Area. 
 
This vision coincided with political developments at that time which put pressure on notions 
of solidarity and that viewed social welfare as a collective activity rather than the 
responsibility of individuals, and social citizenship, the normative claim that egalitarian 
provision of welfare needs is superior to individual neo-liberal provisions.
327
 It had to be 
made clear that Europe exists for its citizens, and not the other way round. It was the time for  
“a People’s Europe”, not surprisingly also the title of the influential Adonnino report.
328
 To 
stress these developments all the Member States, except the UK, signed a Community Charter 
of Fundamental Social Rights in 1989. 
 
The Social Charter contained 26 rights which had to be implemented through an Action 
Programme. The legal status of the Social Charter has never been very clear. It can be 
characterized as a form of soft law, a moral obligation for the Member States to respect these 
social rights. It has therefore been characterised as a “social wish list”
329
 and a bitter failure.
330
 
However, the Charter and its attached Action Programme were useful in refocusing labour 
law issues around social / fundamental rights issues and the starting up of a dialogue on 
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labour law intervention at the EC level after a decade of stagnation.
331
 The Action Programme 
did create a boost for social Europe. The legislative result of the Action Programme was 
seventeen directives, from these seventeen, six dealt with direct labour law issues, where the 
others mainly dealt with health and safety in the workplace. As the directives were to be based 




The 1990s: From Maastricht to Amsterdam, Lisbon and Nice 
The recognition of the principle of subsidiarity and the creation of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) were the biggest changes that were visible after Maastricht; the first 
steps towards a single currency were taken and the economic tests for the Member States 
came into force. However, the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union also introduced a 
change of focus as social aspects became much more identifiable in the new Treaty. The 
Treaty came at a time in which there was, again, a high unemployment rate and a fear 
amongst the Member States for uncontrolled inflationary growth. In addition, it was the end 
of the cold war and a reunification of Eastern and Western Europe came in sight together with 
the probability of a two-speed process of integration.
333
 The Community’s response to these 
fears was reflected in Article 2 EC: “The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a 
common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing the common 
policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the Community a 
harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-
inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic 
performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard 
of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member 
States.” Included in the new additional activities of the Commission were the policies of 
Article 3 in the ‘social sphere comprising a European Social Fund’; ‘the strengthening of 
economic and social cohesion’ and a ‘contribution to education and training of quality’. A 
budgetary boost by the Member States of the financial resources of the EU made that these 
new activities could be put into practice soon after the implementation of the new Treaty. 
 
Other changes that were introduced by the EU Treaty and that influenced the development of 
EU labour law were, besides the abovementioned articles, changes to the titles on education, 
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social policy and vocational training; where the Community was given (restricted) 
competence. 
 
These changes were not included integrally in the new Treaty due to the reluctance of the UK 
to implement these social changes. The UK’s positioning in the debate around the acceptance 
of the Treaty endangered the ratification of the Treaty as a whole. In order not to jeopardize 
the next landmark step of the Community a ‘solution’ was found in placing the social policy 
initiatives in a separate Protocol and Agreement, Social Policy Agreement (SPA) to the 
Treaty.
334
 For the first time an agreement was reached by the twelve Member States that could 
only lead to binding agreements that were applicable to eleven Member States, the UK 
negotiated an opt-out for any initiative coming forth of the Social Chapter and for the EMU. 
The legal status of the SPA stayed unclear as the Agreement was attached to the Protocol and 
the Protocol was attached to the agreement, this making it part of the Treaty and thus part of 
EU law.  
 
As regards the contents of the SPA, three significant results came forth out of the SPA. For 
the first time the concept of citizenship was introduced in the Treaty making the approach 
more individual and allowing the citizens rights and duties, such as the right to free movement 
in the EU and the right to vote in any European Member State’s local elections.   
 
In Article 2 of the SPA the Community’s competence in the social field was broadened, and 
more importantly, qualified majority voting was introduced for a number of new areas: 
working conditions; information and consultation of workers; equality between man and 
women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work and the integration 
of those excluded from the labour market. In the second paragraph of this article a decision 
procedure on the basis of unanimity for the Council of Ministers was introduced for various 
social policy areas: social security and protection of workers; protection of workers when 
their employment contract is terminated; representation and collective defence of the interest 
of workers and employers, including co-determination and conditions of employment for 
legally resident third country nationals. Three areas were not explicitly mentioned as a field of 
competence for the EU: pay; the right of association and the right to strike or impose lock-
outs. 
                                                 
334




The third major change, and for this purpose the most important one, was the new role that 
was envisaged for the Social Partners. For the first time the Community attributed powers to 
bodies not directly integrated within the Community policy-making framework. This process 
will be outlined in detail later.  
 
Even if the developments after Maastricht seem positive, it was not a very active period when 
it comes to legislative activity; only four Directives were concluded. The fact that the UK did 
not participate in any activity in relation to social policy had a considerable impact on this. 
The situation was about to change at the start of 1997 when the UK opted back into the Social 
Chapter due to the change in the domestic government to labour.
335
 The following 
developments in the social sphere were now applicable to all 15 Member States. It was the 
time when the influence of the EMU could be noticed, Rhodes described this period after the 
introduction of the EMU “welfare without work”: expensive social welfare programmes in the 
Member States unsupported by high levels of employment which risked putting the EMU 
countries in breach of the economic criteria that were agreed upon.
336
 The consequence for the 
social situation and the evolution of EU labour law was that the single currency and the open 
market in the EU made that, although labour policy and employment law was still a domestic 
field of activity and falling under the subsidiarity principle, the social policy in one Member 
State became relevant for the other states. The constraints and interdependencies generated by 





The Amsterdam Treaty took these aspects into consideration and operated as a source for 
change. The Amsterdam Treaty was able, due to the reunification of the EU, to merge the two 
previous pillars of labour law in the EU: the SPA and the articles dealing with labour law in 
the EC Treaty. The Treaty of Amsterdam placed the result of these two documents in a new 
Title in the Treaty ‘The Union and the Citizen’. Another major change was the 
implementation of the Employment Title in the Treaty. The objective of Article 3 (now 
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amended and Article 9 TFEU) of the Treaty was amended in the sense that a new task, ‘a high 
level of employment and social protection’, was added. The objectives led to activity based on 
article 145 of the Treaty. This article states that the Member State will work towards a co-
ordinated strategy for employment. Articles 145-149 further defined this strategy which 
became known as the European Employment Strategy. It marked a shift from the protection of 
the individual worker towards the need for a high rate of employment in Europe; full 
participation of the citizens and guaranteeing equal opportunities for all. Connected to this 
new approach is also a new form of stimulating and creating policy. The focus on the 
legislative process disappeared and has made way for the so-called open method of 
cooperation (OMC). The OMC is characterized by focussing on the coordination of labour 
markets and employment policies.  
 
The OMC was one of the most important topics to be fine-tuned at the 2000 Lisbon summit. 
The goal of the Lisbon summit was to make the EU the most competitive and knowledge-
based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion. The social objectives are directed towards the full 
employment in the EU. One of the means of reaching these objectives was through the OMC, 
an approach focused on benchmarking, best practices, and exchanges of experiences. It is a 
soft law instrument and can be seen as an ideal tool to promote social policy creation in the 
EU: the Member States’ power is not reduced in the field of social policy but the focus is on 
the harmonisation of the laws. This marks one of the most important aspects of the Lisbon 
summit, the social aspects and the shift away from the community method of harmonisation 
and including a wider range of actors in the sphere of policy making. These landmark changes 
are still in evolution at this moment. The subsequent Nice Treaty change little to the situation 
described above.  
 
The more significant social impact of the Nice Treaty was the adoption of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.
338
 This Charter served as a codification of existing fundamental (social, 
political, economic and civil) rights and brought them under one European Union umbrella. It 
stressed the importance of the protection of fundamental rights in the Union as a “founding 
principle of the Union and an indispensible prerequisite for her legitimacy”.
339
 The Charter 
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did not have any legally binding effect at the time of the adoption during the Nice Treaty 




However, the most striking novelty
341
 on the social and employment level that was introduced 
with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 was the conversion on the status of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights.
342
 The Lisbon Treaty granted the Charter the same rights as the 
Treaty.
343
 These rights are primarily vertical rights, placing rights and obligations on EU 
institutions and Member States vis-a-vis individuals, however, due to status of the European 
Court of Justice as an EU institution the application of the Charter in judgements of the ECJ 




The time between the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty has been characterized by the failure 
to meet the expectations as laid down in the 2000-2010 Employment Strategy. By the time of 
the mid-term revision it already became clear that the objectives were not going to be reached 
in time.
345
 The same targets
346
 of the Employment Strategy remained in 2010 but the EU’s 
new ten year strategy, EU 2020, included them slightly different, focusing not on employment 
protection but on employment creation. The new strategy is focused on overcoming the deep 
financial crisis in which the European Union finds itself, but it also targets new objectives of 
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The EU2020 objectives and the Charter may influence social policy and the evolution of EU 
labour law in the coming years. According to Barnard
348
 the EU2020 strategies
349
 have had an 
impact for five reasons: it was the EU’s next big project after the Internal Market (1992), the 
EMU (1999) and the big bang enlargement (2003-2005), but now with a more social aspect as 
contrasting the economic aspects; the OMC has been introduced as the method to replace the 
classic Community Method on harmonisation; in this respect more social stakeholders are 
allowed to improve the legitimacy of governance within the EU. Not only the role of the 
Social Partners is enhanced, other stakeholders from civil society more generally are included; 
the shift from employment protection to employment creation and last but not least, the 
concept of ‘flexicurity’: creating better jobs and more security for the vulnerable individuals 
on the labour market while taking into consideration the changing ethos in the labour market. 
 
The Charter may have its greatest importance in providing the Court with a foundation for 





Social Policy and Law Making: Diversity and Flexibility 
 
The translation of social policy into EU legislation is based on the competence laid down in 
153 of the TFEU.
351
 According to Sections 1 and 2 of 153 TFEU the Union has the power to 
employ the ordinary legislative procedure
352
 to use minimum standards Directives to support 
and complement the activities of the Member States, after consulting the Committee of the 
Regions and the Economic and Social Committee, in the following areas: 
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(a) improvement in particular of the working environment to protect workers' health and 
safety; 
(b) working conditions; 
(c) social security and social protection of workers; 
(d) protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated; 
(e) the information and consultation of workers; 
(f) representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, 
including codetermination, subject to paragraph 5; 
(g) conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union 
territory; 
(h) the integration of persons excluded from the labour market, without prejudice to 
Article 166; 
(i) equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and 
treatment at work; 
(j) the combating of social exclusion; 
(k) the modernisation of social protection systems without prejudice to point (c). 
 
There are general limitations on the authority of the Union to legislate under Article 153 
(2)
353
, one concerns the fact that the Directive must seek to avoid to impose unnecessary 
constraints that would impede the creation and development of SME’s and that the legislative 
efforts only entail minimum standards for gradual implementation, having regard to the 
conditions and technical rules obtaining in each of the Member States. Other boundaries of 





 Subsidiarity limits the reach of EU legislation in the sense that it should 
leave space for the national legislators of the Member States to use their national measures to 
reach the objectives envisaged by EC policy makers. If the national legislator cannot achieve 
the objectives proposed by the Community action then the Community legislator is allowed to 
continue the legislative efforts. The principle of proportionality is centred around the Articles 
5(4): the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaty. In this case the Union can only take action if the test of effectiveness 
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and scale are satisfied and any of the taken measures is proportionate. The Commission 
introduces three questions that need to be answered in order to assess if the proportionality of 
the action is in balance with the outcome: 
 
- What is the Union dimension of the problem? 
- What is the most effective solution given to the means available to the Union and the 
Member States? 
- What is the real added value of common action compared with isolated action by the 
Member States? 
The objective of legislation on the basis of Article 153 TFEU is harmonisation in the field of 
social policy and employment law. However, the labour regulatory landscape of the Member 
States is very diverse and in order to reach a common ground based on harmony the right 
instrument needs to be selected. In order to be successful the instrument should be flexible 
enough in its output. The  instrument that is primarily used as the legislative driving force for 
minimum harmonisation is the Directive.
356
 The Member States maintain their ability to detail 
the implementation of the minimum standards (floor of rights) according to the needs of its 
national labour policy and the national method of operation. The Directive itself can contain a 
‘flexibility’ clause in the sense that it exempts the obligatory implementation of its content if a 
regulation respecting the general principles of the Directive is already in force in the Member 
State concerned and the two regulatory frameworks can be operational together in a ‘spirit of 
cooperation’.
357
 Also, especially due to clashes between the Anglo-Saxon and Romano-
Germanic jurisdictions, some Member States are allowed more time to implement a Directive. 
 
The second method of answering to the needs of diversity by means of a flexibility approach 
is the use of soft law. The majority of the EU legislation in the social policy field under the 
1974 and 1989 initiatives of the Social Action Programmes was legally binding. From 1995 
the Action Programmes contained more measures that were persuasive rather than coercive in 
nature. The Commission supported a new view that stressed that the recourse to the most 
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binding instruments should only be made as a last resort.
358
 Eventually the attempts to apply 
soft law measures in order to obtain the right balance between reaching policy objectives 
despite of the national diversity in social systems, culminated in the overall support for the 
OMC as a policy instrument for EU harmonisation in the social field, as a pillar for the EU 
2020 programme. 
 
A last source of flexibility stems from the role of the Social Partners in the European Union. 
In essence it can be said that the social partners have obtained an extensive responsibility as a 
potential co-legislator and that the instruments provided to them support a large degree of 
initiative and flexibility. As the true connoisseurs of social and labour issues, due to their day-
to-day involvement on the ‘work-floor’ the Social Partners are able to touch upon the 
specificities and target the right instrument and method to implement EU policy. The role of 
the Social Partners and the Social Dialogue will be discussed next. 
 
Social Dialogue and Collective Bargaining under the EU Treaty 
The term ‘Social Dialogue’ does not have a uniform definition as its meaning differs in the 
various jurisdictions in which it exists.
359
 In a broad sense, Social Dialogue can be described 
as all sorts of bipartite or tripartite discussions concerning labour problems involving both 
sides of the industry and governmental authorities aimed at wider understanding, resolutions, 
preparing or implementing policies, which may lead to binding agreements. A narrower 
meaning is that the term Social Dialogue entails all discussions and negotiations between both 
sides of the industry with a view to conclude binding agreements.
360
 For the purpose of this 
research the meaning of the EU Social Dialogue will be based on the literal text of Articles 
154 and 155 of the TFEU.  
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1) The Commission shall have the task of promoting the consultation of management and 
labour at Community level and shall take any relevant measure to facilitate their 
dialogue by ensuring balanced support for the parties. 
2) To this end, before submitting proposals in the social policy field, the Commission 
shall consult management and labour on the possible direction of Community action. 
3) If, after such consultation, the Commission considers Community action advisable, it 
shall consult management and labour on the content of the envisaged proposal. 
Management and labour shall forward to the Commission an opinion or, where 
appropriate, a recommendation. 
4) On the occasion of such consultation, management and labour may inform the 
Commission of their wish to initiate the process provided for in Article 153. The 
duration of the procedure shall not exceed nine months, unless the management and 
labour concerned and the Commission decide jointly to extend it. 
 
Article 155: 
1) Should management and labour so desire, the dialogue between them at Community 
level may lead to contractual relations, including agreements. 
2) Agreements concluded at Community level shall be implemented either in accordance 
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the Member 
States or, in matters covered by Article 153, at the joint request of the signatory 
parties, by a Council decision on a proposal from the Commission. 
The Council shall act by qualified majority, except where the agreement in question 
contains one or more provisions relating to one of the areas for which unanimity is 
required pursuant to Article 153(2). In that case, it shall act unanimously.  
 
On the basis of these articles the rights and powers of labour and management, the social 
partners, can be abstracted. Whenever the Commission comes up with the initiative to draft, 
revise or influence policy that is connected to social issues, it is compulsory for the 
Commission to consult management and labour on this. These consultations enable labour and 
management to leave their mark on the Commission’s initiative in a two-stage consultation 
process. Management and labour will give their view on the Commission’s initiative in the 
first stage, they have six weeks to prepare and submit their feedback. It might be possible that 
management and labour advise the Commission to withdraw the initiative in this stage or to 
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inform about the possible direction or the feasibility of the proposal in general. In a second 
stage a consultation on the actual content will follow and management and labour are allowed 
to give their opinion and or recommendations. However, the right that is given to both sides 
of the industry goes much further; management and labour have the power to intervene and 
the power of direct initiative.  
 
The power to intervene means that management and labour can take over the negotiation 
process of the Commission and draft their own agreement on the matter in question: 
‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’.
361
 The scope of their negotiations does not lie within 
the boundaries of the Commission’s proposal. They may include in their negotiations every 
aspect that they deem necessary. The social partners have nine months to come to an 
agreement and present this agreement to the Commission, this procedure is limited in order 
for the social partners not to obstruct European Policy making. If social partners fail to agree 
in those nine months, or decide not to negotiate further, the Commission has to assess the 
situation and it can proceed with presenting its own proposal. In case of successful 
negotiations between management and labour the Commission will propose the result to the 
Council in order for the Council to take a decision. It then depends on the content of the 
agreement if the Council takes a decision with qualified majority or with unanimity. The 
consequence of this legislative path to agreements is that the result has an erga omnes effect. 
The decision of the Council takes the form of a directive. This aspect is even more interesting 
when one realizes that the social partners also have the right of own initiative to come to 
agreements. There is no clear definition on what may fall under an agreement in this context. 
It may entail joint statements, especially important as a form of ‘soft law’ or lobbying 
instrument, but also framework agreements. These agreements may then be implemented in 
the various member states. 
 
Article 155 lists the two methods in which an agreement may be converted to the level of the 
Member States. One method is the way of implementation by means of procedures and 
practices familiar in the Member States. In practice this means that an agreement on the EU 
level will ‘drip down’ to the national level by means of implementation in a collective 
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bargaining agreement. Goerke and Piazolo
362
 are of the opinion that the likelihood that this 
form of implementation will be used is to be negligible. First, the incentives to pursue this 
option are small as all collective contracts would have to contain the same clauses to 
guarantee universal coverage. Second, the laws of only a few states
363
 have provisions to 
extend agreements erga omnes, which could be used to apply bilateral agreements of the 
social partners to all employers and employees. This statement became more true after the 
“big bang” accession of 10 new Member States in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and 





In a similar method to the process described above, the social partners are able to negotiate 
about every topic that they deem necessary. However, the power of the social partners lies 
especially in the fact that the results of their negotiations may be converted into a directive. 
This conversion is only possible if the negotiation result contains elements that may be placed 
under Article 153 of the Treaty: improvement of the working environment and conditions to 
protect workers’ health and safety; information and consultation of workers; equality between 
men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work; and the 
integration of persons excluded from the labour market. These are the elements that are able 
to be passed by the Council on the basis of qualified majority voting. Article 153 sub 3 
includes other issues that can be part of agreements but that need unanimity voting by the 
Council: social security and social protection of workers; protection of workers when their 
employment contract is terminated; representation and collective defence of the interests of 
workers and employers, including co-determination; conditions of employment for third 
country nationals legally residing within Community territory, as well, as financial 
contributions for the promotion of employment and job creation. There are four issues which 
are explicitly excluded from the range of negotiation issues: provisions concerning payment; 
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the right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs. A quick look at these provisions show 
that the range of potential matters that could be the basis for a conversion of an agreement 
into mandatory laws is very extensive and the powers granted to the social partners gives 
them the status similar to that of legislators. 
 
Social Partners: Negotiations and Agreements 
 
Academic literature, as discussed below, has focused on the extent of the social partners’ 
powers to create legislation that has an erga omnes effect. Also, in the case that the social 
partners do create legislations with such a binding effect, is there enough democratic 
legitimacy in the process of lawmaking in such a case?   
 
As stated above, the social partners bargain in the shadow of the law. This process starts when 
the social partners are consulted by the Commission on the basis of Article 154 and decide to 
take over the negotiations from the Commission. On the contrary, when the social partners 
negotiate about topics coming from Article 153, initiated by themselves, there are questions 
about the role of the Commission, as the keeper of the Treaty and of the Council as the 
legislator. What is the influence of these institutions on the negotiation result of the social 
partners? 
 
First, the Commission is obliged to assess the representativeness and the mandate of the social 
partners, and the legitimacy of the agreement. According to Goerke and Piazolo
365
 the 
dominating legal interpretation of the Social Chapter is that the Commission is not granted 
discretion. This is also the opinion of the Economic and Social Council, because the 
procedure set out in Article 4 (now Article 153 TFEU) is not designed to seek the 
Commission’s approval for a collective agreement, but rather to use the Community’s 
legislative machinery to endow agreements with the legal standing that they otherwise would 
not have. In addition to this, Goerke and Piazolo
366
 state that, there is no textual evidence 
contained in the Social Chapter that indicates that the Commission can assess the agreement 
in terms of the criteria listed in its communication. Also, the first draft for Article 4 of the 
Social Chapter contained the following clause: “where management and labour so desire, the 
                                                 
365





Commission may submit proposals to transpose the agreement referred to in paragraph 1 into 
Community legislation.” Because this optional clause (may) was replaced by a more 
restrictive clause (shall) in Article 4 Section 2, it is arguable that a limitation of the 
Commission’s discretion was intended. According to Goerke and Piazolo
367
 it is the general 
legal opinion that there is no doubt on the Council’s discretion because the general division of 
power between Commission and Council implies that the Council is not bound to the 
Commission’s proposal and is therefore not constrained by the social partners’ agreement. 
However, in that respect, the Social Chapter nor the Treaties contain rules in the case that a 
social partner agreement has been rejected. This implies that the Commission and the Council 
do not have the power of discretion. 
 
As regards Commission or Council amendments to the social partner agreements, Goerke and 
Piazolo mention that the Commission would not have the right to amend the agreement 
because the agreement would then no longer represent the  social partners’ mutual view. In 
addition, the Council would also be bound to the agreement of the social partners. The 
Commission claims that, just like on national level, the Council is not allowed to amend such 
agreements. The amendment of these agreements would be in contrast with the principle of 
subsidiarity. The Council does have the right to reject a proposal in their view. 
 
Keller and Sörries also state that according to the Commission the Council should not enjoy 
substantial rights of change and that it (the Commission) threatens to withdraw a proposal if 
the Council tries to change the agreement of the social partners.
368
 Britz and Schmidt
369
 judge 
on the basis of (old) Article 211(1)
370
 of the Treaty that the Commission has as its duty to 
judge if an agreement is compatible with Community law and that it therefore has the right to 
reject an agreement to be forwarded to the Council. As regards the Council, Britz and Schmidt 
comment that the Council alone bears the political, as well as the legal, responsibility for 
Community law. Thus, it must be free to decide whether it wishes to grant the joint request of 




 Keller, B. and  Sörries, B. (1999), Old wine in new bottles?, Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 9, 1999, 
p. 111-125 
369
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law, European Law Journal, Vol. 6, Nr. 1, 2000, p. 45-71. 
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management and labour for the implementation of an agreement. Britz and Schmidt also 
argue that it seems that the powers of amendment are not available; it would undermine the 





 shares this view and adds that the status of the proposal would change if the 
Council could amend it; it would then be a Commission proposal that would be ‘sent back’ 
after amendment. The oddity would then be that the Commission would be forced to re-
consult the social partners under article 153.  
 
In conclusion, the Commission and the Council have limited powers to amend agreements 
between  management and labour concluded on EU level. The Commission may only reject 
an agreement based on a marginal test concerning the legitimacy of the agreement. In 
addition, it seems unlikely that the Council would reject a proposal from the social partners. 
The important role that has been attributed to the social partners has been stressed, they can be 
regarded as external legislators. Barnard
373
 gives four explanations and justifications for the 
involvement of the social partners which she distils from Community documentation 
regarding the emergence of the social partners as key actors in social policy. She addresses 
the issue of subsidiarity; the social partners are part of the interaction between the Community 
and the Member States in the social arena; effectiveness; legitimacy and democracy. The 
issue of legitimacy is closely connected to an important aspect of the Social Dialogue, namely 
representativity. 
 
Representativeness of Social Partner Organisations 
 
The European Commission has defined three criteria that social partner organisations need to 
fulfil before they can be admitted to the Social Dialogue.
374
 The organisations in question 
must: 
 
- be cross-industry or relate to specific sectors or categories and be organised at 
European level;  
                                                 
371
 Supra, Britz and Schmidt (2000). 
372
 Supra, Franssen, E. (2002), op.cit. 
373
 Barnard, C.(2002), The social partners and the governance agenda, European Law Journal, Vol. 8, 2002, p. 
80-101. 
374
 European Commission (1993) Communication concerning the application of the agreement on social policy 




- consist of organisations which are an integral and recognised part of Member States’ 
collective bargaining structures and are competent to negotiate agreements, in 
addition to being as far as possible representative of all Member States;  
 
- have adequate structures to ensure their effective participation in the consultation 
process.  
 
In its 1996 Communication
375
 the Commission added two more criteria dealing specifically 
with the Article 155 (2) agreements. The Commission needs to examine if those involved in 
the negotiation have a genuine interest in the matter and can demonstrate significant 
representation in the domain concerned. This indicates that an organisation active in one 
particular sector could not conclude an agreement that would lead to an erga omnes binding 
effect in another sector in which the organisation is not sufficiently represented. Franssen 
adds to the Commission criteria extra elements that in her perspective need to be respected.
376
 
According to her the membership of the European, as well as the national, organisations must 
be voluntary; the European organisations must have internal democratic decision making 
procedures; the European organisations must be mandated by their national affiliates to 
conclude European agreements and membership of the European organisations should exist in 




 argue that the 
representativity of social partner organisations should also be measured according to the 
amount of people that are covered by an 155(2) agreement converted into a Directive. The 
Court of First Instance (CFI) (General Court) added a similar criterion as a result of the 
UAPME case
379
. In this Case UAPME argued that, since it had been consulted in the 
‘informal’ 154 consultation stage of a Directive concerning parental leave, it should have 
been invited to be involved in the negotiations that would formally lead to a proposal to the 
Council. The CFI stated that the Commission and the Council have to ascertain whether, 
having regard to the content of the 153 (2) agreement in question, the signatories, taken 
together, are sufficiently representative to justify the Council to turn a European agreement 
                                                 
375
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into a Directive. 
 
In order to find out if a social partner organisation is representative the European Commission 
carries out a representativity check. In principle all the organisations that have been specified 
in the 1993 communication are able to negotiate an agreement, according to the Commission. 
As an extra check the Commission organises informal meetings with organisations that have 
not participated in the negotiations after an agreement has been reached. During this meeting 
the Commission invites the organisations to communicate possible defects in the agreement, 
such as the possible lack of representativeness. These organisations can influence the follow-




Levels of Social Dialogue 
 
The Social Dialogue as anchored in the TFEU can take place at three levels. The intersectoral 
level, the sectoral level and company level. The intersectoral level is the umbrella level of the 
EU. It is a Social Dialogue on a generalist inter-professional level and it thus is the most 
important level of Social Dialogue, being the source for the most elaborate outcome of 




The intersectoral Social Dialogue entails various platforms for negotiation and action. Every 
year the Social Dialogue Committee gathers representatives from the cross-industry social 
partners in order to have an (informal) Social Dialogue. The meetings contain three sessions, 
one for each side of the industry and one plenary session. An outcome of these meetings could 
be the creation of specific working groups and the organisation of seminars on issues related 
to industrial relations. The Social Dialogue Committee is also responsible for the follow-up of 
the outcome of negotiations between the cross-industry social partners. Finally, an 
institutionalised basis for negotiation and a source for forward motions concerning the Social 
Dialogue are the regular Social Dialogue summits, headed by the president of the European 
Commission. 
 
                                                 
380
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The intersectoral Social Dialogue includes six representative cross-industry organisations.
382
 
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) represents workers across the industries at 
European level. ETUC was set up in 1973 and it includes 81 organisations from 36 European 
Countries, including all EU Member States, and 11 European Industry federations with some 
60 million members. When it comes to issues related to the European Social Dialogue ETUC 
can take decisions by means of its executive committee when it is supported by 2/3 of its 
members. The 11 federations include the majority of European branch trade unions, which 




The Confederation of European Business (Businesseurope) was set up in 1958 and is the 
largest employers’ organisation in Europe in terms of economic coverage. It includes 39 
employers’ associations from 33 European countries, including all EU Member States. It 





The European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General 
Economic Interest (CEEP), set up in 1961, is an employers’ association for public sector 





The European Association of Craft, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (UAPME) 
represents over 78 member organisations including national cross-sectoral federations of 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises federations and other European organisations 
representing small businesses. According to its own figures it represents more than 11 million 
businesses employing 50 million workers. After the abovementioned case before the ECJ 





Eurocadres represents professional and managerial staff in Europe, in all branches of industry, 




 To be found at the website of ETUC: http://www.etuc.org/r/5. 
384
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385




 To be found at the website of UAPME: http://www.ueapme.com/spiP.php?rubrique1. 
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the public and private services and administrative departments. It is a member of the ETUC 




The European Confederation of Executives and Managerial Staff (CEC) is a professional 
organisation but it is independent of ETUC. It represents European branch federations and 17 





The sectoral Social Dialogue as we know it today evolved out of the first platform for 
negotiation between a European policy maker and the actors from a specific sector. The 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, contained an article 
dedicated to the setting-up of a Consultative Committee composed of an equal number of 
workers, producers, consumers and dealers of these industries.
389
 The  (executive) High 
Authority was obliged to consult the Committee whenever it concerned general objectives and 
programmes. After that, with the creation and evolution of the European Union and EU labour 
law, came the introduction of sectoral joint advisory committees in the 1960s. The purpose of 
these joint committees was to broadly assist the European Commission  in the drawing up and 
implementation of Community Social Policy aimed at improving and harmonising living and 
working conditions in their respective sectors.
390
 To this end the sectors were able to produce 
joint opinions and reports; carry out seminars and influence the Commission on their own 
initiative. Eventually these committees had to create the basis for European level collective 
bargaining. The impetus for the creation of these joint committees was two-fold. The first 
‘wave’ was comprised of five sectoral joint committees that evolved due to the fact that these 
sectors became part of common EU policy. These first five sectors were agriculture (1963 
establishment of a joint advisory committee and 1974 institutionalised as a joint committee); 
road transport (1965); inland waterways (1967) establishment of a joint advisory committee 
and in 1980 institutionalised as a joint committee); fisheries (1968 establishment of a joint 
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The second wave was caused by the trend towards liberalisation in the end of the 1980s and 
the first half of the 1990s, of industrial sectors and the necessity for the sectors to react to 
these developments and to assist the European Commission in the improving and harmonising 
of living and working conditions. These sectors were sea transport (1987); civil aviation 
(1990); telecommunications (1990) and postal services (1994).  
 
Simultaneous with the establishment of these second generation joint committees, informal 
working parties were created. These informal working parties were less ambitious in their 
output as regards the joint committees and they stressed the importance of creating links 
based on mutual trust and understanding. In this sense it also responded to the reluctance on 
the side of the employers to be organised at European level. Due to the lack of pressure from 
the side of the Commission, unlike sectors where EU policy was being created and the joint 
committees were obliged to act, these informal working parties were successful in drafting 
texts based on mutual interests such as training and education. These informal working parties 
were created in the following industries: sugar (1969); Horeca (1983); Commerce Retail 
(1985); Commerce Wholesale (1987); Insurance (1987); Banking (1990); Footwear (1991); 
Construction (1992); Textiles and Clothing (1992); Private Security (1993); Woodworking 
(1994) Electricity (1996); Personal Services (1998) and Tanning and Leather (1999). 
 
Thus it appears that already for more than 30 years there exists activity in specific sectors 
when it comes to industrial relations and social partner activity. However, it was only in the 
late nineties that the European Commission began to signal the importance of the sectoral 
Social Dialogue.  
 
In 1996 the European Commission issued a communication on the Social Dialogue that 
contained an entire section to the sectoral Social Dialogue.
392
 In this communication the 
European Commission proposed a reform to the above described method of operation of the 
sectoral Social Dialogue. It states that it regrets that the potential of the joint committees and 
informal working parties as consultative bodies has not been used to the full outside of 
mandatory consultations. And when the opinion of the bodies had been sought, according to 
the Commission, the “sectoral bodies have often been unable to give their opinion until after 
                                                 
392
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the Commission has adopted the text in question”.
393
 One of the reasons that was given for 
this result was the fact that the possibility for the social partner in a specific sector to react on 
policy initiatives was limited to social aspects of the proposal rather than to economic policy 
considerations. The Commission was of the opinion that the compartmentalisation of the 
social and economical aspects needed to be bridged and it proposed a reform as regards to 
move some of the tasks relating to the joint committees and informal working parties from 
DG V to the relevant sectoral DG’s. Under this system, which aims for a rationalisation of 
consultative bodies, the responsibility and administrative structure, at least for the Joint 
Committees which cover a Common Policy of the EU, retaining responsibility for 
coordination, for dialogue on social policy and for monitoring the effectiveness of Social 




Another main issue that justified a reform was the heavy budgetary and administrative burden 
that stemmed from these bodies. The objectives that the Commission had in mind for reform 
were therefore: a reduction of the number of members of each committee; to cover all 
strategic sectors and to improve inter-sectoral information and coordination.
395
 The 
Commission wanted to avoid that the bodies would grow with every expansion of the 
European Union. With the second objective the Commission envisaged to include sectors in 
which the social partners were clearly active and that the issues that were included in 
negotiations should cover priority issues dealing with social implications of the relevant social 
policy as well as questions of general interest to the sectoral social partners. The last objective 
intended to bring together representatives from the different sectoral dialogues for information 




With its decision of 20 May 1998
397
 the Commission took action according to the advice 
above and it introduced a renewed sectoral Social Dialogue: Sectoral Social Dialogue 
Committees (SSDC’s). These SSDC’s comprise a maximum of 40 members evenly divided 
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The social partner organisations that wish to start up negotiations within a SSDC make a joint 
request to the European Commission. After a representativity check the European 
Commission may give a green light to the social partners. The check is carried out using the 
same criteria as are applicable to the intersectoral social partners. Delegations are composed 
according to internal procedures. The meetings of a SSDC is always attended by a 
Commission representative that acts as a secretary. The chairperson of such a meeting may 
also be a Commission representative, at the joint request of the partners. The rules of 
procedure and the annual work programme are expected to be drawn up by the social partners 
themselves. General topics are discussed in annual meetings and more specific topics and 
detailed information is discussed in particular working groups. In order to disseminate 
outcomes of negotiations and to receive external input round table sessions, seminars and 








Social Dialogue on enterprise level 
 
The Social Dialogue on an enterprise level or Euro-Company level has received impetus after 
the Directive on European Works Councils (ECWD) in 1994
401
, this being the key-
development in this area. The directive serves as the basis for the creation of intra-company 
fora consisting of representatives of workers and management. The ECWD provides for 
information and consultation of employee representatives based on a contractual model. The 
enterprise level Social Dialogue is of less importance to the thesis; the focus will below be on 
the sectoral Social Dialogue. 
 
The results of the sectoral Social Dialogue on the various levels can be categorized in a choice 
of manners. The European Commission has a system of categorization which can be found at 
the Employment and Social Affairs website.
402
 A clear overview is also given by Pochet.
403
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a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of 
undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees 
402
 To be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=521andlangId=en, the different types are 
categorized under the pull-down menu.  
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The latter will be used here.  
 
Pochet distinguishes various types of joint documents and provides a quantitative analysis of 
the activity of the social partners on a cross-industry as well as on sectoral level. The 
categories of agreements are: 
 
Agreements: this category responds to agreements initiated between the European social 
partners (pursuant to Article 155), intended for national organisations and with a follow-up 
and procedure determining precise mechanisms and deadlines for implementation. 
Agreements may or may not be converted into directives. 
 
Recommendations: This category comprises texts whose provisions are drawn up by the 
European social partners, intended for national organisations and for which a follow-up and 
evaluation procedure is laid down at national and European level. There is deemed to be 
follow-up if the text of the joint document sets out (reasonably precise) procedures for 
national implementation and for a European level evaluation of this follow-up at a given point 
in time. This is therefore a procedural definition. Follow-up as defined here should not be 
confused with implementation, which relates to substantive aspects. 
 
Declarations: this category corresponds to ‘declarations of intent’ drawn up by the European 
social partners, intended for national organisations or for themselves, and where no explicit 
follow-up procedures are set out in the text or where the procedure is vague. 
 
Tools (for training and action): This category comprises various sub-categories: studies (only 
studies carried out jointly by the social partners and not by European and / or national 
consultants); handbooks; glossaries or databases. 
 
Rules of procedure: these are recognition agreements between the social partners. 
 
Common positions: this category corresponds to texts addressed to the European institutions. 
These texts may be produced under very different circumstances. Sometimes the prime 
purpose of a common position is very obvious but, in other cases, it may be vague due to 
                                                                                                                                                        
403
 Pochet, P. (2006), A quantitative analysis, in Dufresne, A., Degryse, C., Pochet, P. (eds.), The European 
Sectoral Social Dialogue: actors, developments and challenges, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2006, p. 83-87. 
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being watered down by the numerous matters covered. 
 
In addition, Pochet has distinguished the themes which have been covered by the various 
documents. The themes are health and safety; Training; Employment; working time; Social 
Dialogue; enlargement; working conditions; non-discrimination; sustainable development; 




The most recent overview of the results of the ESSD was provided by the European 
Commission in 2010 in its staff document on the functioning and potential of European 
sectoral Social Dialogue.
405
 In this document the Commission stresses the importance of the 
sectoral committees and also promotes more synergies between the parties. The representative 
social partners should also be open for allowing other representative bodies in on their 
invitation in order to strengthen representativeness where possible. 
 
The total outcome of texts up to 2010 was over 500 joint documents.
406
 The overview of the 
results shows that between 1998 (third generation Social Dialogue) and February 2010 a total 
of 338 joint outcomes were registered. Of these outcomes
407
 there were 6 agreements that 
were backed by a Council decision,
408
 4 autonomous agreements,
409





 164 joint opinions
412




A general conclusion of this overview is that the Social Dialogue in practice is much more a 
consultation mechanism in combination with an instrument that produces non-binding texts. 
The majority of texts are codes of conduct, guidelines, etc - in essence, soft-law initiatives. 
This development may not, in principle, relate to the ‘romantic’ idea that was advocated by 




 European Commission, Commission Staff working document on the functioning and potential of European 
Sectoral Social Dialogue, SEC (2010)964 final 22 July 2010, Brussels. 
406
 Ibid, p. 6. 
407
 Below the definitions of the sort of agreements were published in Weber, S. (2009), Autonome Sozialdialoge 
auf EU-Ebene. Zur Problematik der Implementation von ‘Texten der neuen Generation’, Industrielle 
Beziehungen, Vol. 15, Nr. 1. p. 53-75. 
408
 Member States are responsible for transposition and implementation. 
409
 Implemented in accordance with the practices specific to management and labour and the Member States. 
Primarily the Social Partners are responsible. 
410
 Identification of policy priorities, guidelines and codes of conduct, policy orientations. These agreements 
require a regular reporting and follow-up.  
411
 Outlining future work and activities, no implementation or follow-up provisions. 
412
 Provide input to the European institutions and/or public authorities. No follow-up, implementation or 
monitoring provisions. 
413
 Internal documents, practical advice. 
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Delors in the 1980s, it does fit in the picture of the new approach towards EU labour law 
which is directed towards the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy by means of the Open 
Method of Cooperation. Under this development the social partners are supposed to take more 




Despite this new approach, more focused on consultation, it cannot be denied that the Social 
Dialogue has been successful in establishing consensus about issues relevant to social partners 
in a specific sector. This has been illustrated in a EU Social Dialogue newsletter were the best 
practices in 29 sectors.
415
  The social partners were invited to present their achievements over 
the last years. The overviews provided by the social partners contained four EU wide 







and Personal Services / Hairdressing
419
, agreements have been reached. These agreements 
were made on the umbrella level of the EU and have been implemented in the national 
Member States. The agreements in these sectors cover millions of workers and show the 
potential impact of the EU Social Dialogue. 
 
Despite this success, the perspective of the movement of the Social Dialogue from negotiation 
to consultation remains vivid in academic literature.
420
 This is in a way a realisation that the 
Social Dialogue does not have as the main purpose to create EU labour law. Pressing 
elements for this to evolve in that way are lacking at this moment. The only tool for 
pressuring the social partners, and mainly the employers, to conclude binding agreements is 
                                                 
414
 See also Branch, A. (2005), The evolution of the European Social Dialogue towards greater autonomy: 
challenges and potential benefits, The International Journal of comparative labour law and industrial relations, 
Vol. 21, Nr. 2, p. 321-346. See also both the 1998 and 2010 Communications.  
415
 European Commission, EU Social Dialogue Liason Forum (2014), EU Social Dialogue Newsletter nr. 5: 
Success Stories on Sectoral Social Dialogue achievements in Europe. 
416
 Framework agreement on prevention from sharp injuries in the hospital and health care sector. This 
framework agreement affects 12.5 million workers active in the healthcare sector in the EU. European 
Commission, EU Social Dialogue Liason Forum (2014), EU Social Dialogue Newsletter nr. 5: Success Stories 
on Sectoral Social Dialogue achievements in Europe, p. 45. 
417
 Agreement on workers health protection through the good handling and use of crystalline silica and products 
containing it. This agreement was turned into a directive and now covers half a million workers at 6.400 
industrial sites in around 34 countries. European Commission, EU Social Dialogue Liason Forum (2014), EU 
Social Dialogue Newsletter nr. 5: Success Stories on Sectoral Social Dialogue achievements in Europe, p. 62. 
418
 Agreement on working conditions of mobile workers in cross-borders services. European Commission, EU 
Social Dialogue Liason Forum (2014) EU Social Dialogue Newsletter nr. 5: Success Stories on Sectoral Social 
Dialogue achievements in Europe, p.73. 
419
 European Framework Agreement on the protection of occupational health and safety in the hairdressing 
sector. European Commission, EU Social Dialogue Liason Forum (2014), EU Social Dialogue Newsletter nr. 5: 
Success Stories on Sectoral Social Dialogue achievements in Europe, p. 66. 
420
 Dufresne, A. (2006)  The Evolution of sectoral industrial relations in Europe, in Dufresne, A., Degryse, C., 
Pochet, P. (eds.), The European Sectoral Social Dialogue: actors, developments and challenges, Peter Lang, 
Brussels, 2006, p.50-81. 
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the threat of community legislation. As this threat is not a very vivid one in most cases, social 
partners to not see the need to become very active. This would change if there would exist, for 
example, a collective right to strike in the European Union. But this collective right is lacking 




have characterized this development as a weakness of the Social Dialogue. 
The reality is that, perhaps, the vision was too optimistic in the early days of Social Dialogue. 
In practice, judging on the current sectors, an umbrella collective bargaining agreement, on 
the (minimum) contents of an employment relationship is very difficult to obtain when one 
realizes the differences in national labour law regulations. These difficulties have also been 
illustrated by Franssen
422
 when describing the implementation of the telework agreement. In 
the case of the telework agreement the social partners had to implement the agreement on a 
national level within three years. However, the implementation differed from Member State to 
Member State. In some countries the social partners agreed to implement the agreement by 
means of an instrument not characterized as collective bargaining. In other countries the 
implementation has been achieved through legislation and in again another number collective 




 has previously charted why, in some sectors, the weakness and lack of outcome can 
be explained. In summary the employers favour a more consultative dialogue, and not a too 
politicised discussion where trade unions bring issues into the scope of the negotiations that, 
according to the employers, do not fit in Social Dialogue. Also the fear of extra costs is 
mentioned. From the side of the workers the lack of the political will of the employers is 
identified as the main impediment. Pochet charts the more objective impediments as: national 
unique structures that cannot be compared with other countries and different negotiation 
methods. In addition to this, the subsidiarity issue is raised in order to hold EU negotiations 
back; the specificity and the complexity of sectors make that they cannot be managed on an 
umbrella EU level. Finally, a lack of resources and poor organisation of the Social Dialogue 
meetings and the general economic situation such as company closures which are not 
                                                 
421
 Blanpain, R. (2007),The European Social Dialogue and voluntary framework agreements, In Blanpain, R. 
(ed.), European framework agreements and Telework: law and practice, A European and Comparative Study. 
The Hague, Kluwer, p. 31-39; Keller, B., Sörries, B.(1998), The sectoral social dialogue and European social 
policy: More fantasy, fewer facts,  European Journal of Industrial  Relations, Vol. 4, Nr. 3, p. 331-348.; 
Franssen, E. (2007), De Europese Sociale Dialoog, Arbeid Integraal, 2007, Vol 1.p.19-42. 
422
 Franssen, E. (2007), De Europese Sociale Dialoog, Arbeid Integraal, Vol 1.p. 25-26. 
423
 Supra, Pochet (2006), P. 111-112. 
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conducive to dialogue and solidarity. 
 
Despite the proven difficulties of obtaining the result of an erga omnes EU agreement, the 
Social Dialogue does possess the characteristics to reach such an agreement. It depends on the 




In this chapter the European Social Dialogue has been placed within the larger framework of 
the evolution of EU labour law. From the moment that Europe felt that it was necessary to 
show a more ‘human face’ the evolution of labour law shifted towards a more participatory 
one. Industrial relations developed and along the years the social partners became more 
autonomous in regulating their sectors. 
 
This regulation of the sector may eventually culminate in the conclusion of binding 
agreements that have an erga omnes effect in the total European Union. This effect is reached 
by means of the issuing of a Directive by the Council on the initiative of the Commission. In 
the case that the social partners request the Commission to put a request for a Directive 
forward to the Council than both EU institutions are only permitted to marginally test the 
agreement reached by the social partners. Another option is to implement the agreements by 
means of procedures familiar to the national level of the different member states. 
 
The focus of the chapter was the sectoral Social Dialogue. Although there have not been 
many autonomous agreements in the course of the years, and other obstacles for success as 
regards the output of documents coming from the Sectoral Social Dialogue have been 
identified, it appears to be clear that in theory the Sectoral Social Dialogue can be an 
instrument to create legal certainty amongst the Member States. 
 
This legal certainty is, as has been illustrated in the previous chapter, much desired in the 
European professional football sector. The European Social Dialogue has also been 
introduced in European Professional football. The next chapter assesses whether the Social 




























In April 2008 a Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee for professional football (FSDC) was 
established. In 2012 that committee concluded its first agreement on the minimum 
requirements for standard player contracts in the professional football sector in the European 
Union and for the rest of the UEFA territory (the Autonomous Agreement).
424
 This chapter 
focuses on the historical background that led to the establishment of the FSDC. The historical 
overview includes the first steps towards a FSDC that were supported and funded by the 
European Commission. The route to the final composition of the FSDC will be also be 
considered. The chapter will contain an analysis of the content of the Autonomous Agreement 
and the implications connected to the implementation of the agreement. After that, an analysis 
of the reactions to this Autonomous Agreement will be presented. Finally, it will be 
determined if and how the Autonomous Agreement may create legal certainty. The next 
chapter will then analyse what issues fall outside of the scope of the Autonomous Agreement 
and whether discussions within the FSDC can lead to agreements in these key areas of 
European football governance. 
 
EU Framework directive on fixed-term work: The transfer system under threat 
In June 2008 a Council Directive on fixed-term work came into force: Council Directive 




The directive was the result of industrial relations negotiations on a cross-industry level. The 
partners that negotiated this directive were the CEEP, UNICE and ETUC.  
 
                                                 
424
 Currently UEFA has 54 Members. All the EU Member States are UEFA members and the non EU Member 
State members are Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbeidzjan, Belorussia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Faeröer Islands, 
Georgia, Iceland, Israel, Kazachstan, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Ukraine, 
Russia, San-Marino, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey. Some EU Member States have more than one association 
within their territory, such as the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and Gibraltar).  
425




The directive emphasizes the necessity for an equal treatment and non-discrimination of 
workers with a fixed-term contract as regards workers with a contract for indefinite time. By 
means of setting minimum conditions that limit the successive use of fixed-term contracts, the 
workers are protected against abuse. The Member States are obliged to implement one or 
more of the following measures regarding the use of fixed-term contracts: 
- Objective reasons justifying the renewal of fixed-term employment contracts; 
- Determining the maximum allowed total duration of fixed-term employment contracts; 




The directive does not exclude employment contracts in professional sports from its scope. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that contracts in European Union professional football also 
need to meet the requirements laid down in the directive. According to the regulations of 
FIFA, contracts in professional football are contracts for a minimum duration, from the 
effective date of commencement until the end of the football season with a maximum duration 
of five years.
427
 FIFA makes the exception that the duration may be subject to different 
lengths on the basis of necessary consistence with national laws. The directive indicates that 
the normal working relationship between an employee and employer should remain a contract 
of indefinite time. Therefore, it can be assumed that if a contract of a fixed-term lacks an 
objective justification or that its renewal lacks an objective justification, this contract may be 
converted into a contract of indefinite time. 
 
After the Bosman case the transfer system in professional football changed. Pre-Bosman the 
payment of transfer fees was based on the permission given by the player’s previous club for 
him to join his new employer. The club had to give permission to the actual ‘transfer’, only 
after that permission the registration would move from one club, or league, to another. 
 
With Bosman the application of EU legislation on free movement of workers forced this 
system to an end. The football governing bodies introduced a revised transfer system in 2001 
that replaced the source for payment of ‘fees’ whenever a player moved from one country to 
another to carry out his profession as a football player for a new employer. The ‘transfer fee’ 
became a payment for a preliminary ending of the employment contract, by the payment of 
                                                 
426
 Directive 1999/70/EC, Clause 5. 
427
 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, Article 18 (2). 
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damages due to a unilateral breach of one of the signatory parties to the contract or through 





Today, the system of the payment of ‘transfer fees’ is based on the use of contracts for a 
fixed-term. This can also be understood from the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer 
of Players.
429
 In the case that the use of the fixed-term contracts, or the successive use of 
fixed-term contracts, would be short of a foundation on an objective justification just as the 
directive requires, a conversion into a contract of indefinite time could be the consequence. In 
that case, a club as an employer would run the risk that the football player would only have to 
respect a legally stipulated notice period to leave his club for another. In that case, the basis 
for the payment of a fee to the player’s previous club would disappear and the only 
entitlement for a compensation would derive from the system of the payment of training and 
education compensation,
430
 however this would only apply to players under the age of 23 and 
it could constitute only a fraction of the potential total amount that could be generated by the 
transfer of the player. 
 
Dutch Employers’ Organisation in Professional Football (FBO) Researches Impact 
of Directive 1999/70 
 
Concerned at the potential implications of the directive, the Dutch employers’ organisation in 
professional football (the FBO) carried out research to assess the impact of the directive in 
five European Member States. The FBO is the employers’ representative in Dutch 
professional football and has all 38 professional clubs in the Netherlands as its members, from 
the first and the second division. The FBO was established in 1968 and has ever since been 
part of the industrial relations structure in football, with the Vereniging Voor Contractspelers 
(VVCS) and ProProf as its counterparts in the negotiation of the collective bargaining 
agreement in Dutch professional football. In 1999 the conclusion of a collective bargaining 
agreement in the Dutch professional football sector became a necessity in order to save the 
                                                 
428
 A more elaborate description of the 2001 Agreement will follow in Chapter  6. 
429
 Especially Articles 13 to 17 deal with the stability of contracts.  
430
 The system of training compensation has been under scrutiny of the European Court of Justice in the Bernard 
case, see before. The current system is laid down in the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players Article 
20 and Annex 4 of the aforementioned regulations. A more elaborate description on the functioning of the 
system of training compensation shall follow in Chapter  7. 
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post-Bosman transfer system. The reason for this was that a law on the use of fixed-term 
contracts came into force in the Netherlands.
431
 This flexlaw was in line with the requirements 
of the EU directive on fixed-term contracts, curtailing the use of fixed-term and requiring 
special justifications for the use of successive fixed-term contracts to prevent abuse. The 
flexlaw provided only one solution for allowing unlimited successive use of fixed-term 
contracts. This was by means of the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement between 
representative organisations from both sides of the industry.
432
 Therefore the collective 
bargaining agreement in Dutch professional football has saved the practice of payments of 
transfer fees in the Post Bosman era. 
 
After the timeframe for implementation of the EU directive in all the EU Member States had 
elapsed, research was carried out under the authority of the FBO. Five EU Member States 
(UK, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and Portugal) were assessed. The aim of the research 
was to determine if, and how, the directive had been implemented on the level of that Member 
State and what the impact was, or could be, on the contracts that were used in the professional 
football industries of those countries.  
 
The main conclusion of the FBO research was that if the professional football sector wished 
to maintain the transfer system based on the 2001 transfer agreement then it should try to 
introduce a collective bargaining agreement in the European Professional football sector.
433
 
However, in order to create a Social Dialogue in the European Professional football sector 
two equal partners were needed. At that time FIFPRo was already actively promoting its role 
as a social partner, but a representative from the side of the employers did not exist yet.  
 
The FBO held talks with representatives from DG Employment and Social Affairs of the 
European Commission and it came to the conclusion that the employers in the European 
Professional football sector needed to be made aware of the necessity to create an employers’ 
organisation. Only after the creation of an employers’ organisation that would meet the 
criteria as established by the European Commission in its 1993 Communication on the 
representativeness of social partner organisations, a Social Dialogue could be established. 
                                                 
431
 Publication Staatsblad nr. 332 1998, Wet flexibiliteit en zekerheid, laid down in Book 7 of the Dutch civil 
code, Article 7:668a. 
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 Article 7:668a Dutch civil code. 
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 Branco Martins, R. (2002), European Sport’s First collective labour agreement, issued by the FBO. 
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Creation of the European Federation of Football Clubs (EFFC) 
 
The FBO was the founding partner of the EFFC. The EFFC was specifically created to carry 
out a project to create awareness about the European Social Dialogue in the European 
Professional football sector.
434
 The EFFC intended to inform stakeholders about the concept 
of the Social Dialogue on the level of the individual Member States as well as at European 
level. Its aim was to facilitate the start of consultations between management and labour at 
Community level and, in pursuance thereof, the establishment of contractual relations. The 
EFFC attached the status of an academic research platform to itself. However, it did 
communicate the idea that, in the case the stakeholders in professional football deemed it 
necessary to establish a social partner on employers’ side, the EFFC could be used as a 




The EFFC was not only involved in a project promoting the Social Dialogue in the ‘old’ 15 
Member States,
436
 it also carried out a similar project together with the T.M.C. Asser Institute 
in the countries that were about to accede to the EU in 2004, at that time still Candidate 
Countries.
437
 Both projects were co-funded by the European Commission under Budget 
Heading B3-4000. This budget heading of the European Commission enables the Commission 
to support the financing of consultations, meetings, negotiations and other operations 
designed to achieve the objectives of the social objectives of the Union.
438
 Simultaneously 
FIFPRo carried out similar projects in the beginning of the past decade. The first project in 
2002/2003 was intended to create awareness about the Social Dialogue and to assess who 
could be FIFPRo’s counterpart in industrial relations. This project ran simultaneously with the 
first EFFC project. The second project in 2003/2004 looked at organizing regional meetings 
                                                 
434
 T.M.C. Asser Institute (2004), Promoting the Social Dialogue in the European professional football, Project 
supported by the European Commission under a grant through budget heading B3-4000. 
435
 Promoting the Social Dialogue in European Professional Football, International Sports Law Journal, 2003, 
Vol. 3, T.M.C. Asser press. 
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 T.M.C. Asser Instituut (2004), Promoting the Social Dialogue in European Professional Football, Candidate 




 The call for proposals is renewed on a yearly basis but it was renamed. The call can be found on the following 
webpage. http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=629andlangId=enandcallId=373andfurtherCalls=yes . 
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and to establish a Social Dialogue committee.
439
 The latter was not successful in obtaining its 
objective, however FIFPRo took the first steps by introducing an informal tripartite football 
dialogue with stakeholders UEFA and the EPFL. This dialogue was chaired within the 
structure of UEFA.
440
 A third project in 2004/2005 looked at further streamlining the process 




As the focus of this historical description lies on the employers’ side, the main conclusions of 
the studies by the EFFC will be given. This conclusion can be divided into two parts. First, 
the question about the desirability of a Social Dialogue on the level of the European Union. 
Second, the issue of representation: after a tour through Europe, what organisation turned out 
to be fit to represent the interests of the employers on the umbrella level of the EU? 
 
The study embarked on the statement that the interconnection and friction between the various 
legal sources of regulatory influence in European professional football lead to legal 
uncertainty; as described in chapter two and three. In order to achieve (more) legal certainty 
the study pointed that the fact that the Social Dialogue was embedded in the EU Treaty could 
lead to more certainty due to the prevalence of EU law over rules and regulations of sports 
governing bodies. According to the study, it would be highly desirable to use the Social 
Dialogue as a framework for concluding a basic EU collective bargaining agreement in 
football which could help establish greater legal certainty in the following areas:  
- The basic employment contract in football would be a fixed-term contract including a 
minimum and maximum duration;  
 
- The duration and nature of the work, including a definition of ‘professional football 
player’;  
 
- Minimum harmonisation of the conditions of employment of third-country nationals, 
including a code of conduct for employment and recruitment of third-country players;  
 
                                                 
439
 Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut des Sciences du Travail,(2006), Study on the representativeness of 
the social partner organisationorganisations in the professional football players sector, project no. 
Vc/2004/0547, February 2006, p. 32, footnote 64. 
440
 For comments by the relevant stakeholders please see the website of the Swiss players’ union: 
http://old.safP.ch/news/detail.php?lang=0andid=37 . See also Independent European Sport Review, 2006. A 
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 Awarded grants under budget heading 04.03.03.01: Industrial relations and social dialogue 
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- A social security scheme for players, for example, including a ‘bridging pension’;  
 
- Post-career education for players;  
 
- Contract stability, including the final introduction of a system which is binding upon 
all parties in football;  
 
- Creating and formalising a code of conduct for the preliminary breach and termination 




Regarding the feasibility issue, the study concluded that the European Commission could not 
easily decide what organisation could be able to represent the employers in football as there 
was no explicit employers’ organisation active at that moment. The study analysed  the 
composition of the EPFL and was unable to tell with certainty if the EPFL would qualify as a 
social partner.
443
 The main reason for this questionability was that out of the 14 member 
leagues of the EPFL in 2003 only seven of the member leagues were part of national 
collective bargaining structures. Other reasons were the mandatory membership of the leagues 
for the clubs, which is contradicting the fundamental principle of freedom of association, and 
the close connection with the national football association, putting the independence of the 
organisation into question. The study recommends the Commission to carefully assess which 
parties should play a role in the composition of a potential sectoral Social Dialogue 
committee.  
 
In 2005 the grouping of the major football clubs in the EU, the G-14, commissioned the 
T.M.C Asser International Sports Law Centre to  research the potential role of the G-14 
grouping as a social partner.
444
 The Centre concluded that although the G-14 grouping did not 
meet the requirements as laid down by the European Commission for social partners to 
participate in the Social Dialogue, it could have a role in an “informal Social Dialogue” or 
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that it may be granted an exception on the basis of the concept of the specificity of sport.
445
 
The Centre also made a comparison to other sectors where the approach to potential social 




After the presentation of the study of the EFFC and the FIFPRo, the European Commission 
requested that the Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL) research the representativeness of 
social partner organisations in professional football. This type of project is commonly carried 




The UCL concluded, contrary to the findings of the T.M.C. Asser Institute, that the EPFL was 
representative enough to participate in the European Social Dialogue. It then became clear 
that the road for the envisaged social partners in professional football, the EPFL and FIFPRo, 
was open to jointly ask the European Commission to establish a sectoral Social Dialogue 
committee.  
 
During this process, however, the G-14 was involved in the Oulmers case where as a 
compromise the G-14 was dismantled and the ECA was created. Officially the ECA does not 
meet the social partner requirements. ECA does not consist of members that are social 
partners on the level of the Member States. Also, the individual clubs are not representative 
social partners but individual employers. Nevertheless, both the EPFL and FIFPRo agreed to 
the participation of the ECA in the EU Social Dialogue. The motivation was that the ECA 
complemented representativeness left open by EPFL. 
 
The Creation of the European Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee in the 
Professional Football Sector (FSDC) 
 
On 10 December 2007 FIFPRo and the EPFL jointly submitted a request to the Commission 
for the establishment of a sectoral Social Dialogue committee. In a letter dated 13 March 2008 
the Commission confirmed that the conditions for the creation of a FSDC existed. As a 
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 in order to be installed, the social partners needed to establish their rules of 
procedure and appoint a chair to their committee.  
 
This procedure highlights the specific position of sport, due to the role of UEFA, and also the 
ECA, in the FSDC. UEFA is not a social partner as it does not meet the criteria as established 
by the Commission. However, UEFA does have, according to the social partners, a role to 
perform in the European Social Dialogue as an ‘associate party’. A similar status has been 
given to the ECA.
449
 According to the Rules of Procedure the status of an associate party is 
similar to the status of a social partner in the Committee, where the decisions shall be taken 
by consensus.
450
 Moreover, the social partners have agreed to appoint UEFA as the 




The interconnection between the Social Dialogue and general football issues is also stressed 
due to the fact that the agenda of the Social Dialogue committee is composed in the meetings 
of the Professional Football Strategy Council (PFSC), where the same members as the FSDC 
are present.
452
 This council was established by UEFA and operates within UEFA structures. 
The objectives of the PFSC are to maintain the European model of sport in the professional 
football sector. It is a platform to listen to the clubs, leagues, players and member associations 




This interconnection is a disputable issue. In practice the social partners have now bound 
themselves to the jurisdiction of UEFA through the connection with consultative bodies that 
are part of the UEFA structure. By connecting the powers to influence the functioning of the 
FSDC to the PFSC a decisive pressure can be placed on the social partners by UEFA. In this 
case, UEFA places its decision making powers outside of their own structures. This could 
                                                 
448
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feed the idea that due to the pure consultative nature of the committees within UEFA, UEFA 




For example, a key issue for the collective of teams participating in the UEFA competitions, 
is the composition and distribution of income from the exploitation of these leagues. The 
majority of ECA members compete in these competitions on a yearly basis.
455
 A stagnation of 
discussions on the level of the PFSC when dealing with this issue could influence the agenda 
and decision making in the FSDC. The connection might endanger the scope and the objective 
of the European Social Dialogue by decreasing the FSDC to a mere platform for discussions 
on issues that were pre-determined by UEFA.  
 
The rules of procedure and the working programme of the FSDC were officially launched on 
1 July 2008 in a meeting in Paris.
456
 The working programme lays down the objectives of the 
parties involved. The parties aim to strengthen the possibilities of social partners to shape the 
future developments regarding employment in the professional football sector and to 
articulate European levels of Social Dialogue.
457
 The parties agree to accept the Social 
Dialogue as a valid instrument for the implementation of agreements on labour related matters 
reached within the Professional Football Strategy Council. 
 
The most important objective was the work connected to discuss and, where agreed, promote 
and develop the concept of ‘the European Professional Football Player contract minimum 
requirements’ (MRSPC). This work started in 2008 and could be seen as a further elaboration 
on the work that was carried out in the tripartite dialogue that was established after FIFPRo’s 
initial projects in the European Union.  
 
Since 2008 there has been a yearly plenary meeting and specific topic related working group 
meetings, all scheduled by a steering group. In the first plenary meeting in November 2008 
the rules of procedure were presented and the composition of specific working groups was 
laid down. The first working groups dealt with the evolution of the Autonomous Agreement 
                                                 
454
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into an Autonomous Agreement and with the state of play as regards the implementation of 
the agreement.
458
 The next plenary meeting took place in Brussels on 28 February 2011.  
 
It took three years to hold the next plenary session as the time in between was characterized 
by reluctance from UEFA, the ECA and the EPFL. The reluctance lead to a situation of 
deadlock. The reason was the fact that FIFPRo, after the 2008 FSDC establishment, sought to 
transform the agreement that was concluded on the MRSPC into an agreement that would not 
only be binding on the Member States of the EU but also to the remainder of the UEFA 
territory.
459
 The other parties in the committee did not wish to impose binding rules on their 
members. FIFPRo did not want to jeopardise the effect of the agreement by making the result 
a purely voluntary decision for the stakeholders to live up to the standards.
460
 FIFPRo found 




The European Commission intervened in the impasse and used its task as a broker to facilitate 
the dialogue between the social partners.
462
 With the consent of all parties concerned the 
European Commission drafted a compromise agreement.
463
 The agreement was aimed at 
strengthening the implementation of the agreement through the voluntary route.
464
 This 
intervention eased the antagonist attitude of the parties and the work towards the creation of a 
document that would lead to consensus went on. Despite this breakthrough it could not be 
prevented that the initial planning of the presentation of the Autonomous Agreement on 5 
April 2011 needed to be postponed. The compromise document needed to receive the 
approval from the ECA, UEFA and the EPFL and FIFPRo needed to await its general 
assembly meeting outcome first.
465
 UEFA and the representatives from the employers 
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informed FIFPRo that they would come up with their amendment to the Commission 
compromise and present that to FIFPRo.
466
 In the meantime the FSDC’s further elaborated on 
the issue of stability of contracts and FIFPRo suggested the creation of a working group on 
this topic
467
, but the ECA was reluctant to agree to these initiatives in that stage.  
 
This reluctance disappeared after April 2012, at which point FIFPRo agreed on the amended 
compromise it received from their counterparts. The Autonomous Agreement was presented 
in a plenary session on 19 April 2012. Mr. Michael van Praag, replacing the FSDC and UEFA 
chairman Michel Platini, highlighted in his opening speech that this was an historic moment 
and he stressed the importance of the Autonomous Agreement for the professional football 




Below the content of the agreement will be discussed. After that, the implications as regards 
the implementation of the agreement will be presented, before embarking on an assessment of 
the effect of the agreement on EU professional football. 
 
Agreement Regarding the Minimum Requirements for Standard Player Contracts 
in the Professional Football Sector in the European Union and in the Rest of the 
UEFA Territory 
 
The agreement establishes minimum requirements for professional football contracts in 
Europe.
469
 The scope of the agreement is all professional football clubs
470
 and professional 
football players who are bound to a club, the contract should do so on an employment 
contract.
471
 The agreement attaches basic validation criteria to the employment contract such 
as the names of the parties, their ability to be legally bound to the contract and a co-signature 
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of the parents in the case that the player is a minor.
472
 In the case of a club, it should be a 
direct member of the league and/or association. All the signed contracts need to be registered 
at the league and/or the national association concerned whereby all the parties to the contract 
receive a copy.
473
 The contract stipulates the duration with a clear starting and an ending date. 
The right to terminate on the basis of just cause must be included in the contract, the club has 
the right to give a reasonable notice to the player in case of long or permanent injury. In that 
case a referral needs to be included in the contract to the FIFA Regulations on the Status and 
Transfer of Players. In case of a negotiation on the termination or extension of the contract the 
national implementation must ensure the equal balance of the parties. The contract also needs 
to mention if there are other parties involved in the negotiation such as the parent or guardian 
of the player or an agent if he has been involved in the negotiation of the agreement.
474
 The 
contract contains a section of definitions, but if this sections is not included that a connection 





The applicable legislation to the employment contract should be in accordance with the 
hierarchy of laws and of protecting the player against social dumping.
476
 If there are annexes 
to the contract they should all be included and no other contract may cover the employment 




The agreement then goes into detail about the duty of the club to fulfil all its financial 
obligations: the payment of salaries and all other financial bonuses, reimbursable costs, other 
benefits such as car, housing, phone, etc. In the case that there exists a national pension fund 
scheme than these monthly payments are also specified in the contract. All methods of 
payment and the right currency are specified. A sport specific element as regards the financial 
obligations is the fact that the contract should contain a clause on major impacts on the budget 
or generation of revenue by the club: promotion or relegation.
478
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The agreement includes a clause on the applicability of Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 
June 1994 on the protection of young people at work.
479
 The effect of this Directive in the 
context of the agreement is that the contract should ensure that every youth player involved in 
a youth development programme at a club should have the opportunity to also follow non-
football related education in order to prepare for a post-football career.
480
 A clear holiday 
scheme is also mandatory. 
 
As regards health and safety, the player should have a medical insurance in place as well as 
for risk. These issues, including a programme for doping prevention, are brought under the 
general umbrella of Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of 
measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work.
481
 It is also 
an obligation of the club to protect the human rights of the player, such as the right to free 




The core obligations of the player are included in the contract. It is the essence of the 
profession of football to play matches to his best endeavour, to participate in training and 
match preparations in accordance with the instructions of the trainers / coaches, to maintain a 
healthy lifestyle and to comply with other instructions. These are the issues that establish the 
subordinate relationship and that are therefore the fundamental for the fact that the 
relationship between a club and a player is an employment contract. Other elements include 
the sport specific necessary adherence to relevant regulations of football governing bodies, 
not to gamble on activities within football and to participate in the club’s commercial and 
social events. Standard employment clauses concern cooperation with necessary medical 
treatment and to return all club items at the end of the employment liaison with the club.
483
 
Every contract should contain a statement on the method of commercialization of the player’s 
image. The contract does not give a standard mandatory provision but it just gives a 
recommendation. The general principle is that the player may exploit his own image rights 
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when not in conflict with the rights of the club. The club may then exploit the player’s image 




In the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players the issue of of player loans is 
explained and regulated.
485
 The standard contract contains a provision that mandates the club 
and player to both agree to a loan spell at another club. This avoids a situation that a player is 




The standard contract must contain clear statements on penalties in case the player violates 
the club’s rules. The player should be granted the right to appeal to the club in the company of 
the captain of the team and/or a union representative.
487





Players and clubs are bound to arbitration courts in case of disputes. The contract refers to 
these internal sport courts, keeping the general civil courts aside. An exception is made for 
certain countries where it is not allowed that labour issues are governed by dispute resolution 
in arbitration courts. The arbitration courts should guarantee fairness in the sense that the 
courts should be impartial and consists of equal and balanced representation from players as 
well as from employers. In countries where there is no final internal arbitration procedure 
available, for example when there is only one arbitration court, appeal to the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport should be made possible. Where the FIFA Regulations so describe, the 
issues between players and clubs that deal with employment may also be brought before the 




The players and clubs must abide by rules and regulations of the association and the leagues 
that are of influence to the contract. The contract must contain a provision that this is 
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 The same is applicable to the impact that a collective bargaining 




Every contract needs to contain further final provisions that underline the applicable law and 
jurisdiction, the authoritative version of the contract in case of translation of the contract, the 
fact that the contract is confidential, the validity of the complete contract in case of a nullity 
of a specific clause, number of copies and distribution of the contract to the parties, all 




The MRSPC explicitly refers to the role of UEFA as a party to the agreement and to UEFA’s 
role in the Social Dialogue.
493
 The MRSCP also requires that anti-racism is emphasized.
494
 
The practical issues as regards the agreement itself concern the fact that the agreement 
contains minimum requirements and that further protection of the player on the national level 
is allowed through more favourable conditions.
495
 The agreement lasts from the date of 
signing for four years and the parties will do their best to have a new agreement in order three 




Implementation and Enforcement of the Autonomous Agreement 
 
The initial deadlock in the negotiations between the social partners was attributable to the 
method, scope of implementation and enforcement of the agreement. Whereas FIFPRo 
wanted to bind the complete UEFA territory to the agreement, the other signatory parties did 
not wish to go beyond the EU to impose legislation or strict regulations on their members. 
UEFA and the employers’ representatives promoted the ‘voluntary’ route of implementation. 
This voluntary route would consist of persuading the national members of the social partners 
and associate parties to implement the negotiation result into their own national systems but 
not to be legally bound to do so.  
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The compromise was presented by the European Commission and articulated in Article 18 of 
the Agreement. The parties to the agreement will use their best endeavours to ensure 
implementation of the agreement on the national level of the EU member states and of the 
UEFA territory. This method that was agreed upon is a ‘mixed’ approach, as it was practically 
impossible to create a Directive on the basis of a Council decision that would be implemented 
and enforced beyond the territory of the EU.  
 
This mixed approach as a specialis of the voluntary route relying on national procedures and 
practices specific to management and labour and the Member States can be brought in line 
with the procedures within the context of Article 155 TFEU, as discussed in the previous 
chapter.  Due to the fact that the Autonomous Agreement contains elements that strive to be 
minimum standards, it is a reality that in some countries the current standards are already in 
line with the level of regulation that the agreement promotes. Therefore, in the countries that 
already have a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in force no actual implementation 
needs to take place. Where no CBA exists the social partners should seek to create the 
fundamentals for creating stronger industrial relations and eventually implement the 
agreement through a CBA. In the case that in some countries this method may not be the most 
appropriate one, alternative methods may be found by the social partners involved. As an 
example of such an alternative method the, standard contract used by the football governing 
bodies may already contain elements of social protection and standard clauses that are already 
in line with the Autonomous Agreement. If this is not the case, the regulations of the leagues 
and / or associations could impose a standard contract that incorporates the elements of the 
Autonomous Agreement. 
 
The voluntary route thus entails a ‘marriage’ between (EU) employment law and the 
enforcement of the Autonomous Agreement through implementation in standard contracts of 
which the use is binding upon the members due to internal association regulations. Non-
commitment could eventually lead to a system of (sporting) disciplinary sanctioning such as a 
deduction in points, financial implications or a ban from registering players during the 
registration periods. 
 
The Commission compromise describes various levels of implementation and divides the 
countries that are intended to fall under the scope of the agreement into groups. The first 
group consists of countries where the social partners agreed to implement the agreement 
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within one year after signing. The countries that have been identified in this respect are 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, England, Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland, Switzerland and Norway.
497
 The 
second group, where the social partners have two or three years to implement the agreement, 
consists of Bulgaria, Greece / Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia.
498
 In the 
remaining countries the period of implementation could take three years. 
 
The European Commission created a system that monitors the implementation of the 
agreement. This system is founded on the ‘European Professional Football Social Dialogue 
Taskforce’.
499
 This taskforce reports to the Steering Committee of the FSDC. The Steering 
Committee creates the agendas for the (plenary) meetings in the FSDC, and for UEFA’s 
Professional Football Strategy Council. The taskforce will visit selected countries or selected 
regions in order to convince and to assist the parties at the national level to implement the 
agreement. The taskforce consists of representatives of each of the signatory parties and their 
national or regional affiliates.
500
 The European Commission concludes by arranging a 
schedule for the visits. 
 
The taskforce and its results will be frequently monitored by the FSDC working group on 
implementation of the Autonomous Agreement. This working group was created on the basis 
of the decisions that were taken on the plenary Social Dialogue meeting of 19 April 2012, 
when the Autonomous Agreement was launched. According to the mandate that has been 
given to this group the tasks are to make the MRSPC a reality throughout the whole UEFA 
territory while respecting the principle of solidarity. The working group will identify with 
help of the national associations and social partners at national level the issues that need to be 
resolved in order to implement the minimum requirements. To plan meetings to create 
awareness about the function and role of national affiliates in this process of implementation, 
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during the scheduled meetings agree on the best methods for implementation.
501
 At the same 




Assessment of the FSDC 
 
Prior to the start of the FSDC in 2008, academic debate concerning the European Social 
Dialogue not only focused on the fine-tuning and harmonisation of  employment-related laws 
but more on the potential impact of collective bargaining on competition law, as shown 
below. In some cases, the connection is made to the history of concluding collective 
bargaining agreements in the closed leagues of the United States main sport disciplines. In the 
United States collective bargaining between union and management began to transform in the 
1960s and early 1970s and it opened the door for a non-exhaustive exemption from the 
application of antitrust laws. This exemption was called the ‘labor exemption’ and helped the 
leagues to maintain a competitive balance within a closed competition.
503
 The exemption was 
allowed if it primarily only affected the parties to the collective bargaining relationship, dealt 





In 2003 Meier used this perspective when he described the emergence of the European Social 
Dialogue in professional football. Coming from the context of the discussions between FIFA, 
UEFA and FIFPRo as regards the change of the transfer system, in 2001, he approached the 
Social Dialogue as a potential framework for bringing the 2001 agreement in line with the 
commands of the European Commission.
505
 He also discussed the potential gain for UEFA 
could have in implementing its intended club licensing system into a collective bargaining 
agreement and thus move away from the pressure it encountered from EU competition law. 
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Especially concerning the imposition of a proposed ‘soft cap’ on the expenditure of no more 
than 70% of the club’s income on players’ wages, as proposed by the then G-14. Meier was of 
the opinion that there was not a lot of space for the social partners that were busy profiling 
and positioning themselves in those days to start a functioning Social Dialogue in the 
aftermath of the then recently concluded new, post-Bosman, transfer system. He said: 
 
“On the other hand doubts can been raised as to whether the new transfer regulations 
leave enough scope for a Social Dialogue. According to the clubs and the leagues the 
liberalisation of the player market has already proceeded so far that further 
concessions to the players’ unions are hardly imaginable. In addition, the new transfer 
regulations enable the clubs to continue the transfer system – including trade in 
players. Yet, the abolition of the transfer system has been the main goal of FIFPRo 
since its founding. On the first conference on sectoral dialogue the General Secretary 
of the French Professional League, Philippe Diallo, made quite clear that from the 
employers’ point of view the Social Dialogue should take into account the key 
elements of the transfer agreement since the employers in professional soccer were not 




Meier is therefore sceptical about the prospects for a Social Dialogue in professional football. 
In his perspective the hindrance lies in the strong involvement of political stakeholders in the 




Parrish and Mietinen discussed this potential impact of the European Social Dialogue on the 
classical governance model of sport in the EU. They argued that:  
 
“its (European Commission) advocacy of structured Social Dialogue taking place 
within the Treaty framework has the potential for social partners to negotiate 
collectively thus partly removing the EU from some potential future sources of 
conflict. Yet this policy option is also contentious. Encouraging horizontal channels of 
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stakeholder dialogue disturbs the vertical pattern of governing body authority which 




In the same book Parrish and Miettinen suggest that football might adopt a process “making 
use of methods of Social Dialogue such as collective agreements”, which would amount to a 
contractual way for football’s stakeholders to settle their differences and remain compatible 
with EU law
509
. They refer to the Brentjes case
510
 in which all employees of a Dutch building 
company had to sign a compulsory contract with a pension scheme provider on the basis of 
the fact that all workers should be entitled to receive the same pension terms on an equal basis 
regardless of risks. The authors therefore also make an indirect connection to the potential 
exemption from the application of EU competition to sport in case of a Social Dialogue. 
Dixon is critical towards this approach, arguing that:  
 
“These are examples where dialogue can maximise the interests of all parties – at the 
time of the agreement, dialogue can provide more than even a victory in litigation. 
This has less application where the interests are strikingly different, and divisions 
between rich and poor clubs are such that they are not realistically social partners for 
each other let alone capable of entering into such partnerships with players and 
governing bodies. Given the state of football, dialogue is more about settling litigation 
or possible litigation – a dynamic very favourable to the richest clubs seeking to 
exercise their economic freedoms.” And: “The potency of such a threat obviously 
depends on whether the benefits of breakaway outweigh this dent in their earning 
power. Also the existence of a sectoral agreement will only be relevant to the 
application of competition law, it would not help FIFA or UEFA restrict a breakaway 
that invoked free-movement rights.  In truth, almost by definition, EU law cannot 
oblige parties to compromise their legal rights. The greatest contribution it can make 
to dialogue is to leave sufficient uncertainty as to victory so as to blunt the confidence 
of the elite that, should it come to litigation, their economic rights will be trumps. Of 
course, the law can never aspire to spread doubt as to what the law is”
511
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Parrish attaches more value to the Social Dialogue. He positions the FSDC as a body with a 
long-term potential to transform industrial relations in European football based on the 
conclusion of binding agreements. In the short-term he attributes two functions to the FSDC: 
a source for potential governance standard change in European football and as a lobbying 
technique for the social partners in terms of their relationship with the EU, and as a venue for 
negotiated settlement between the rival interests operating within the EU’s sports policy 
subsystem.
512
 Parrish treats with caution the assessment that the creation of the FSDC has lead 
to a new system of European industrial relations in professional football. He notes that the 
committee until then (2011) had only been established for three years and that it did not 
conclude any agreement. He also stressed the lack of the much desired legal certainty that the 
FSDC can bring in non-labour related issues or that it cannot be used as a mask for clubs to 
impose restrictions on players. Parrish also elaborates on the general criticism to the system of 
Social Dialogue as that it does not lead to binding agreements in the vast majority of the 
negotiations prior to the culmination into a result.
513
 Especially employers would prefer soft 




As regards governance change Parrish claims that both the players and the clubs view the 
Social Dialogue as a means of imparting pressure on FIFA and UEFA to allow for greater 
stakeholder participation within the structures of the sports governing bodies and enables 
them to influence the policy of control of FIFA and UEFA, where before the tools for such 
influence were limited.
515
 The Social Dialogue implies a further shift towards a system of 
governance based on co-regulation were a wider range of stakeholders is involved in the 
decision making procedures.
516
 Two other examples of the (potential) impact of the FSDC on 
governance are described by Parrish. The FSDC would be able to further define the specificity 
of sport as laid down in Article 165 TFEU. The ‘vague’ elements of Article 165, such as the 
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promotion of “fairness and openness”,
517
 and the “cooperation between bodies responsible for 
sport”, can be further defined in the context of labour relations when discussed by the social 
partners in the FSDC.
518
 Finally, Parrish states that if FIFPRo would not only use the FSDC 
as a tool to lever greater influence with the clubs and UEFA but also to conclude more far 
reaching and binding agreements then a comparison with the US model of sport would be 




Meier and Garcia argue that “those eager to contest the traditional power of the governing 
bodies might have expected too much too soon”.
520
 They claim that there have been no other 
venues that have empowered interest groups with the ability to influence the powers of the 
governing bodies than the threat of potential litigation. They conclude: 
 
“one (albeit not the exclusive) explanation for the relatively limited empowerment of 
clubs and players in football governance is that successful action in alternative 
political venues following a different institutional logic requires further investments in 
organisational capabilities since claimant status might not suffice...Nevertheless 
competition policy appears as a venue to be used by interest groups that support a 




In the context of the analysis of Parrish and Garcia and Meier, Anderson analyses an 
evolution in three steps as regards possible travel towards the US model. This evolution is that 
the US pattern of restrictive transfer related litigation have first been fought in a contract / 
private law arena. Consequently, that antitrust law was applied to sports cases, which lead to 
litigation. This ended when the labour exemption through collective bargaining agreements 
was introduced. By using the collective bargaining agreements and the labour exemption, the 
various stakeholders avoided that Bosman type accidents of litigation would determine the 
future of their sport.
522
 They would take their own initiative and bargain collectively towards 
solutions.  According to Anderson the EU sports sector has taken the first two steps and has 
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now taken another half step forward. He attributes this half step to the structured dialogue 
principle as introduced in the White Paper on Sport. 
 
Geeraert et al introduces a new approach in the academic debate on governance failures in 
professional football.
523
 Geeraert claims that Social Dialogue is one of the elements that are 
part of a complex structure of interconnected layers of governance.
524
 Leading in the approach 
is the governance of the sector through governance networks, cited by Geeraert from 
Sörensen:  
 
“A relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally 
autonomous actors, who interact through negotiations, which take place within a 
regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework and to a certain extent is 
self-regulating and which contributes to the production of public purpose within or 




He assumes that the intertwined political, legal and economic driving forces in professional 
football are enduring and that therefore an evolution from a pyramid to a more governance 
model network. In his conclusion Geeraert acknowledges that further research is needed to 
provide more concrete recommendations. As regards Social Dialogue, Geeraert claims that 
there are many problems before a solution between the parties can be reached, such as the 
lack of an agreement concerning FIFA’s transfer regulations due to the fact that UEFA would 
have no mandate to conclude an agreement in the FSDC that would concern these regulations. 
The latter brings him to state that the FSDC could not be compared to the North American 
models of collective bargaining because these agreements govern the employer-employee 
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relationships between the owners of the teams and the players. Colucci and Geeraert
526
 state 
that the method of implementation of the MRSPC does not lead to impulses for stakeholders 
to enforce the agreement as it would only be a case of ‘endeavours’ and not of binding rules. 
Geeraert also claims that the bigger European leagues refused to ratify the agreement taking 
away the mandate of EPFL to continue the negotiations.
527
 Finally, he states that on the basis 
of the ILO Convention 154 the social partners should be able to bargain freely and that 
governments would not be able to enforce the implementation of an agreement or put pressure 




The overview above is centred around three themes. First, the lack of activity within the 
European Social Dialogue in general and in professional football in particular. Second, the 
obstacles related to the stakeholders’ participation in the FSDC. Third, the implementation 
and enforcement of the agreements in the FSDC. The impact of the FSDC on the governance 
structure of football was also discussed, linking it to collective bargaining models in the US 
sports. 
 
The lack of activity in the European Sectoral Social Dialogue is an issue that has been 
discussed in the previous Chapter 4. Pochet described general reasons for the lack of outcome 
in the European Sectoral Social Dialogue. Employers favour a more consultative dialogue, 
limited in scope. Whereas the workers are more keen to exploit the venue of industrial 
relations to a further extent than the employers. In the football sector these obstacles have also 
been noticed. As the horizontal structure of collective bargaining might influence the pyramid 
model of EU sports governance, it is likely that UEFA has been reluctant to encourage or 
support the clubs to pursue a Social Dialogue. Those clubs hoping to participate in the UEFA 
competitions have felt the pressure of UEFA regarding their participation in the (creation of) 
the FSDC. However, taking the potential impact on the governance model in football into 
consideration, it has not taken an extremely long time before the Social Dialogue has been 
introduced in football. One has to take into consideration that only one year after the 2001 
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transfer regulations agreement, the aftermath of Bosman, the first Commission funded 
projects were started in order to create awareness about the Social Dialogue. The process then 
focused on the definition of the social partners, within 5 years representative organisations 
were created. The employers’ side (EPFL and ECA) was undeveloped. Also, 4 years after the 
establishment of a FSDC the first Autonomous Agreement has been celebrated. This is a good 
result in comparison to the numbers in other Sectoral Social Dialogue Committees: until 2010 
there had been only 4 Autonomous Agreements in all sectors together.  
 
The general obstacles to stakeholder participation are also linked to the structure of the 
participating stakeholders. However, these general obstacles are, contrary to what has been 
argued in the review above, less present in the FSDC. Geeraert’s argument that UEFA would 
not have a mandate to discuss and conclude an agreement concerning the FIFA regulations 
may be contested. Because, issues that would touch upon the relationship between employer 
and worker may all be part of a Social Dialogue discussion and be part of an agreement when 
falling within the scope of the TFEU Social Dialogue articles. Although UEFA has to agree 
on the agenda of the FSDC, the social partners, the EPFL and FIFPRo, are not obliged to 
include UEFA in the negotiations on the platform of the FSDC. Therefore, if these social 
partners decide that topics that fall under the scope of the FIFA regulations should be part of 
the FSDC, then this should be possible and under the Social Dialogue structures they cannot 
be prevented by a third ‘non-industrial relations’ party such as UEFA. As regards the lack of 
representativeness of the EPFL, Geeraert’s claim about the refusal of some leagues to ratify 
the Autonomous Agreement should be seen from a different perspective. It has not been a 
refusal from these leagues to implement the agreement; these leagues already had a system in 
place that respected the minimum criteria. There is no relation to the issue of representativity 
from the side of the EPFL. In general, if the obstacles to start negotiations within the FSDC 
are related to the lack of willingness of the parties involved, then the ultimate motivation to 
pursue the route of a FSDC is to avoid legal challenges. Therefore, the claim of Garcia and 
Meier that competition policy remains the venue to influence an agenda, does not take into 
consideration that, next to litigation, an enforceable result by means of a negotiated settlement 






FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players 
Introduction 
 
The autonomous agreement of the FSDC regarding the minimum requirements for standard 
player contracts was a transformation and further elaboration on the agreement reached in 
2006 
528
 by a working group comprising the EPFL, FIFPRO and UEFA. One of the 
differences between the two documents is
529
 that the former explicitly states that in particular 
the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) needs to be taken into 
account before the finalization of each individual contract between a professional football 
player and the club on the UEFA territory takes place.  
 
The autonomous agreement, on the contrary, refers in two of its articles to the RSTP and 
places emphasis on the application of EU fundamental rights and secondary EU law to 
football players’ contracts.
530
 The focus of the autonomous agreement lies on employment 
issues, and despite the fact that it refers to FIFA regulations, there has been no analysis of 
potential implications of the content of the RSTP with EU law. 
 
Therefore, the question arises if in the regulations of these governing bodies there exist topics 
with relevance to the employment relation between footballers and their clubs that would 
deserve further analysis. Insofar as the parties to the autonomous agreement have committed 
themselves to further elaborate on provisions to regulate the employment contract while 
taking account of the specific nature of sport, it is to be investigated whether issues that are 
currently regulated by FIFA could, or should, fall within the scope of issues best covered by 
the Social Dialogue. It could be a better forum for the creation of legal certainty and stability 
and thus avoid legal challenges to the RSTP. 
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This chapter analyses the RSTP and determines what topics could, or should, potentially be 
addressed in the forum of the Social Dialogue. First an overview will be given of the process 
that has led to the current RSTP. Consequently, the following issues will be described: status 
and registration of players, contractual stability, training compensation, minors, player release 
to national teams, duration of contracts, unilateral option clauses and dispute resolution. 
Finally, it will be concluded how these topics may be embedded within the Social Dialogue. 
 
The FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: The 2001 Agreement  
 
The essential element of any transfer system is the creation of a situation whereby the 
movement of a player on the labour market is restricted. The restriction is grounded on three 
conditions that are common to a system of player restraints.
531
  First, a temporary limitation of 
a transfer during a sporting season can be imposed on the athletes or a limitation on the 
registration of an athlete can be imposed on a club.
532
 Second, there might exist national or 
international quota systems limiting the number of foreign players to participate in national 
team competitions.
533
 Third, the federations concerned may create a further elaborated system 
of formal requirements that need to be fulfilled in order for an international movement of an 
athlete to be implemented.  
 
The international transfer of football players has been regulated by a mixture of rules set by 
UEFA and FIFA since 1979.
534
 After Bosman FIFA decided to be solely responsible for the 
implementation of the transfer system, including the implementation in the European 
Union.
535
 FIFA was forced to change the transfer system in accordance with the prerequisites 
set by the judgment, related to safeguarding the free movement of football players within the 
territory of the European Union. As FIFA is an association of undertakings under EU law, and 
therefore the transfer regulations can be regarded as an agreement between undertakings, also 
EU competition law is applicable to FIFA and their regulations. Therefore, in addition to 
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adjust the transfer system in accordance with the free movement of workers, EU competition 
law grants the European Commission the authority to investigate if such agreements have as 
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.
536
 As such, the 
European Commission also needed to be satisfied that the transfer regulations did not restrict 
the clubs’ ability to acquire football players due to unnecessary high transfer fees and that it 
did not affect interstate trade. 
 
FIFA and UEFA attempted to bring the transfer regulations in line with EU law requirements 
by simply not applying them to transfers of EU nationals within the territory of the EU and by 
abolishing the 3+2 rule. This was not accepted by the Commission. In 1996 the Commission 
maintained certain objections to the transfer system on the basis of competition law due to the 
continuing imposition of the payment of fees for the movement of non-EU players within the 
territory of the EU after the end of their employment contract. FIFA and UEFA expressed 
their reluctance to adjust the transfer system in a manner that would go beyond the 
requirements set with Bosman. Instead of following the lines of the Commission FIFA and 





Although these lobbying activities might have influenced the eventual agreement and the 
position of sports governing bodies in general due to the subsequent mentioning of sport and 
its specific characters in the Amsterdam Treaty and Nice Declaration, it did not prevent the 
European Commission from launching a formal investigation, on the basis of an infringement 
of competition law without grounds for a justified exemption, into the operation of the 
international transfer system in 1998.
538
 The Commission objected to provisions within the 
transfer system that had the effect of:  
1. Prohibiting a player from transferring to another club following their unilateral 
termination of contract, even if the player has complied with national laws governing 
the penalties for breach of contract; 
2. Allowing a club to receive payment for a player leaving a club if the contract has been 
terminated by mutual consent; 
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3. Encouraging high transfer fees which bear no relation to the training costs incurred by 
the club selling the player, a practice condemned by the Court in Bosman and one 
which limits the ability of small clubs to hire top players; 
4. Allowing for a transfer fee to be demanded for the transfer of players (both in and out 
of contract) from a non-EU country to a member state of the EU and vice versa. 
After receiving the Commission’s statement of objections, FIFA decided that it should 
continue negotiations on its own, without assistance from UEFA. FIFA approached FIFPRo 
and held talks with the players’ union in 1999 and 2000 in order to find a solution with the 
players.
539
 Despite the approximation of FIFA to FIFPRo no concrete solution to the 
objections raised by the Commission were presented. On the contrary, the relationship 
between FIFA and FIFPRo suffered from a severe infraction when FIFPRo decided to 
negotiate within their own ranks and claiming that FIFA had a hidden agenda. Since that 




In total, a two year period of deadlock had followed the Commission’s objections. This 
situation of inaction motivated the Commission to give FIFA a deadline of 31 October 2000 
for the submission of an alternative transfer system, while a threat of a formal decision to 
impose sanctions and fines had to serve as a motivational tool for FIFA.
541
 From that moment 
UEFA felt that it was necessary to reappear in the centre of the negotiations in order to avoid 
that FIFA would agree to an unacceptable liberalization of the players’ market in Europe.
542
 
UEFA promoted the value of a constructive and positive dialogue with the Commission and 
that the dialogue, inevitably leading to change, would be acceptable if it would be a wider 
dialogue than the one that FIFA had conducted.
543
 As a result of this approach a Transfer Task 
Force was established grouping the interests of FIFA, UEFA and a representation of some 
leagues. This group presented a set of proposals to the Commission on 27 October 2000. The 
Commission was positive but cautious about the recommendations that had been presented. It 
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considered that the efforts of the ‘football family’ were a positive step forward and a good 
basis for discussion, but that on certain aspects the proposals presented needed to be clarified 
and completed through discussions with the different interested parties. According to the 
Commission a negotiated compromise should include mutual basic rights for players and 




Garcia stresses that the political developments that occurred simultaneously with the 
presentation of the work of the Transfer Task Force were of importance to an efficient 
conclusion of the negotiations towards a final agreement. The Declaration on Sport, a 
Presidency Conclusion, presented at the 2000 Nice EU summit, stressed the social importance 
of sport and the significant role of sports governing bodies in organizing their sport within a 
sphere of specificity and a with flexible application of EU law to sport. Around the Nice 
summit political leaders of the major football nations expressed their support, through formal 
and informal fora,
545
 to UEFA and FIFA and pressured the Commission to find a solution 




After these develops it was clear that there were common grounds for reaching a solution. The 
Nice Declaration created fertile soil for a compromise between FIFA and UEFA. A 
compromise was found and the negotiations between the Commission and FIFA came to an 
end by means of an exchange of letters between the president of FIFA and commissioner 
Monti of DG Competition in March 2001. The new rules came into effect in September 2001, 
whereby FIFA and FIFPRo had agreed a month earlier that the latter would be involved in the 
implementation of the regulations and would be present in the newly to be established dispute 
resolution chamber. In a press release on 5 March the Commission revealed the principles for 
the new regulations: 
 
 in the case of players aged under 23, a system of training compensation should be in 
place to encourage and reward the training effort of clubs, in particular small clubs;  
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 creation of solidarity mechanisms that would redistribute a significant proportion of 
income to clubs involved in the training and education of a player, including amateur 
clubs; 
 
 international transfer of players aged under 18 to be allowed subject to agreed 
conditions; the football authorities will establish and enforce a code of conduct to 
guarantee the sporting, training and academic education to be provided:  
 
 creation of one transfer period per season, and a further limited mid-season window, 
with a limit of one transfer per player per season;  
 
 minimum and maximum duration of contracts of respectively 1 and 5 years;  
 
 contracts to be protected for a period of 3 years up to 28; 2 years thereafter;  
 
 the system of sanctions to be introduced should preserve the regularity and proper 
functioning of sporting competition so that unilateral breaches of contract are only 
possible at the end of a season;  
 financial compensation can be paid if a contract is breached unilaterally whether by 
the player or the club;  
 
 proportionate sporting sanctions to be applied to players, clubs or agents in the case of 
unilateral breaches of contract without just cause, in the protected period;  
 
 creation of an effective, quick and objective arbitration body with members chosen in 
equal numbers by players and clubs and with an independent chairman; 
representatives of FIFPRo will sit on FIFA's Dispute Resolution Chamber, together 
with representatives of clubs. FIFPRo will also nominate representatives for the new 
Arbitration Tribunal for Football, to which decisions of the Dispute Resolution 




 arbitration is voluntary and does not prevent recourse to national courts.547 
 
On 5 June 2002 the Commission formally closed the investigation into the transfer rules. 
Commissioner Monti stated that:  
 
“The new rules find a balance between the players' fundamental right to free movement 
and stability of contracts together with the legitimate objective of integrity of the sport and 
the stability of championships. It is now accepted that EU and national law applies to 
football, and it is also now understood that EU law is able to take into account the 
specificity of sport, and in particular to recognise that sport performs a very important 





However, this statement does not have any influence on the legal status of the agreement. The 
exchange of letters that served as a conclusion is an informal settlement and not legally 
binding on the parties. The status of the agreement does not prevent the Commission from re-
opening an investigation although it is unlikely to do so on its own, especially in the current 
context of Article 165 and the promotion of a structured dialogue.  
 
However, this landscape that favours informal settlements leaves enough room for political 
manoeuvre for both the Commission and the stakeholders. A negative consequence is that the 
current system leaves a degree of legal uncertainty and scholars and practitioners have already 




In the following the current FIFA transfer regulations, the 2010 version which is based on the 
2001 Agreement, will be analysed along the lines of the negotiation agreement principles. 
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FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, 2008-2013 
 
The reformation of the transfer system intended to be the basis for a balance between players’ 
rights and contract stability. However, there remain doubts about the legality of the transfer 
agreement. A clear example of this statement is the announcement of FIFPRO in December 
2013 to challenge the 2010 RSTP.
550
 FIFPRO indicated that it will address the issue of the 
free movement of workers within the EU, competition law and human rights.
551
 However, no 
specificities about the content of the challenge were given. 
 
The RSTP lay down global and binding rules concerning the status of players, their eligibility 
to participate in organized football, and their transfer between clubs belonging to different 
associations. Section 1 are the introductory provisions. Sections 2 deals with the status of the 
player, Section 3 regulates the registration of the player, Section 4 concerns the maintenance 
of contractual stability between professionals and clubs, Section 5 deals with third party 
influence on clubs, Section 6 is regulates the international transfer of minors, and Section 7 
organizes the jurisdiction of FIFA over disputes. In the annexes to the regulations the release 
of players for national teams, the FIFA Transfer Matching System
552
 and the methods for 




The national associations are supposed to include the majority of the regulations into their 
national regulations. The remaining articles are only applicable when an international transfer 
takes place or when there is a dispute with an international dimension. These topics fall 
directly under the authority of FIFA, therefore there is no need for a national association to 
include those articles directly on the national level within their own regulations. The only 
deviation from the regulations that is allowed by FIFA is the deviation from Section 4 of the 
RSTP, these articles deal with maintenance of contractual stability and the national 
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 FIFA TMS is a digitalized system for the administration of international transfers. In essence it controls the 
international transfers by demanding that both the selling club and the acquiring club fill in the details of the 
intended transfer into a FIFA database. At the moment that the details, such as details over the acquisition 
amount that the new club needs to pay and of the status of the player and the player passport, are in conformity 
with each other, when they ‘match’ the administration of the transfer can take place and the move is given the 
green light by FIFA. 
553









The Status and Registration of Players 
 
Sections 2 and 3 deal with the status of players and with the registration of players in case of 
participation in a national competition and/or registration after an international transfer. 
According to the RSTP the player is either a professional or an amateur. A professional is a 
player who has a written contract with a club and is paid more for the footballing activity than 
the expenses he affectively incurs.
555
 The autonomous agreement contains elements that need 
to be included in the written contract and it specifies that the contract is an employment 
contract. It also states that national labour law may provide extra mandatory provisions that 
need to be taken into account by the signatory parties to the employment contract. It is to be 
assumed that the status description of the player as a professional can be understood to be in 
line with the concept of ‘worker’ within the context of Article 43 TFEU, as only the notion of 
‘worker’ would trigger the application of the provisions of the free movement of workers.
556
 
The transfer system in itself only functions properly due to the compulsory link of the football 
player to his club and, directly (individual membership) or indirectly (via his link to his club) 
to the association that governs football on the national level. In broad terms, this affiliation to 
the association, which is made concrete through the registration of his license to play at the 
national association of which his club is an affiliate, has a double objective. On the one hand 
it enables the football governing bodies to enforce their internal laws and regulations on the 
player as the registration of the player is conditional upon his acceptance of the rules of the 
football governing bodies. On the other, the football governing bodies are able to exercise 
control over the functioning and regularity of the competitions.  
 
As they are able to assess which player is playing for what team they can prevent non-
authorized players from participating in a competition. The international transfer of a player, 
the activity that falls within the scope of the RSTP, is in fact the international movement of 
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the registration of the player, or, the license of the player to enable him to participate in a 
competition. The player may be registered for 3 clubs during one sporting season while only 
be eligible to play for two clubs during that season.
557
 The international movement of the 
registration of players is limited to two ‘registration windows’ per season: three months after 
the end of the season and one month mid-season window. Players whose contract has expired 





National Associations are free to decide when they will have their registration windows in 
accordance with the duration of their competitions. Decisive for the movement of a player is 
the duration of the window of the receiving country. There has been a debate about the 
duration of the window, whereby clubs have argued that the transfer window should be closed 




According to ECJ jurisprudence in Lehtonen
560
 a restriction on free movement is permitted if 
objective justifications dealing with the integrity of the game are present. These justifications 
have to be connected to the fairness of competitions. However, this does not mean that any 
restrictive period in a season is automatically allowed under EU law. If a registration period is 
shortened, the freedom of movement of workers may be infringed. In essence, the means need 
to be in proportion to the methods used. 
 
A player may be registered only after an International Transfer Certificate is issued. He may 
be registered on a temporary move whereby he continues to be affiliated to his club but plays 
for another club for a determined period of time that falls within the duration of his 
employment contract with his actual club.
561
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FIFA and UEFA stressed the importance of a balance between the players’ rights to free 
movement within the territory and the stability of contracts, with the argument of the integrity 
of the sport and the stability of the competitions.
562
 The post-Bosman 2001 agreement 
introduced Articles 13 to 17 on the maintenance of contractual stability, including the 
application of the protected period, as well as a FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber
563
 that 
could serve as the guardian of the concept of contractual stability within the scope of 
application of FIFA’s regulations.  
 
The protected period is a period of three entire seasons or three years, whichever comes first, 
following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded prior to the 
season of the player’s 28
th
 birthday or two entire seasons or two years, whichever comes first, 
following the entry into force of a contract, where such a contract in concluded after the 28
th
 
birthday of the professional.
564
 The protected period starts running every time a contract is 
concluded and renewed between a professional and a club. If a contract is unilaterally 
breached without grounds, by either one of the parties during the protected period, the party 
that can be held liable for the preliminary breach, will face sporting sanctions. The sporting 
sanctions for the club will be a ban for registering players for a duration of two consecutive 
registration periods. The sporting sanctions for the player may amount to a period of 
ineligibility to play for four months and in aggravating circumstances, six months. 
 
The basic article dealing with the maintenance of contractual stability is Article 13 in which 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda is laid down. A contract is to be respected and may only 
be terminated after the expiry of its duration or by mutual agreement between the parties. In 
professional football ‘mutual agreement’ is mostly reached in cases where club and player 
agree on the amount of damages that will have to be paid by the player, or in practice, his new 
club, to ‘buy out’ his contract. FIFA further acknowledges the situation in which a player and 
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a club may come to an end of their contractual relation if either one of them invokes the 




A termination for just cause can have two sources. First, FIFA defines the ‘sporting just 
cause’. Sporting just cause is a source for a premature ending of the contract with a fixed 
duration that only applies to an ‘established professional’. There is no jurisprudence on the 
exact meaning of this term. Therefore, it can be felt that the intention of FIFA is to give the 
possibility to the football player that has sufficient skills to play football on a competitive 
level but that is not fielded by his employer,
566
 to seek opportunities to play for another 
potential employer.
567
 In the case of sporting just cause the player will not be faced with 
sporting sanctions, nor will he be forced to pay compensation to his previous club. Ongaro 
gives a nuance to this approach when he states that a reasonably low fee may be imposed on 
the player due to the fact that the club did not neglect its contractual obligation in the case of 




The existence of a ‘regular’ just cause should be decided on a case by case basis. The party 
that decides to unilaterally terminate a contract should therefore take into consideration that 
the early termination is only justified if a certain level of severity has been reached.  In 
general, just cause is considered as given when there are objective criteria which do not 
reasonably permit expectation of a continuation of the employment relationship between the 
parties.
569
 A severe element is, amongst others, the non-fulfilment of the club of its financial 
obligations towards the player. In such a case, CAS jurisprudence has clarified that two 
conditions need to be met: the amount that has not been paid in time by the employer should 
be a substantial amount and the employee should have given a warning to the employer in 
advance.
570
 In general, three months delay in payment of a salary gives a player the right to 
unilaterally terminate a contract without the risk of running sporting sanctions nor the 
payment of compensation. In aggravating circumstances the non-fulfilment of the financial 
obligation could be a source for unilateral termination with just cause after two months. 
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In all other cases of a premature ending of the contract on the initiative of one of the parties, 
which in any case may not occur during the course of a season,
571
 the party that has been in 
breach is liable to pay compensation.  
 
The contract between the player and the club may contain a clause in the case of a preliminary 
termination. If such a clause is included then the parties should, at the time of drafting the 
contract, be quite precise in the choice of the wording of such a clause. Commonly seen 
instruments are the ‘buy-out’ clause or the ‘liquidated damages’ clause. The former offers the 
party that invokes it the right to end the contract by paying the amount that is stipulated in the 
clause. The latter is a more abstract clause as it is difficult for a party to determine in advance 
what the damages will be that he incurs in case of a breach. If there is a disproportionality in, 
for example, the players’ monthly remuneration and the height of the damages clause, then an 
adaptation of the abstract amount may be ordered by the body involved in the resolution of 
the dispute.  
 
In the absence of a contractual clause establishing or giving guidelines for the calculation of 
the compensation sum in case of a termination of a contract without just cause, the parties 
need to fall back on Article 17 of the RSTP. Article 17(1) states that in all cases the party in 
breach shall pay compensation.  The compensation payment is subject to any payment 
deriving from the obligation to pay training compensation. The FIFA regulations give the 
following guidelines for the calculation of the amount of compensation: 
 due consideration for the law of the country concerned; 
 the specificity of sport; 
 any other objective criteria, in particular: the remuneration and other benefits due to 
the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on 
the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, the fees and expenses paid or 
incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the 
contractual breach falls within a protected period. 
The professional football player is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the 
compensation together with his new club.
572
 The new club shall be invited to establish that it 
has not been a party to prohibited inducement , but a priori the club will be deemed to have 
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induced the player. If the breach of contract takes place within the protected period, the player 
and his new club can face sporting sanctions. In the case that the protected period has passed 
then no sporting sanctions shall apply, however the player may be facing disciplinary 
sanctions if he fails to give notice of termination within 15 days after the last official match of 
the season. If another party is involved in the inducement of the breach of contract and this 
person is subject to the FIFA regulations, then he shall also be sanctioned. 
 
The criteria laid down in Article 17 leave space for interpretation. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the issue of the calculation of compensation for breach without just cause has 
been dealt with in a number of cases that ended up at the CAS in an appeal procedure. Below 
an overview will be given of the main article 17 cases. Consequently an analysis of the 




Just before his nineteenth birthday Scottish football club Heart of Midlothian (Hearts) signed 
Andrew Webster from the club Abroath. In 2001 the club agreed a contract with Webster after 
paying a transfer compensation of £75,000. The initial four year contract was set to expire in 
2005, however Hearts and Webster agreed on a new-four year deal in the course of 2003. 
Webster was now bound to the club until June 2007. His career developed and Webster 
earned caps for Scotland while becoming a solid defender in Hearts’ starting line-ups. In the 
course of 2005 Hearts wanted to extend their contractual relationship with Webster again, for 
a period up to 2009. However, Webster refused to sign as he felt pressured to do so and at the 




According to the facts presented in the underlying case in first instance at the FIFA Dispute 
Resolution Chamber,
575
 Webster first intended to unilaterally terminate his contract claiming 
just cause, but then realized that he could use Article 17 as this would be a much speedier 
procedure. His agent informed interested clubs that the ‘fee’ that was supposed to be paid to 
Hearts would only amount to the residual value of his contract. Webster signed with FA 
Premier League side Wigan Athletic without payment of any sort of compensation. In the case 
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that was brought to the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber by Hearts, Hearts claimed an 
amount of £5,037,311. The DRC partly accepted the claim but it arrived at a total amount as 
compensation of £625,000. The argumentation for the Chamber to reach this amount was that 
there was no aggravating element on the basis of a unilateral breach within the protected 
period but the simple application of the amount of the residual value of the contract as 
damage would be in contrast with the principle of the maintenance of contractual stability. 
Therefore, the Chamber connected its decision to the justification offered by Article 17’s 
criteria to calculate the amount of compensation, in addition to national law and the 
specificity of sport, any other objective criteria. The Chamber argued that Webster had raised 
his profile as a player at Hearts and that this was due to a contribution of the club. Although 
the reasoning was vague, Wigan was held jointly and severally liable for the payment of an 
amount of £625,000. After this decision all parties filed an appeal at CAS. CAS found that it 
could not be determined on what grounds the DRC had decided on the amount of the 
compensation. It decided that the decision of the DRC was invalid, it rejected the claim of 
Hearts and based its decision purely on the height of the compensation on the residual value 
of the contract: £150,000, as no other sums, such as unamortized transfer fees or agent 
commissions, were available to include in the calculation. 
 
The football stakeholders, especially the clubs, were afraid of the potential impact of the 
Webster case. FIFA reacted that this decision would have far-reaching and damaging effects 
on football as a whole.
576
 The fear of the clubs was that they would lose income on the 
potential transfer fees generated by the sale of players. With the decision in Webster a player 
could walk out of his contract without no other sanction then the payment of the residual 
value of the contract. If the player would have appreciated in the course of his current 




The Brazilian player Matuzalem was transferred in June 2004 from the Italian club Brescia 
for €8,000,000 by the Ukrainian club Shaktar Donetsk. The contract was concluded for the 
                                                 
576
 www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/releases/newsid=682195.html. See also: De Weger (2008), F. The Webster 
Case: Justified panic as there was after Bosman?, The international sports law journal, 2008 Vol. 1-2, The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. 
577




length of five years ending on 30 June 2009. In the contract a ‘transfer clause’ was included. 
This clause offered an interested third club clarity as regards the fee it had to pay if it would 
be interested in acquiring the services of Matuzalem by means of a transfer. The clause was 
set at €25,000,000. Matuzalem became an important player in the team and gained interest 
from other clubs in Europe. Italian side Palermo offered Shaktar $7,000,000 for the player but 
Shakter rejected this amount. Matuzalem decided to unilaterally terminate his contract with 
Shaktar on the basis of Article 17 of the FIFA Regulations within 15 days after the last game 
of the Ukrainian football season. Matuzalem signed a contract with Spanish Real Zaragoza, 
while Shaktar Donetsk denied that Matuzalem had grounds to claim the applicability of 
Article 17. Shaktar pointed towards the €25,000,000 transfer clause. It was this amount that 
Shaktar claimed in the procedure it initiated before the DRC, where it held Matuzalem and 
Real Zaragoza jointly and severally liable.
578
 The counterclaim of Real Zaragoza and 
Matuzalem was an amount of €3,200,000.  
 
The DRC decided that the transfer clause did not affect the unilateral breach of Matuzalem 
because it was directed towards a potential new club in case of that clubs acquisition of the 
services of Matuzalem through a settlement with mutual agreement after the payment of the 
sum that would enable such a transfer. The Chamber used three arguments to calculate the 
amount of the compensation: the residual value of the contract; the non-amortised value of the 
acquisition transfer fee paid by Shaktar to Brescia in 2004 and, as a consequence of the 
specificity of sport principle, the poor conduct of the player as he had left the club at a time 
when it was entering European club competitions. The DRC established that the amount of 
the compensation on these grounds should be €6,800,000.  
 
The case was appealed to CAS which upheld the decision related to the transfer clause. 
However, it did adjust the amount of compensation to be paid by Matuzalem or Real 
Zaragoza. The argumentation was based on the calculation of the value of the lost services for 
Shaktar: the amount that Shaktar needed to pay to replace the player, added to the amount of 
remuneration that the player was still supposed to receive for the remaining two years of 
contract: €11,258,934. In addition to this amount the Court applied the argument of the 
specificity of sport. It reaffirmed that the player had become an important player (captain) for 
Shaktar and that it had left the club in a crucial phase of competition. Although the Court 
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acknowledged that the exact amount of damage could not be quantified, it did impose an extra 
amount of €600,000 to the established compensation, so a total amount of €11,858,934. Both 




The Egyptian goalkeeper El-Hadary played in his home country for Al-Ahly, where he signed 
a contract binding him to the club from January 2007 to the end of the 2010 football season. 
In 2008 Al-Ahly entered into talks with the Swiss club FC Sion about a potential transfer of 
the player to Switzerland. The clubs failed to reach an agreement, however the day after El-
Hadary signed a contract with FC Sion and informed Al-Ahly that he had unilaterally 
terminated his contract with the latter. Al-Ahly brought the case before the FIFA DRC and 
was successful. The DRC calculated the compensation on the grounds of the remuneration 
that was still due to the player and on the loss of a potential transfer fee. This amount was set 
at €300,000. The DRC tripled the amount on the basis of the specificity of sport, apparently 
the player had caused the club so much damage that this addition to the basic amount was 
justified.  
 
In appeal before the CAS another method of calculation was employed. The CAS determined 
that the amount reached by FIFA was too high. It took into consideration what the salary 
would be that El-Hadary would earn at FC Sion for the remaining duration of the contract he 
initially had with Al-Ahly. This amount would be added to the loss of the transfer fee by Al-
Ahly and after that a deduction took place of the amount of salary that Al-Ahly did not have 
to pay because of the leave of the player. The final amount was established at €796,500. In 
addition to the jointly and severally liability of both player and club, El-Hadary also faced 






                                                 
579







Goalkeeper Morgan de Sanctis signed a contract for Udinese Calcio in Italy after being 
transferred from Juventus, also from Italy. The contract was entered into in July 1999 and had 
a duration of five years initially, while it was extended in the years after with a final extension 
leading to a contract with a validity from 2005 to 2010. His salary at Udinese amounted to a 
total sum €630,000 gross with an addition of bonuses, a rent contribution of €9,700 and a 
yearly bonus of €350,878. In 2007 the protected period for De Sanctis had elapsed and he 
terminated his contract prematurely within 15 days before the end of the season. Not long 
after the termination of his contract De Sanctis signed a four year contract with the Spanish 
club Sevilla FC. Sevilla, in accordance with the Spanish customs, included a penalty clause in 
the contract that if the player would unilaterally breach the contract he would be liable to pay 
€15,000,000 to the club. In the case before the DRC
581
 in 2008 Udinese calculated its losses 
and arrived at a compensation claim of €23,267.,94. The DRC awarded Udinese a payment 
for their losses but substantially lowered the amount. Of the total amount, €3,547,134 
resembled the compensation, but extra amounts would be added. The motivation was that this 
amount was the average of the salaries under the old and the existing contracts, a non-
amortised agent fee of €36.000 and the value of the services attributed to De Sanctis by both 
clubs. In, addition, and bringing a further dimension to the extent of the notion of specificity 
of sport, was an amount of €350,000. In total the final amount was €3,933,134. On appeal, the 
CAS, not surprisingly, approached the case de novo and used another method of calculation. It 
lowered the total amount to €2,250,00 and it set the replacement costs on €4,510,00 for the 
remaining time of the contract (three years) and then deducted the amount that Udinese had 
saved on not having to pay the wages. 
 
Article 17: Assessment  
 
Article 17 of the RSTP provides the methodology for the calculation of the training 
compensation. The outcome of the abovementioned cases serves as a source for analysis of 
the way in which the CAS has interpreted the individual elements of the methodology. Here it 
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will be assessed how this approach promotes legal uncertainty. The pillars on which the 
amount of compensation is calculated on the basis of the Article 17 are: 
 due consideration of the law of the country concerned 
 statement in the contract 
 the specificity of sport 
 any other objective criteria, these shall include (in particular): 
o remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract 
and/or the new contract; 
o the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years; 
o the (amortised) fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club; 
o if the breach falls within a protected period. 
 
The Law of the Country Concerned 
 
An analysis of the key Article 17 cases reveals that none of the calculations have been based 
on the law of the country concerned. Ongaro
582
 argues that the fact that the regulations 
include the reference to national laws, does not stipulate that these national laws needs to be 
applied. The consequence is that the national law should only be taken into consideration by 
the deciding authority. He states that the background of the regulations
583
 is that the decisions 
of the DRC normally rest upon general legal principles rather than on specific provisions of 
contractual and civil law. When a case goes into appeal it already is ‘instructed’ on the basis 
of the FIFA statutes, where it is mentioned that CAS shall primarily apply the various 
regulations of FIFA and, additionally, Swiss law.
584
  The CAS has set aside clauses that 
include a choice of law in the contract.
585
 In the key Article 17 cases the CAS has made such 
a movement. In Webster CAS did not apply Scottish law but Swiss law because the general 
Scottish laws on damages for contractual breach were ‘neither specific to the termination of 
employment contracts nor to sport or football’.
586
 In Matuzalem there was no explicit choice 
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of law, therefore the CAS applied FIFA regulations and Swiss law.
587
  El-Hadary and De 
Sanctis the court used the approach that if a party would prefer the application of national law 
it should give enough reasons for the Court to do so.
588
 Parrish concludes, in line with 
Ongaro’s thoughts, that the approach of CAS seems to be to apply the regulations as they are 





Statement in the Contract 
 
The existence of specific clauses on ‘liquidated damages’ or ‘buy-out’ clauses has been 
discussed. In the key case of Matuzalem the discussion concerning the legal consequence of 
the ‘transfer clause’ did not lead to clarity. Therefore the parties may include such a clause in 
the contract but they need to be careful about the exact wording in order not to leave too much 





The Specificity of Sport 
 
There are no clear guidelines on how to approach the specificity of sport by the arbitrators of 
the CAS. Parrish argues that the specificity of sport should be seen as an approach by CAS as 
informing an analysis under ‘any other objective criteria’
591
 In general the CAS argued that: 
“the criterion of specificity of sport shall be used by a panel to verify that the solution 
reached is just and fair not only under a strict civil (or common) law point of view, but 
also taking into due consideration the specific nature and needs of the football world 
(and of parties being a stakeholder in such world) and reaching therefore a decision 
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which can be recognised as being an appropriate evaluation of the interests at stake, 
and does so fit in the landscape of international football”.
592
  
This reasoning was also the guidance of the panel in Matuzalem. Also in Matuzalem, the 
panel referred to the specificity of sport in the sense that, unlike in ‘normal’ employment 
relations, the worker in football is not the weaker party per definition and that this could be 
taken into consideration in determining the amount of compensation.
593
 In Webster the 
specificity of sport was described as: 
“the goal of finding particular solutions for the football world which enable those 
applying the provision to strike a reasonable balance between the needs of contractual 
stability, on the one hand, and the needs of free movement of players, on the other 
hand, i.e. to find solutions that foster the good of football by reconciling in a fair 




Ongaro adds in general that when embarking on the calculation of compensation, the DRC 
exclusively follows the other elements first, so not the specificity of sport, provided by the 
regulations. So strict adherence to the fundamental principles is maintained. After establishing 
the amount, the Chamber examines specific football matters that could justify an increase or 
decrease of the reached amount. Elements could be, amongst others, the behaviour of the 
party at fault, the timing of the premature termination (in relation to registration windows for 




Remuneration and Other Benefits due to the Player under the Existing Contract 
and/or the New Contract 
 
This aspect entails the remaining salaries to be paid to the player under a normal continuation 
of the terminated contract, and the salaries that the player should receive under the new 
agreement. However, the wording of the regulations (and/or) (again) leaves space for 
interpretation by the DRC and the CAS. In Webster the court argued that only the residual 
value of the contract should be taken into consideration, whereas since Matuzalem the 
‘positive interest’ approach has been applied, taking also the future earnings of the player into 
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consideration. Positive interest, or expectation interest, aims at determining an amount which 
places the injured party in the position as it would have had if the contract was performed 




The (amortised) Fees and Expenses Paid or Incurred by the Former Club 
 
Under this heading the paid transfer fees and the potential replacement costs could be 
included. If the new club includes a ‘transfer clause’ in the contract, it could also create an 
element for the calculation. Again, the CAS has been ambiguous in its approach. In Webster it 
decided not to apply the potential replacement costs of the club in the final amount. In this 
respect it should be noted that where the player was bought by Hearts for an amount of 
£75,000, Hearts at the time of the dispute claimed that the value of the player had augmented 
to £4,000,000. The court judged that the rise in value of the player could not only be 
attributed to the club.
597
 In Matuzalem the replacement costs were inserted in order to bring 
the club back into the position in which it was before the unilateral breach of the contract – 
the so called ‘positive interest’ principle. This approach served as a precedent.  
 
The transfer fees paid to third parties in order for the club to acquire the player have also been 
a basis for debate. The key cases all include claims from the appealing party that the 
amortised transfer fee should be part of the compensation. However, for different reasons this 
request was not attributed. In Webster the paid transfer fee, like in El-Hadary and De Sanctis, 
had already been amortised. In the latter the payment of an outstanding agent fee was 
included. In Matuzalem the value of the fee was already incorporated in the total calculation 
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The Time Remaining on the Contract and Breach within a Protected Period 
 
These criteria do not have an explicitly independent approach when calculating the 
compensation. The time of the contract is necessary to calculate the abovementioned 
compensations. The protected period is clearly based in the regulations and should be applied, 
however in De Sanctis the CAS decided not to apply the fact that the contract was terminated 





Conclusions on Contractual Stability 
 
The RSTP that were informally agreed between the European Commission and FIFA by 
means of an exchange of letters intended to foster contractual stability through Articles 13 to 
17. However, a balance needs to be found between this intention and the free movement of 
workers, as required by the Commission. The stability needs to be clear and certain in order to 
prevent that stakeholders will seek recourse to ordinary Courts in search of desired clarity in 
an individual case.  
 
One issue that puts extra pressure on players is the protected period. The informal agreement 
allowed for a protected period to be included in the contract. However, this period would 
consist of a maximum of three years for players under the age of 28 and two years for players 
over the age of 28. The informally agreed terms clearly focussed on the age and not on the 
contract. The FIFA definitions sections establish that the period starts to run again after the 
conclusion of a new contract. Therefore a player who is bound via consecutive contracts to 




 could effectively never be relieved from a protected period 
if the contract is renewed after every second year. This is a regular procedure taking into 
consideration that it is practice to include unilateral extension options (see further) in the 
contract in favour of the club, under certain conditions. Therefore, the automatic extension of 
the protected period might lead to a too severe burden on the player as he will be faced not 
only for three years with a sporting sanction after a unilateral termination, but, if he remains 
with the same club, potentially longer.. 
 
                                                 
599
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 185 
The methodology for the calculation of the compensation amount to be paid by the player 
after the protected period is not well defined. As an analysis of the key Article 17 cases 
reveals, neither the FIFA DRC, nor the CAS, have applied a similar calculation in any of the 
cases. A turn has been made from the ‘residual value’ perspective in Webster to the ‘positive 
interest’ perspective after Matuzalem, but no fixed methodology has been applied. Therefore 
the parties cannot know in advance what the compensation would be that will free them from 
each other. In addition, in the case that the parties have agreed on a contractual clause 
establishing an amount, the wording is also open for discussion and this could jeopardize the 
certainty as regards the agreed terms. The notion of ‘sport specificity’ appears to put too much 
of a burden on the players. They will not know what financial risk they run when unilaterally 
ending a contract. This uncertainty appears to be advocated by clubs in order to promote 
stability.
600
 In fact, the ECA legal advisory panel chairman Ivan Gazidis stated that: 
 
“CAS continues to recognise that the financial consequences of a breach of contract 
must be analysed on a case by case basis. We welcome this approach, which means 
that a party in breach of a contract must take responsibility for the damages caused to 
the innocent party. Further, the uncertainty of outcome in any individual case 




This notion of preaching uncertainty to promote predictability is not in line with basic legal 
principles such as the predictability of the law and the minimisation of litigation. It seems that 
litigation is the only way in which a player secure certainty about the amount of compensation 
after a breach. In addition, for clubs the damages in case of a unilateral termination are clear 
as they will not result in a higher payment than the residual value of the contract with a 
potential mitigation in the case that the player has found alternative employment in the time 




As regards the application of the law concerned, it turns out that, after the analysis, it is 
unnecessary to include a choice of law in the contract. Even an explicit clause will only be 
“taken into consideration” by the DRC and/or the CAS but will not be applied per se. On the 
                                                 
600
 Parrish, R. (2011) Contract stability: the case law of the Court of Arbitration for sport, in M. Colucci (ed) 
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contrary, there are no cases where the national law has been applied. Before the CAS the 
regulations of FIFA are applicable and in cases of unclear principles or rules recourse is found 
to Swiss law. This is a serious undermining of the principles of the national legislation that are 
democratically established in line with labour law fundamentals, expressing a balanced 
equality between workers and employers in the sense that the worker is regarded, in general, 
as the weaker party. The specificity of sport has proven to be an instrument that treats worker 
and employer in football on the same grounds. This issue becomes even more problematic if 
the application of EU law is set aside by the football courts.  
 
The compensation payment, when jointly and severally liable for club as well as player, can 
be too high in certain cases, burdening the player with an unrealistic amount. In the case of 
the player Matuzalem, he appealed before the Swiss federal supreme court
603
 stating that 
neither he, nor his club Real Zaragoza, would be able to pay the amount of €11,858,934 as 
compensation to Shaktar Donetsk. The CAS award interfered with Matuzalem’s economic 
activity: as neither he nor the club could pay the amounts he was sanctioned by FIFA and 
therefore he was unable to compete in any official competition, and, consequently he would 
be unable to earn any income to pay the fine. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court found that the 
effective lifetime ban of the player was disproportionate as regards the objectives pursued by 
the regulations that searched for contractual stability. The Swiss Supreme Court indicated that 
the disciplinary sanctions that serve as a ‘u-turn’ for enforcing CAS awards are not necessary 
as the New York Convention is the basis for recognition of arbitration awards under the 
signatory parties. 
 
Lambrecht mentions two more issues that may jeopardize the creation of contractual stability. 
First, the fact that since August 2011 FIFA no longer enforces CAS awards of ordinary 
procedures, being procedures that have been brought to CAS in first instance. This is 
problematic for all the contracts that include a clause to deal with disputes under the CAS 
ordinary procedures, in first instance. The procedure to enforce the CAS award is lengthy and 
will eventually lead to an unenforceable sanction.
604
 The fact that the DRC decisions 
concerning the payment of compensation take between two to four years is very problematic. 




 Lambrecht, W.(2011) Contractual stability from a club’s point of view, in M. Colucci (ed) European Sports 
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An uncertain message is spread if one takes into consideration that the issuing of a provisional 






The principle of compensating clubs for the training of their players was one of the informally 
agreed principles in the 2001 transfer agreement. In Bosman
606
 and later in Bernard
607
 the 
Court of Justice judged on the legality of such a system for training compensation. In Bernard 
the judgment was targeted towards the French system of mandatory signing an employment 
contract with the club that trained the player. In Bosman the fact that compensation for 
training could serve as an incentive for clubs to train young players was defended. However, 
the conditions of such a training scheme need to be carefully construed, as they have to be in 
line with the general conclusion from the Bernard case: 
 
“Article 45 TFEU does not preclude a scheme which, in order to attain the objective 
of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players, guarantees 
compensation to the club which provided the training if, at the end of his training 
period, a young player signs a professional contract with a club in another Member 
State, provided that the scheme is suitable to ensure the attainment of that objective 
and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain it.” 
 
The scheme to remunerate the club for the training of a player restricts free movement. 
However, a certain restriction should be allowed in order to encourage clubs to continue to 
recruit and train players. The system to compensate clubs must, however, be proportionate 
and take only the realistic costs connected to the training of the players into consideration. If 




 such a set of justifications should be in place in order to 
successfully exempt a system of training compensation from the application of EU free 




 Bosman (C-415/93). 
607
 Bernard (C-235/08). 
608
 Hendrickx, F. (2010), Justification of training compensation in European Football: Bosman and Bernard 
compared, in Colucci M, European Sports law and policy bulletin 1/2010, p.30-33. 
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movement laws. First, the reimbursement should relate to the real and actual incurred costs of 
training.
609
 Individual and global costs may also be included. This means that the training of a 
pool of players needs to be capitalized. All costs involved for training a group of players 
should be taken into consideration when a decision is made on the amount that the 
compensation for training of one single successful player should entail. Third, the payment of 
the compensation for training should be divided amongst the clubs that have actually 
participated in the training of the player. Fourth, the obligation to pay training must decrease 
over time. Hence, after a certain amount of time the training of the player is over.  Finally, the 
payment of the compensation should be done by either the club or the player, and, most 
importantly, the free movement of the player should not be prevented. It will be assessed 
below if indeed the freedom of movement of the player is not, unjustifiably, restricted in the 
current RSTP.  
 
After deciding to implement a system, FIFA asked their member associations to propose the 
elements that needed to be the source for the calculation of training compensation. 
Unfortunately FIFA received very few replies.
610
 Therefore FIFA communicated a non-
exhaustive list of factors
611
 that lead to the implementation of a system of calculating the 
actual training costs. The system was incorporated in the FIFA RSTP.
612
 Training 
compensation is generally paid when a player signs his first professional contract or whenever 
he signs a consecutive contract up until the end of the season of his 23
rd
 birthday and up to his 
21
st





 The average amount of training compensation for one player is determined every 




2. Category: USD 30,000 
3. Category: USD 10,000 
4. Category: USD 2,000 
                                                 
609
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610
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 Currently in Article 20 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and more in detail in Annexe 
4. 
613




2. Category: USD 40,000 
3. Category: USD 10,000 
4. Category: USD 2,000 
Europe:  
1. Category: EURO 90,000 
2. Category: EURO 60,000 
3. Category: EURO 30,000 
4. Category: EURO 10,000 
North and Central America: 
 2. Category: USD 40,000 
3. Category: USD 10,000 
4. Category: USD 2,000 
Oceania:  
2. Category: USD 30,000 
3. Category: USD 10,000 
4. Category: USD 2,000 
South America:  
1. Category: USD 50,000 
2. Category: USD 30,000 
3. Category: USD 10,000 
4. Category: USD 2,0000 
 
The top level clubs are category 1. These are only clubs of the big five leagues in Europe
614
 
and the Netherlands. The costs to be paid by the acquiring club are the costs it had to pay had 
it trained the player itself. The first time the player signs a contract the amount is calculated 
on the basis of the category of the acquiring club multiplied by the years that the player has 
trained at the selling club.
615
 In a subsequent transfer only the subsequent club is entitled to 
receive training compensation when a player moves to a new club. Special provisions are 
created for the EU and EEA. In the case of a transfer within the EU and EEA the calculation 
is based on an average of the training compensation between the two clubs in the case that  
the new club is in a higher category. If the player moves to a lower category, then the lower 
                                                 
614
 England, Germany, France, Italy and Spain. 
615
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category club does apply. If it is clear that the player completed his training before his 21
st
 
birthday (which is difficult to be proven) then the final season of training may be placed 
earlier in time. If the player is not offered a contract by his former club, with at least the 
equivalent conditions, upon expiry of his contract than the club is not entitled to receive 
training compensation.
616
 As an extra protection for the youth, the years of training of the 
player are normally set from age 12-15 on the last category, for every club, except in the 
circumstance that the player transfers to another club before the age of 18, then the full 




A simple calculation of a realistic case will show that this system can be extremely restrictive 
regarding the free movement of workers. Ajax Amsterdam is well known for its training 
facilities and practices. It scouts players throughout the Netherlands. A young player can be 
recruited to play for Ajax from, for example, 11 years. He will go through all the ranks of 
Ajax and then move, within the Netherlands, on his 19
th
 birthday to another club at the bottom 
of the premier Dutch league table. This is no peculiarity as many players with an ‘Ajax 
history’ are active in the Dutch league. This player plays at this club for two years on a 
relatively low salary. When he is 21 he may wish to continue his career abroad. If this player 
wishes to move to, for example, the English Championship (second level of professional 
football, but a traditional club) then the amount of training compensation to be paid by the 
English club should be 12-15: 4x €10,000 +  16-20: 5x €90,000 = €590,000. This is an 
unrealistic fee and will prevent many clubs from signing a player of that sporting status. In 
such a case a player’s only possibility to move to another club is if his former club is ready to 
waive its right to the compensation. This situation applies to EU and EEA players, non-EU 
players do not have to receive an offer for a new contract to maintain the claim for training 
compensation of their previous club intact. 
 
Another example of a potential restriction is the vagueness of the offer of a contract. In the 
case that a player is an amateur at a club, any offer for a professional contract from the club 
that has trained him, is to be considered as an offer if the offer is based on a compensation 
higher than his expenses. The situation might occur that the player is offered a contract by a 
bigger team than his current training team just before the end of his training period. If his 
training club then offers the player a professional contract for a very low amount it can secure 
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the training compensation payment for the player. This seems logical, but if for example a 
Dutch club has understood that one player, who has been trained by the club, is of interest to a 
foreign club, it might just offer a very low wage in order to secure only the training 
compensation. Whereas if the player would have asked for a reasonable wage, he would not 
be able to negotiate that with a club. This practice leads in individual cases of uncertainty for 
the player, or for him to be forced to accept a lower contract than the one offered. 
 
In addition to training compensation, clubs can also receive a solidarity payment.
618
 This type 
of payment will be distributed amongst all the clubs that have trained a player during his 
training period. This is an amount of 5% of the transfer compensation to be paid by the new 
club of the player in the case that a player makes a transfer where ‘profit’ has been made. The 
clubs that have trained the player will get an even share of the 5% commission based on the 




As the acquisition costs for players and players’ wages have grown substantially, there are 
clubs that have changed their strategy in their search for talented football players.
619
  The 
investment in talent is now more than a strategy targeted at purely sporting success, it is a 
significant source of income that allows for more economic competitiveness. Grosso Modo,  
two different types of investing in talent are able to be identified. First, (Western) European 
clubs scout and buy the local talent as this investment is cheaper than training a local 
player.
620
 Second, clubs invest in the creation of academies. These academies are ither 
connected to the professional team itself in the country of origin, or in football development 
countries where a relatively low investment can lead to an efficient recruitment of a relatively 
large number of players.
621
 In England clubs such as Manchester United and Chelsea F.C. had 
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 Celen, B., Lederman, L., Rigopoulous, A., J.A. Rodriguez., Sadowski, P. (2010), International transfers of 
minors: Recommendations to improve the protection of Young Players in the current transfer system, Research 




 Supra. The authors mention in their report the example of Feyenoord Ghana Academy. The academy has 
collaborated in some projects with Unicef and has a good reputation. However, the migration of talent to 
“parent” club Feyenoord Rotterdam has not been very successful in the recent years. The academy was inspired 
by the ASEC Mimosas academy in Ghana that produced big talents such as Kolo Touré, Gervinho, Sekou Cissé, 
Emmanuel Kone, Romaric, Emmanuel Eboué and more. In Ghana also the Right to Dream academy has been 
active and Dutch team FC Utrecht opened an academy in the town of Tamale. Another type of investing in talent 
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in the squads of 20 an average of 6 to 8 non-national players.
622
 There also exist academies 
not directly linked to a professional football club, this makes it difficult for the national 
associations to control what players are playing at the club because they do not participate in 
organised football.
623
 The legal framework for the international transfers of minors is 
embedded in Article 19 of the FIFA RSTP. The article forbids the international transfer of 
players under 18 years.
624
 This article is the basic framework and a further elaboration of the 
article deals with exceptions to the general rule. The following exceptions apply: 
 
1. The player’s parents move together with the player to the new country for non-
footballing reasons. 
 
2. The transfer takes place within the territory of the EU. Then the player is allowed to 
move to another EU country only and insofar as the new club provides the player with 
adequate football education, a school or vocational education that will allow the player 
to pursue a career outside football and make all the necessary arrangement to ensure 
that the player is looked after carefully. 
 
3. The international transfer within EU takes place when the player lives no further than 
50km of the border and/or the club is no more than 50km of the border. A maximum 
distance of 100km stands between the player’s club and his domicile.
625
 
Some disturbing issues have lead to a stricter application by FIFA of the regulations and to 
more strict regulations in itself, as evidenced below. Therefore, since October 2009 a specific 
sub-committee must decide on the international transfer of a minor.
626
 Only if strict criteria 
are met will the transfer will be validated. A reason for this approach was the misuse and 
                                                                                                                                                        
through academy is through a single owner owning multiple teams. For example Red Bull owns teams in New 
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circumvention of the FIFA regulations. One example was the case of the Paraguayan player 
Caballero
627
 who moved from Olimpia Asuncion to Cadiz in Spain. His mother travelled with 
him to Spain. FIFA, after investigations, understood that the mother was not moving to Spain 
for reasons not linked to football. In appeal to CAS the Spanish club argued that the decision 
of FIFA was against Spanish, Swiss and international employment and human rights 
legislation. The panel stated that: 
 
“ the contented FIFA rules limiting the international transfer of players who are less 
than 18 years old, do not violate any mandatory principle of public policy under Swiss 
law or any other national or international law insofar as: 1) they pursue a legitimate 
objective, namely the protection of young players from international transfers which 
could disrupt their lives, particularly if, as often happens the football career 
eventually fails or, anyways, is not as successful as expected, 2) they are proportionate 




Another case that reached CAS was a situation whereby Nigerian youngsters came to play for 
Danish side FC Midtyjlland
629
 with a student visa and consequently were registered for the 
football club. An investigation learned that, according to CAS, the education was purely 
connected to the education schemes offered by the club and that there was no link to any other 
educational institution. An attempt to apply the Cotonou agreement
630
 to non-working 
situations was not allowed by the CAS. 
 
Alarming numbers of incidents of transfers of minors were presented by Gallavotti.
631
 He 
raised the problems of minors arriving in Italy on tourist visas and then staying at a club for a 
long period of time until their eighteenth birthday. From that moment on, these players may 
be registered at an Italian club for the first time. In Italy in the season 2008-2009 409 non-
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Italian players were registered whereby 407 had never been registered abroad. A very 
alarming situation. 
 
In the light of the perspective of the free movement rules of the EU it must, however, be taken 
into consideration that the restriction on the free movement may only be exempted from the 
application of EU law if in line with justifications on the basis of public policy, public 
security or public health.
632
 These reasons are similar to the framework of reasons given in the 
Acuña case.
633
 Therefore a balance needs to be found between the protection of minors and 
rules on free movement. What needs to be analysed in this respect is the ability for the 
relevant authorities to assess the entry of minors on the territory of a Member State of the EU. 
The football governing bodies are only capable of assessing a potential trafficking crime at 
the moment that a request for registration is made. The procedure leading to the registration, 
the actual trafficking, cannot be assessed.  
 
Hence, it also needs to be taken into consideration that trafficking in football should fit the 
general definition of trafficking provided by the relevant EU legislation.
634
 It is doubtful if in 
football the transfer of minors may qualify as child trafficking.  In football this is in majority 
probably not the case. The players who arrive in Europe at a young age are normally 
determined to be successful as a footballer and sustain their families with their income. It 
cannot be said that they travel against their will. Their will is, in some cases such as the Italian 
example above, influenced on the wrong grounds. CAS has also confirmed that the issue of 
trafficking of minors needs to be addressed through employment and immigration law. There 
have been multiple suggestions that all stakeholders should be involved in finding a better 
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 UEFA proposed to carry out research to identify the problems of transfers 
of minors within the EU. It aims to provide figures and statistics with the negative 
consequences of those transfers.
636
 However, the outcome of such research may not lead to an 
imbalance between the freedom of workers and to protection, as this may well turn out to be a 
quasi-protection. 
 
Player Release to National Teams 
 
According to the FIFA statutes the FIFA’s Executive Committee draws up a calendar for 
international matches.
637
 The ultimate responsibility for organizing international football 
matches for national team lies with FIFA.
638
 The organization of the FIFA competitions, such 
as the World Cup in different age categories and the Confederation Cup, can only be well 
organized as the composition of the national teams is as strong as possible. Therefore, in order 
to guarantee an interesting spectacle, FIFA has the complete freedom to call up players to 
participate in matches for their national teams. This authority is imposed on the national 
association member of FIFA through the annexe 1 of the FIFA RSTP. Clubs are obliged to 
release their players on the dates that were fixed on the international match calendar 
639
 and 
also for the preparation period, that is 14 days in case of final stages of a competition, 
compulsory five days for double-date matches in qualification stages, four days in the case 
that a match is played in another confederation than the home country, and the least is a 
period of 48 hours for single matches and/ or friendlies.
640
 The clubs are not entitled to 
receive financial compensation for the time that the player is not able to work for his club. 
The club needs to insure the player for illness and accident. In the case that a player is bodily 
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 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, annexe 1, Article 2. The insurance for bodily injuries 
is included in the regulations after the threat of litigation in the Oulmers case.  
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The compulsory release of players, without the payment of their salaries
642
 in the time that 
they are away, has a serious impact on the employment relation between the club and the 
player. The argumentation that FIFA should be allowed to demand that a player is released 
needs to be balanced against the freedom of the parties to conclude a contract in which they 






The Duration of Contracts 
 
Article 18 stipulates that the minimum duration of a contract is one year and the maximum 
duration of a contract is five years. This implies that all contracts that are used in the 
professional football industry have to be contracts for a fixed-term. As was discussed above in 
Chapter 5, in the European professional football sector European Union law applies. In that 
sense, Directive 1999/70 applies.
644
 This directive protects, as discussed, the rights of 
employees with fixed-term contracts against discrimination vis-à-vis employees with contracts 
with an indefinite duration. S hould a certain number of fixed-term contracts be used 
consecutively, then the contract shall be regarded as a contract of indefinite time. The 
duration of the contract is limited and prima facie a justification of the use of a fixed-term 
contract instead of a contract for indefinite time needs to be objectively justified. It is not to 
be expected that the mere mentioning of the fact that contracts have to be of a fixed-term in 
association regulations can be regarded as an objective justification as mentioned in the 
1999/70 Directive’s Article 5. In addition, even if the FIFA RSTP state that national law 
should prevail when it comes to mandatory labour legislation, in case of a dispute this 
national law only applies before a national (arbitration) court. In the case that a dispute has an 
international dimension and FIFA claims competence then it is ready to set aside national 
laws and apply Swiss law and/or the principles of the FIFA regulations. In appeal the CAS 
will do the same. An illustration of a case where Dutch national employment law was set 
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aside is the case concerning a contractual dispute between PSV Eindhoven and the player 
Leandro do Bomfim:  
 
“The principles outlined under Art….36 of…these regulations are also binding at 
national level”. As a result, the rule set forth in article 36 can be invoked “at national 
level” in the relation between clubs and players: national associations cannot depart 
from such rule; and domestic provisions inconsistent with the principles expressed by 
the mentioned Article 36 of the FIFA regulations 1997 cannot be invoked “at national 
level” to seek and to obtain a remedy, enforcing a contract having a duration of more 




The Use of Unilateral Option Clauses 
 
Players that have not reached the age of eighteen cannot be bound by contractual clauses that 
effectively determine a longer duration than three years. If the regulations mention these 
clauses it implies that the use of clauses that pretend to have such an impact are commonly 
used. This is indeed the case. Clubs wishing to have a certain freedom to decide if they 
continue with a player for a longer term often include unilateral option clauses, basically an 
irrevocable offer from the side of the player to enter into an agreement with the club for 
binding him longer, in their employment contracts. Although the autonomous agreement 
mentions that clubs and players should have equal rights as regards the prolongation of a 
contract, this does not entail the criteria for the use of these options in its scope. The practice 
of the use of unilateral option clauses is, internationally considered to be allowed if the 




The potential maximum duration of the labour relationship should not be excessive. Secondly, 
the option needs to be exercised within an acceptable deadline before the expiry of the current 
contract. Thirdly, the salary derived from the option right has to be defined in the original 
contract. One party shall not be at the mercy of the other party with regard to the contents of 
the employment contract. Finally, the option shall be clearly established and emphasized in 
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According to the RSTP, FIFA has two dispute resolution chambers.
648
 These are the DRC and 
the Player’s status committee. The jurisdiction of these chambers is defined in the RSTP.
649
 
These FIFA tribunals acknowledge an appeal procedure at CAS.
650
 However, even if the 
parties make a choice of law in their individual contract, the football courts will only take this 
into consideration but will continue to apply the principles of the FIFA regulations and Swiss 
Law. A dispute between a player and a club dealing with, for example, a contractual 
disagreement will take between 2 to 4 years before a decision is taken.  
 
Overall Assessment of the use of Social Dialogue as a Forum for the Creation of 
Legal Certainty 
 
FIFPRo’s challenge to the FIFA RSTP illustrates the lack of legal certainty for the actors in 
the football sector. A system that seemed to be the fruit of a negotiation between football 
governing bodies and the European Commission is now under threat of legal scrutiny. The 
outcome of a legal challenge is uncertain. A challenge to the RSTP might lead to an overhaul 
of the system. In order to analyse if the European Social Dialogue could serve as a potential 
forum for a negotiated settlement and avoidance of legal challenges, it should be confirmed if 
the issues discussed above can be characterized as Social Dialogue issues.  
 
The Social Dialogue deals with employment issues that are relevant and impact on the 
relation between the employer and the worker. Therefore, any issue that has an impact, in a 
specific sector, on an individual that can be qualified as a ‘worker’ under the characteristics of 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, may be included in the European Social 
Dialogue. Regards, the issues deriving from the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of 
                                                 
647
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Players, this impact is evident. Hence, in order for a professional football player to carry out 
his professional activity he needs to be registered. This is a prerequisite for determining his 
status as a ‘worker’.  
 
The following issues from the RSTP have been identified and discussed and the connection 
between these topics and Social Dialogue will be explored in turn: 
 
 Contractual stability 
 Training compensation 
 Transfers of minors 
 Player release for national teams 
 Contract duration and unilateral option clauses 




One of the fundamental issues of the agreement of 2001 was the objective of the creation of 
contractual stability. However, the analysis above demonstrates that the current method in 
which this stability is reached is through the existence of uncertainty. The uncertainty relates 
to the calculation of the amount of damages that a player is due to his former club for 
breaking his contract prematurely. The fact that this amount can be a lot higher than the rest 
value of the contract, based on the ‘positive interest’ doctrine, makes that a burden which is 
placed on the player. The outcome of the Matuzalem appeal before the Swiss Federal tribunal 
illustrates that the system is too restrictive. This is for the reason that, if the player and/or his 
new club (for being severally liable) cannot pay the amount decided by the DRC / CAS, the 
disciplinary sanctions that are imposed on the player will prevent him to work.  
 
At the moment that the contractual stability objective was introduced by FIFA as part of the 
compromise in 2001 there was no mentioning about the intention to promote the ‘positive 
interest’ principle. The agreement contained a protected period proposal, but this de facto 
consequence of the contractual stability articles goes beyond that what was proposed. 
Furthermore, the constant ‘renewal’ of the protected period was also introduced by FIFA after 
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the informal agreement had been made public. The social partners have already started a 
discussion on the issue of contractual stability in a FSDC working group, however the 




According to the analysis, the topic is suitable for Social Dialogue. A renegotiation of the 
contractual stability issues within the FSDC would diminish the potential legal challenges to 
the rules and will create more clarity for all stakeholders involved. To achieve more certainty 
and stability, the FSDC could create a standard ‘preliminary breach’ clause that could be 
included in all employment contracts, thereby taking away the ambiguity that exists now in 
relation to contractual clauses defining an amount for damages in case of a preliminary 





In the Bosman aftermath the acknowledgment of a football club’s entitlement to a form of 
compensation for the training and education of players was elaborated by FIFA. In the 2001 
informal agreement it was proposed that in the case of players aged under 23, a system should 
be in place to encourage and reward the training effort of clubs, in particular small clubs. 
 
Training compensation is, according to Bosman and Bernard, a legitimate objective to restrict 
the free movement of a player. However, this restriction is only allowed in the case that there 
is a compensation for the actual costs incurred by the training of the player. In individual 
cases, as has been illustrated, a potential impediment goes beyond reason and leads to a de 
facto restriction on the player to join another team. The calculation of the compensation could 
not be in relation to the training and/or the offer of a new contract by the training club can be 
construed in the way that it is merely targeted to secure compensation whereby the player 
cannot leave his training club as a free player. 
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The issue of training compensation leads to de facto restrictions in individual cases and it 
therefore is a basis for legal uncertainty and potential legal challenges by parties that are 
frustrated in their free movement. These parties are either workers or employers and therefore 
the topic seems appropriate for a discussion within the framework of the European Social 
Dialogue. With the consent of the workers a further acceptance of the rule can be established, 
however, all FSDC partners need to be involved in the creation of a more balanced set of rules 
for the calculation of training compensation. FIFA acknowledged that it did not receive much 
feedback from its members when it came to a suggestion of the parameters to determine the 
amount of training compensation. It seems appropriate to involve the clubs and players in this 




The FIFA RSTP include a system for the protection of minors. Only under certain conditions 
is it possible to transfer players under 18, whereby there exists a difference between the 
conditions for the European Union and for the rest of the world. However, this system is 
connected to the scope of regulative authority of FIFA and will therefore only be initiated at 
the moment of a (request for) a registration of a minor. The actual problems relating to the 
illegal transfer of minors, the trafficking of children, by contrast, occurs in a stage before the 
registration. 
 
The European Commission is of the opinion that sports federations are not adequately 
equipped to combat and punish offences against public order, particularly in the fields of 
human trafficking which falls within the province of financial supervision, fiscal control and 
crime prevention/law enforcement policies.
652
 According to the Commission, Member States 
must play a complementary role by supervising the measures implemented by national 
federations and imposing criminal penalties for offences against public order.  
 
The recognition of the problems related to the transfers of minors has already been confirmed 
officially by the European Commission and the European Parliament in 2007 in the White 
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two EU institutions emphasized on the existing EU directives
654
 that were applicable to the 
protection of minors in the context of their transfers and to the application of immigration 
laws.  
 
As the Member States have the ultimate responsibility to criminalize and prosecute the 
trafficking of children, it should be through the form of a formal set of rules that this activity 
is specifically targeted to football. The European Social Dialogue is a tool that can turn an 
agreement from the social partners into a directive if jointly requested to the European 
Council. By doing so, the football sector could not only influence the situation during and 
after the registration of the minor, but already in advance attach a formal framework of 
control and sanctioning to the scouting and trafficking of minors. The involvement of the 
social partners should and their initiatives shall also create a greater balance between 
protection and the right on free movement. 
 
Duration of Contracts 
 
The directive on the use of fixed-term contracts is applicable to professional football in the 
European Union. It is restricted to use multiple contracts for a fixed-term consecutively if an 
objective justification allowing this use is available. A mere mentioning of the compulsory 
use of fixed-term contracts in the regulations of a football governing body might not be 
sufficient for a protection against the legal challenge of the system. Therefore, the explicit 
recognition of the fact that contracts in professional should be contracts of a fixed-term should 
be the source for an ‘umbrella objective justification’ for the use of such contracts. Therefore, 
the issue is clearly a topic that could be part of a Social Dialogue. The criteria established by 
Portmann regarding the requirements for the admissibility of unilateral extension options 
could be part of a Social Dialogue discussion.
655
 The social partners may agree on a standard 
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wording of a unilateral option clause that could survive legal scrutiny and create certainty for 
the parties that are willing to include this in their contracts.  
 
Player Release for National Teams 
 
Clubs are forced to release their players for the national teams. This includes all official 
matches and for the time around those official matches. For international tournaments the 
players are forced to join their national team when called-up. In the case that a club does not 
collaborate to release the player it may risk a disciplinary sanction.  
 
The clubs do not receive any compensation for the wage paid to the player for the time of his 
leave. Clubs have pressured FIFA and UEFA for a change in this system by threatening the 
governing bodies with a legal action. In the aftermath of an affair between FIFA and Bayern 
Munich, whose president is also ECA’s president, concerning the player Arjen Robben who 
returned injured from an international game with the Netherlands, an agreement has been 
reached between FIFA and the clubs about a risk insurance in case that the player returns 
injured to his employer. This insurance is the club protection programme.
656
 After a period of 
28 days the insurance pays the salary of the player in the case of a temporary total disability 
(TTD) to play football. The total amount that the insurance will cover is €7,500,000. The total 




In addition to this amount the clubs will share in the benefits of the World Cup tournaments. 
For the World Cup in Brazil in 2014 a gross amount of $70,000,000 is made available for the 
distribution amongst all the clubs that have released their players for the national team 
competition.
658
 This amount will be divided pro rata in relation to the players that have been 
released per team. 
 
Although this compromise has taken away direct threat as regards legal challenges, it still is a 
fact that any national club competition in the world is depending on the planning of the FIFA 
world cup for the composition of the match calendar. This issue deals with working time and 
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it therefore can be placed in the European Social Dialogue as a typical employment issue. It 
could lead to more stability if the international match calendar, together with the club 




The FSDC could also be the platform for the establishment of an alternative dispute resolution 
chamber or for a specific branch of CAS. Hence, the cases that are now brought before these 
courts do not take into account other sources of law besides FIFA regulations or Swiss law. In 
this manner the parties in a dispute loose the protection of EU law, more notably the 
application of the freedoms offered by EU law. 
 
The FSDC could establish an arbitration panel within its own structures, or within the UEFA 
structures. The social partners and associate partners in the FSDC could then appoint 
arbitrators to deal with disputes that take place within the territory of the EU. In such a case, 
the arbitrators would apply the basic standards of the Autonomous Agreement and also apply 




This chapter has presented the history of the RSTP leading to the conclusion of the informal 
agreement between FIFA, UEFA and the European Commission in 2001. It also illustrated 
that legal uncertainty is connected to the current RSTP and that the agreement with the 
European Commission is not legally solid enough to take this uncertainty away. This is 
evidenced by the announcement of FIFPRo that it will challenge the RSTP on the basis of 
infringements of the freedom of movement of players, of competition law and human rights. 
 
Various elements of the RSTP have been analysed and it has been concluded that through the 
forum of the European Social Dialogue legal certainty can be attainted. The topics in the 
RSTP are employment related issues and are therefore fit to be implemented in the 
negotiations taking place within the FSDC. 
 







UEFA has been appointed by means of a compromise with the social partners as the 
chairperson for the FSDC and as an associate party to that committee. The role of UEFA is to 
present the agenda for the FSDC meetings and to conduct the meetings. The agenda for the 
meetings is agreed upon by the parties in the FSDC outside of the FSDC structure in the 
UEFA governed PFSC. An associate party has, according to the rules of procedure, a similar 
status as a social partner, the voice of UEFA needs to be taken into consideration in order to 




UEFA also has a responsibility in the implementation of the Autonomous Agreement. UEFA 
is required to use its best endeavours to ensure implementation of the Autonomous 
Agreement.
660
 Consequently, due to the implementation strategy that was agreed between the 
parties in the FSDC on the basis of the compromise brokered by the European Commission, 
an alternative source for implementation is added to the typical routes. In countries where no 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) exists at national level, UEFA may force their 
member national associations to introduce the minimum requirements from the Autonomous 
Agreement in a standard contract.  
 
A novelty to the European Social Dialogue is that this opens the door for implementing a 
Sectoral Social Dialogue Autonomous Agreement beyond the borders of the European Union. 
 
Notwithstanding this role of UEFA in the FSDC, the current Autonomous Agreement goes no 
further than minimum requirements. Although legal certainty is created regarding these 
minimum requirements, this does not prevent other sources of regulation threatening the 
stability of the European football sector. These regulations may not primarily be linked to the 
employment relationship between a football player and his club, but they may influence that 
employment relationship. 
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UEFA is the organiser of European club competitions and has specific regulations for the 
organization of the Champions League and the Europa League.
661
 In order for clubs to be 
eligible to compete in these competitions they need to be licensed by UEFA on the basis of its 
club licensing regulations.
662
 The adherence to the licensing criteria in these regulations are as 
decisive for participation in these competitions as is qualification through sportive merit 
achieved in national competitions. 
 
The Champions League and Europa League regulations allow clubs to register a maximum of 
25 players per season of the competition.
663
 The 25 player squad must be construed along the 
lines of the ‘Home Grown Player’ requirement. The UEFA Club Licensing Regulations has 
introduced the Financial Fair Play system, putting a limit on clubs’ expenditures. 
 
Both regulations are currently under legal scrutiny. The practical functioning of the Home 
Grown Player Rule (HGPR) has been critically analysed and found to go beyond the 
necessary means to reach its objective.
664
 The Financial Fair Play Rules (FFPR) are being 
legally challenged before a Brussels court
665
 and a complaint concerning its legality has been 




This chapter analyses both regulations and determines if they could, or should, be addressed 
in the FSDC. First an overview will be given of the FFPR. Consequently, the HGPR will be 
                                                 
661
 UEFA Champions League Regulations, to be found at: 
http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/Regulations/competitions/Regulations/01/79/68/69/1796869_








 Due to the similarity of both regulations as regards the HGPR further reference shall only be made to the 
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presented. Both regulations are then placed within the context of EU law. Finally, it will be 
concluded how these topics may be embedded within the FSDC. 
 
UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play 
 
At the start of the 2004-2005 season UEFA introduced the Club Licensing system. The goal 
was to encourage European club football to look beyond the short-term and consider 
underlying longer-term objectives essential for the game’s good health.
667
 The licensing 
system is targeted at clubs that have qualified to participate in UEFA competitions. These 
teams need to fulfil the criteria laid down in the club licensing regulations in order to be 
eligible to play. The key principles that a club needs to consider in its club operation, since the 





Recent developments in the economic sense have changed the landscape in football. Despite 
the sport’s growing popularity there has not been an equally levelled growth. Many clubs are 
in liquidity problems and have reported high debts and, as a consequence, were forced to open 
their doors for private investors and other equity participants to gain influence in the club’s 
operations.
669
 On the other hand, some other clubs have climbed up the competitive ladder 
and nestled themselves at the top of the European competitions through external investments. 
This development leads to an ever growing gap between the top clubs and mid-size or smaller 
clubs, and, consequently to an impact on financial stability and competitive balance.
670
 
Today’s European football has a limited number of clubs that are responsible for the vast 
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majority of the total revenue generated by European football,
671
 while even between the top 




Therefore, in addition to the rules based on the principles above, UEFA’s executive 
committee unanimously approved a financial fair play (FFP) concept in September 2009 and 
this concept was transposed in the UEFA club licensing and financial fair play regulations in 





 To improve the economic and financial capability of the clubs, increasing their 
transparency and credibility; 
 To place the necessary importance on the protection of creditors and to ensure that 
clubs settle their liabilities with players, social/tax authorities and other clubs 
punctually; 
 To introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances; 
 To encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues; 
 To encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football; 
 To protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football. 
In summary: the FFP regulations seek to achieve long-term financial soundness and thereby 




The core principal of the FFP regulations is the break-even requirement: clubs are not allowed 
to spend more than they earn: their expenses need to be in line with their income.
675
 If these 
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two elements are in balance then there exists a ‘break-even’. The accounts of the club need to 
be in balance. The monitoring of the well-functioning of the system is carried out by the 
UEFA Club financial control body.
676
 The monitoring period is a period of three years.
677
 The 
clubs are allowed to have an acceptable deviation, this being the maximum amount of break–
even deficit that a club may have over the aggregate monitoring period.
678
 The allowed 
deviation is €5 million over the aggregated period or €45 million over the season 2013/2014 
and 2014/2015 and €30 million over the next seasons if the deficit is covered by financial 
injections from equity participants and/or related parties.
679
 In practice this means that 
(aspirant) owners or investors of/in football teams will no longer be able to contribute to the 
exploitation and composition of a team due to immense financial injections,
680
 limiting such a 
contribution to €45 or €30million per three seasons.  
 
Clubs that do not comply with the Club licensing and FFP regulations will be brought, via the 
Club Financial Control Panel, to UEFA’s independent disciplinary bodies. There already have 
been cases before CAS dealing with the regulations.
681
 The sanctions on clubs can be 
financial and/or a (multiple year) ban for participating in UEFA competitions. 
 
The Club Licensing system and the Financial Fair Play regulations and EU Law 
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The European Commission’s competition head Joaquin Almunia was involved in talks with 
UEFA President Platini when creating and implementing the FFP regulations.
682
 On 21 March 
2012 the European Commission and UEFA issued a joint statement
683
 in which the initiative 
by UEFA was welcomed and accepted by the European Commission as it believed that the 
break-even principle deriving from the FFP regulations is consistent with the aims and 
objectives of EU policy in the field of State Aid. However, despite the Commission’s full 




Therefore, a recourse to the European Court of Justice would place the validity of the FFP 
regulations under scrutiny of the Court. According to a number of authors
685
 the FFP 
regulations would not pass the requirements of consistency with EU law. The FFP 
regulations, despite having praiseworthy aims, lead to a barrier for competition. As Dupont 
states:  
 
“But as an agreement (the FFP) whereby industry participants jointly decide to limit 
investments, FFP likely constitutes collusion and hence a violation of EU Competition 
law. FFP may also infringe other EU freedoms such as the free movement of workers 
and services.”  
 
The FFP is a joint agreement between clubs to limit their freedom to acquire players by 
restraining their ability to do invest in players’ wages and  registrations. The clubs, as 
undertakings gathered under UEFA and therefore fitting under the EU competition law 
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definition of an undertaking,
686
 need football players to create their product: the football 
spectacle. Competition is, at first sight, distorted. Moreover, it is clear that the FFP regulations 
intend to influence the finances of the participants in EU team football competitions so the 
description as an economic activity is a logic consequence, making EU law applicable to the 
issue at stake.  
 
In addition to a distortion of competition, Lindholm compares the introduction of the FFP 
regulations with the introduction of a salary cap in Europe.
687
 A salary cap is a measure to 
limit how much money teams may spend on player salaries.
688
 The use of salary caps is more 
common in North American professional sport leagues,
689
 where they normally are part of 
collective bargaining agreements (CBA) between team owners and players.
690
 Despite the fact 
that such a rule is anti-competitive it is exempted from antitrust laws as a ‘labor 
exemption’.
691
 The conditions for such an exemption to be valid is that the CBA must 
primarily affect the signatory parties, concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining 
and it should be the product of arm’s-length bargaining.
692
 In the United States there are 
generally two types of salary caps.
693
 A cap can be related to an individual, or to a team. In 
case that it is related to a team, the cap can be an absolute cap, connected to the total number 
of teams in a league, or a relative cap, connected to the turnover of the team that implements a 
cap on his roster. There may be a hard cap, the total amount a team can spend and applicable 
to all the athletes in a team without exemption possibilities, or a soft cap, a connection to a 
proportion of the revenue and that allows exemptions to the general applicability of the cap, 
for example in the case of exceptional talents or team icons.
694
 According to Lindholm the 
FFP regulations have the same effect as a salary cap in the European Union, although at first 
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sight this might seem different.
695
 The break-even requirement entails a salary cap system that 
can be defined within the scope of a relative salary cap, teaming the total budget of the club to 
a limited amount that the club may spend on salaries. Therefore, the FFP regulations make it 
more difficult for a player to move to another club that participates in, or to a club that will 
qualify for, European competitions. Hence, a club cannot spend more than a certain amount, 
within the cap, on players’ wages. The employment of a player is dependent on the space left 
in the cap. Although these rules do not directly discriminate on the basis of nationality, they 
do form an obstacle to the free movement. As stated in Bosman:  
 
“provisions which preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his 
country of origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of movement…constitute an 





The arguments used as an illustration need further analysis in order to examine if the rules 
drafted by UEFA are able to be exempt from the full application of the EU laws on 
competition and free movement of workers.  
 
The Financial Fair Play rules under EU competition law analysis 
European competition law and ECJ case law have introduced a method to analysing the 
application of article 101 TFEU, which is based on four questions. 
1. Is UEFA, as the designer of the FFP rules, an undertaking?  
2. Does the decision affect trade between Member States? 
3. Is the effect on trade between Member States appreciable?697 
4. Does the decision have as its object the restriction or distortion of competition? 
It has been made clear above that UEFA can be seen as an undertaking according to an 
analysis along the lines of existing EU jurisprudence. The analysis of the effect on interstate 
trade has been dealt with as a precedence in the Court’s judgment on Société Technique 
Minière.
698
 This requirement has been met if it is possible to foresee with a sufficient degree 
of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law, or of fact, that the agreement in 
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question may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade 
between Member States.
699
 If the approach to, and acquisition of, raw materials is affected 
then apparently at least a form of influence can be noticed. As regards the effect being 
“appreciable”, this requirement is easily met. This is a consequence of the European model of 
sport where UEFA is the sole organizer of the game, therefore any action or decision of 
UEFA is immediately noticed by the competitors in the market. The FFP regulations also 
distort competition, since the rules have as their main and explicit aim the reduction of the 
amount of money that the clubs spend on salaries of players. This is indeed likely to restrict 




It can therefore be concluded that the FFP regulations distort competition and are unlikely to 
be exempt from the full application of EU competition law, unless the rules prove to have a 
genuine and legitimate aim and the choice for the contested rule appears to be proportionate in 
relation to the objective that it intends to reach.  
 
Financial Fair Play Regulations: Legitimate Aim? 
 
In Bosman the ECJ suggested that maintaining a financial and competitive balance between 
sport teams amounted to a legitimate aim and that consequently a restriction on the free 
movement of workers could be allowed.
701
 In the case of the FFP regulations, UEFA states 
that they pursue long-term financial stability.
702
 Moreover, competition is likely to be 
negatively affected because the ‘break-even cap’ is connected to a club’s turnover and that a 
club in a smaller market continues to have less access to income generated through the sale of 
broadcasting rights, or to an enhancement of the income generated from sponsorships, 
merchandising and other exploitation methods of intellectual property rights due to the logical 
restrictions of a consumer base. The clubs with the larger markets and budgets will 
automatically remain on the top of their respective leagues, as well as in the European 
leagues, as their access to the most expensive players remains. However, the European 
Commission has recognized that in the specific market of sports the continuation of the 
                                                 
699
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existence of competitors is also of relevance. Therefore, financial long-term stability is likely 




Financial Fair Play Regulations: Proportionate? 
 
Lindholm refers to the theory of Dietl, the overinvestment theory.
704
 This theory deals with 
the fact that a club’s success judged on the cohesion of the fan-base and the financial merit, 
derives from sporting success. In order to compete in this sporting success clubs will 
overinvest in players, endangering the existence of the club in case of no sporting results. This 
is an issue that the FFP rules try to abolish. However, there is not enough evidence to prove 
that the restrictive method chosen by UEFA to counter this potential threat is proportionate, 
especially if you take into consideration that the overinvestment theory is inconsistent with 
the experience in European football where salary overspending is not a problem for the 




More importantly, are there alternatives that are less restrictive or that can better reach the 
objectives pursued? Lindholm lists four alternatives, which are shared in part by other 
authors.
706
 Less restrictive alternatives could be a better method of sharing the revenues 
between clubs,
707
 downgrading the financial gain of the Champions League and uplift the 
financial gain of the Europa League, limiting the mid-contract transfers of players, the 
introduction of an absolute cap or luxury tax on player’s salaries.
708
 The luxury tax could be 
introduced as an incentive for high-spending teams to share more revenues with the lower 
ranked teams as soon as they have surpassed a certain spending threshold. 
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Financial Fair Play Regulations and the Free Movement of Workers 
 
The free movement of workers is a different perspective, but nevertheless an important pillar 
of the foundation of the European Union. A similar ‘test’ as was carried out in relation to 
competition law, needs to be analysed for the acceptance of a restriction on the free 
movement of workers. This analysis comes forth from the ECJ Gebhard case.
709
 
In order to assess an impediment to one of the four freedoms is allowed, it should be assessed 
if the measures at stake: 
 
1. Are applied in a non-discriminatory manner; 
2. Are justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; 
3. Are suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; 
4. Not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. 
A similar application as the test used above on the issue of competition law would lead to a 
similar result, but now from the perspective of free movement law. Less restrictive measures 




The Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play regulations may be incompatible with EU law if 
challenged before the courts. At the time of writing, there is a case pending before the 
national courts regarding the legality of the rule and a complaint before the European 
Commission. Bosman lawyer Jean-Louis Dupont represents a Belgian football agent, Mr. 
Striani, in his challenge of the FFP rules. As this procedure might take some time before the 
Court reaches a judgment, there might still be time for UEFA to prevent a negative outcome 
and search for another method in securing their objectives with less restrictive means by using 
the FSDC as a forum for negotiated settlement. 
 
The club licensing and FFP regulations seek to achieve long-term financial soundness and 
thereby ensure the long-term viability of European football. The general objective is to use the 
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regulations to avoid clubs becoming tempted to spend more than they earn. This requirement 
has been concretized in the “break-even” requirement.  
 
Effectively the current system is fragile under EU law as a legal challenge could overhaul the 
complete system. The de facto salary cap that is introduced by the ‘break-even’ rule is fragile 
in the light of the EU rules on free movement and the restrictive effect on competition 
deriving from this rule goes against the principles of EU competition law. The regulations are 
not proportionate. It seems unlikely that, when considering the existence of less restrictive 
alternatives, the Court would judge the club licensing system and FFP regulations to be 
allowed under EU law. A challenge to the rules could be carried out by a player or by another 
party that is affected by the rule.  
 
The European Social Dialogue could be the framework for a creation of control on the club’s 
expenditure on player’s wages. The European Social Dialogue is a form of collective 
bargaining and through the fact that the social partners in the European professional football 
sector have appointed UEFA to chair the Sectoral Social Dialogue committee, the issue of 
financial fair play could be placed on the agenda of negotiations in the field of football. In the 
United States salary caps could be introduced via a collective bargaining agreement, despite 
the restrictive effect, due to the ‘labor exemption’. In the European Court of Justice’s 









 it is possible to exempt the full application of EU 
competition law to certain restrictions. As the Court states in Brentjens:  
 
“It is beyond question that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective 
agreements between organisations representing employers and workers. However, the 
social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously undermined if 
management and labour were subject to article 85 (1) (now 101) of the Treaty when 
seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work and employment. It 
therefore follows from an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole 
which is both effective and consistent that agreements concluded in the context of 
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collective negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of such objectives 
must by virtue of their nature and purpose, be regarded as falling outside the scope of 
article 85(1) of the Treaty.”
714
   
 
More specifically, the Advocate General suggested in Brentjens that: 
 
“My conclusion on antitrust immunity for collective agreements is that collective 
agreements between management and labour concluded in good faith on core subjects 
of collective bargaining such as wages and working conditions which do not directly 
affect third markets and third parties are not caught by article 85(1) (now 101) of the 
Treaty.” 
 
The test that therefore needs to take place is if the restricting agreement has been agreed from 
a Social Dialogue between representative partners and if the agreement is structured as a 
collective bargaining agreement. In addition, does the agreement contribute to the working 
conditions of the workers?  
 
In relation to the regulation, it might be suggested that the representative body of players, 
FIFPRo, would recognize the need for financial stability amongst club teams. It has to be 
proven that this system would eventually have a positive effect on the workers. Therefore, if 
the social partners agree that the issue may be placed on the agenda of the European Sectoral 
Social Dialogue Committee and an agreement on a financial fair play rule can be reached, 
then the risk of a legal challenge and overhaul of the regulations is no longer becomes 
realistic. Hence, the restrictive element on the free movement of workers has been 
acknowledged and accepted by the representative body of workers as positive for the workers’ 
conditions and the UEFA proposal has been agreed upon by the social partners within the 
structure of a collective agreement. Therefore, it may be concluded that the only way to 
guarantee  legal certainty for the financial fair play regulations is that UEFA requests the 
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The UEFA Home Grown Player Rule 
 
UEFA’s Executive Committee adopted the HGPR on 21 April 2005 and UEFA’s members 
accepted the rule at the congress in Tallinn. UEFA wished to introduce the rule in order to 
combat issues that, for them, had a negative impact on European football. UEFA detected at 
their member associations and their football clubs the following disturbances: 
 
 A lack of incentive for clubs in training players; 
 A lack of identity in local/regional teams; 
 “Hoarding” of players; 
 Problems for national teams as a result of the points above. 
 Less competitive balance in UEFA club competitions and domestic leagues; 
 An increased link between money and sporting success; 
 Fewer opportunities for local-trained players to play.715 
UEFA claimed that the training and development of talent at clubs was in danger. As the 
influx of income shifted more towards a select number of top clubs it appeared as if it was 
better for them to acquire talents from smaller clubs as soon as they were fit to make the 
(junior) ranks of the top teams, instead of a direct investment in training. As young players are 
more  likely to join bigger teams on both sporting as financial grounds, and taking into 
consideration that for young players restrictions apply as regards contractual bonds,
716
 the 
clubs that trained the players were not properly remunerated for the training time and efforts 
that they had invested in the player. UEFA sought to introduce a rule that would create 
incentives for clubs to keep investing in the training of players and that would be able to 
reintroduce a more balanced form of competition. Hence, if weaker clubs would be under less 
pressure from richer (stronger?) clubs in the sense that they would simply buy away their 
talents and hoard them in B-teams for irregular participation in the A-team, the competitive 
balance could be restored. The methodology was based on the HGPR in combination with the 
club licensing system. 
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The HGPR would encourage the clubs to invest in training their own players, or “locally 
trained players”. The HGPR creates a distinction between locally trained players that are 
“club trained players” and “association trained players”. A club trained player is
717
 a player 
who, between the age of 15 (or the start of the season during which he turns 15) and 21 (or 
during the season into which he turns 21) and irrespective of his nationality and age, has been 
registered with his current club for a period, continuous or not, of three entire seasons (i.e. a 
period starting with the first official match of the relevant national championship and ending 
with the last official match of that relevant national championship) or of 36 months. An 
association trained player is
718
 a player who between the age of 15 (or the start of the season 
during which he turns 15) and 21 (or during the season into which he turns 21), and 
irrespective of his nationality or age, has been registered with a club or with other clubs 
affiliated to the same association as that of his current club for a period, continuous or not, of 
three entire seasons or of 36 months. The HGPR sets a minimum standard of locally trained 
players to be registered on the “A” list of a team, this is a list of 25 players that may be 
registered to participate in UEFA competitions and that needs to be delivered in accordance 
with the deadlines set by UEFA in their regulations governing UEFA club competitions.
719
 In 
the first stages of this introduction, the clubs participating in UEFA competitions could 
gradually bring their squads in accordance with the new requirements. However, since the 
season 2008/09 onwards clubs must have at least 8 locally trained players in their squads. If 
they fail to meet this standard than the amount of 25 registered is also lowered. Of these eight 
players not more than four can be “association” trained.
720
 Although not “aggressively” 
worded, this approach entails a quota for teams, limiting the amount of “non-locally trained” 
players to be fielded. 
 
The European Commission published in its White Paper on Sport,
721
 in the Pierre the 
Coubertin action plan,  that: 
 
“Rules requiring that teams include a certain number of “home-grown players” could 
be accepted as being compatible with the Treaty provisions on free movement of 
persons if they do not lead to any direct discrimination on the basis of nationality and 
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if possible indirect discrimination effects resulting from them can be justified as being 
proportionate to a legitimate objective pursued, such as enhancing and protecting the 
training and development of talented young players.”  
 
Therefore, the European Commission, at first sight, agreed to the rule but it committed itself 
to examine whether the potential indirect discrimination deriving from the rule would be 
allowed on the basis of the legitimate aim of the promotion of training of young players and 
the balance of the competition. An assessment of the impact would be carried out in 2012. 
 
The admissibility of the UEFA HGPR under EU law has been a source for elaborate academic 
debate.
722
 A reproduction of this debate is the start of the research project commissioned by 
the European Commission (DG Education and Culture (EAC)) and awarded to the University 
of Liverpool and Edge Hill University.
723
 The study embarks on the objectives of the 
European Commission when, prima facie, agreeing to the rules. The main aims of the rule can 
be summarized as improving the training and opportunities for young players and the 
(re)introduction of competitive balance.
724
 The analysis that is carried out deals with the 
following questions: 
- Is EU law applicable to the rule? 
- Does the rule restrict free movement? 
- Does the rule restrict competition? 
- If so: does the rule have a legitimate aim? 
- If so: is the rule proportionate, e.g., are there less restrictive alternatives to reach a 
similar or better result? 
 
EU law applicable to the Home Grown Player Rule? 
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 According to the study, p. 13 and 14, the other objectives were the erosion of clubs and the decline of the 
standard of national teams of countries where the clubs consisted of clubs that fielded a large number of non-
national players. These two objectives were not central in the discussion on the position of the HGPR under EU 




UEFA is the governing body for European Football and the rule applies to teams and players 
that are active in a cross border competition. Therefore, the rule does not apply only to an 
internal situation. Sport is not exempt from the Treaty either. According to the decision in 
Walrave
725
 EU law is applicable to sport insofar as the case under analysis constitutes an 
economic activity. It cannot be denied that a rule that can influence the employment of a 
player touches upon the very core of an individual’s economic activity: labour. Even if UEFA 
would argue that the rule should fall outside of the scope of the application of EU law, the 
jurisprudence of the Court has established a framework in Meca-Medina
726
 that no rule of a 
sports governing body, when constituting an economic activity, would be by definition 
exempt from the application of EU law.  
 
The Meca-Medina case dealt with the application of EU competition law, but the test can be 
compared to the Gebhard
727
 test for labour issues, and no exception on the basis of purely 
sporting interest is applicable to it. This is because it deals with professional football and with 
the core activity of the participants in an economic sector: clubs, players, associations, 
leagues, etc. No comparison can be made, in the quest for an exemption, to rules such as the 
composition of national teams.
728
  Therefore it can be concluded that EU law is applicable to 
the rule.  
 
However, not all rules that fall under the scope of application of the Treaty are prohibited. In 
Meca-Medina the contested doping regulations fell under the scope of the Treaty but their 
purpose was of such a relationship to the essence of sport, being the maintenance of rivalry 
between participants, or the integrity of the competition, that an infringement of the EU’s 
competition laws was not considered. In Deliège a similar outcome was reached. Rules of 
selection on the basis of nationality infringed the rules on the freedom of providing services, 
however a certain control and freedom for the governing bodies is needed in order to ensure a 
fair and organized selection mechanism for international competitions. Is the effect of the 
HGPR similarly inherent to the sport as such? According to the authors of the Home Grown 
Player Study,  it is not.
729
 The UEFA competitions have been a huge sporting and commercial 
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success long before the introduction of the rule, therefore the organisation of the competition 
does not depend on the application and enforcement of the HGPR. This conclusion is a start 
for a further analysis of the potential restrictive effect of the contested rule. 
 
The UEFA Home Grown Player Rule and its impact on Free Movement in the EU 
 
The European Commission has already stated its concern when, in principle, agreeing to the 
HGPR. It stressed the possibility that an indirect discrimination would come to the surface 
when the rule would be applied in practice.
730
 The indirect discrimination has been confirmed 
in the study.
731
 It is more likely that locally trained players are players that have the same 
nationality as the club in question. This conclusion is drawn despite the fact that a more 
intense migration of workers between the age of 15-18 has taken off after the introduction of 
the rule. Hence, if a player moves from one association to another association during his years 
of training he can still meet the criteria of becoming a locally trained player without 
occupying a “non home-grown” spot within the ranks of 25 on the A-list. One does need to be 
cautious with this conclusion as it would have an opposite effect on the competitive balance 
of European teams. Due to this rule it is likely that the training and education for traditional 
teams like Ajax Amsterdam is less interesting as their top talents will be transferred to the big 
five EU leagues before the talents sign a contract with their local teams. Moreover, besides 
this ‘muscle drain’, the rules on the transfer of players want to restrict transfers of minors 
whereas the HGPR could incentive the transfer of under eighteen players. Another negative 
consequence could be that clubs that have contracted young players to play for a number of 
years in their academies and, as such, reach the “locally trained player” status, are loaned out 
to satellite clubs. This is a phenomenon that is rising in the European competitions
732
 and 
deserves further analysis outside of the scope of this thesis. Taking the above into 
consideration, a restriction on the freedom of a worker can be identified. 
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EU Competition Rules and the Home Grown Player Rule 
 
It is the consensus in academic debate, although the amount of work dedicated to competition 
law in this context is less than the rules on free movement, that the rule prima facie breaches 
EU competition law.
733
 It is likely that the rule will eventually fail the proportionality test in 
light of the objectives that it pursues. In order to reach such a conclusion, a test along similar 
lines as the test on the FFP can be applied to the HGPR, is the aim of the rule legitimate, is it 
suitable and necessary and, if not, are their alternatives to the rule? 
 
The Aim of the Rule: Legitimate? 
 
In ECJ case law it has been identified that in sport there exists, due to the specific nature of 
sport, restrictions that serve a legitimate aim. A legitimate aim is the proper functioning of a 
competition
734
 or the need to improve player training, education and development and the 
need to protect the competitive balance in a competition.
735
 The latter two are the main 
objectives of the HGPR, therefore it can be determined that the objective of the rule is a 
legitimate one. 
 
Home Grown Player Rule: Suitable and Necessary? 
 
The final questions deal with the suitability and the necessity of the rule. First, does the rule 
attain its stated objectives: better training of youngsters and more competitive balance? The 
study concludes that it can only detect a modest impact on competitive balance.
736
 This is 
partly due to the fact that there is not much data on competitive balance to make a more 
accurate calculation. On the second issue, the impact on youth training, the study concludes 
that there has been very little impact. The trend that the number of locally trained players 
made appearances in main teams has grown slightly but this trend started before the 
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implementation of the rule. The study does not reveal evidence for a major change in 
investment in youth training if the rule continues to exist in its current form.  
 
If the impact of the in meeting its objectives cannot be easily identified, or are rather limited, 
the question arises if there are alternatives. Alternatives that have a less restrictive impact on 
the free movement of workers and competition law. First, the rule could simply be amended 
to a more limited number of players that are locally trained and to be registered at the A-team. 
The amendment could also lie in targeting the rule only to club trained players. Both options 
lead to negative consequences, from the point of view of the authors.
737
 The first would 
probably not pass the suitability test as the only positive outcome, being a small enhancement 
of the competitive balance, would be affected by limiting this number. The second, shifting 
the focus only to club team players and not allowing association team players,  has a negative 
consequence that other teams of the same league will lose income from training and transfer 
fees if the player ‘moves up within a league. The use of association trained players is positive 
for competitive balance. Finally, this option could move bigger clubs to recruit players at an 
(even) earlier stage.
738
 Another option would be to identify the restrictive effect of the rule, 
forcing the club to field more locally trained players, but that the outcome of the rule is more 
positive for youth training and competitive balance. 
 
Besides changing the rule, alternatives can be considered. These could focus on methods 
affecting clubs and methods affecting players. The clubs could be forced, through licensing, 
to invest more in training youth; introduce salary caps; bonuses if national players are fielded; 
a higher part in the share of revenue, etc. The players could be forced to sign their first 
contract with the club that trained them; imposing squad size limits; allowing longer contract 




The final conclusion of the study proves that the legal landscape surrounding the HGPR is 
uncertain. It can be concluded that a legal challenge to the rule is likely to have some form of 
effect, if not the effect of a total abolition. According to the authors:  
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“UEFA’s Home Grown Player Rule has resulted in improvements to competitive 
balance in Champions League and Europa League competitions but these 





The European Social Dialogue could be a platform for negotiating the HGPR or a less 
restrictive alternatives.  
 
The Social Dialogue deals with employment issues that are relevant and impact on the 
relation between the employer and the worker. Therefore, any issue that has an impact, in a 
specific sector, on an individual that can be qualified as a “worker” under the characteristics 
of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, may be included in the European Social 
Dialogue. 
 
The HGPR impacts on both the employer and the worker. The employer is restricted in 
employing the worker of his choice. In addition, he needs to invest in the human resource 
policy of his club by focusing on the training of talent instead of the acquisition of players. 
The EU worker is indirectly discriminated. The HGPR position in a team is likely to be filled 
in by a player that is of the nationality of the country of origin of the employer. The fact that 
the HGPR encourages the transfer of players between the age of 16 and 18 within the EU has 
an impact on players and clubs.  
 
In the case that UEFA is able to convince the social partners that the HGPR is necessary to 
improve the European football sector and that it benefits players and clubs, it may place the 
issue on the FSDC agenda. UEFA is an associate party with a similar status and is able to 
organise the agenda itself, via the route of the PFSC. 
 
When discussing the HGPR within the FSDC a balanced system needs to be presented. The 
research that was commissioned by the European Commission illustrated that the current 
system is too restrictive in relation to the results. The social partners can present their views 
and consent to a negotiated settlement. 
 
                                                 
740
 Ibid, p. 8. 
 
 226 
If the HGPR lacks consensus of the social partners it will remain purely an UEFA regulation. 
The threat of a legal challenge is then realistic. This can be diminished if it would have the 
status of a negotiated result, within the FSDC and if it would be implemented through 
national collective bargaining agreements or via the national associations in standard 
contracts. The enforceability of the agreement would be similar to the situation now, where a 
club needs to comply with the HGPR to participate in UEFA competitions. The only 
difference would be that a potential legal challenge would most likely fail due to the fact that 
the social partners have agreed to embed the HGPR in the FSDC, making the rule part of their 
negotiation within the marginal test by the European Commission as regards compatibility 
with EU law. 
 
A potential challenge on the basis of competition law, the topic’s restrictive effect should be 





This chapter has included the UEFA regulations on Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play 
and the Champions League in the analysis of topics that could be part of a FSDC. 
 
In relation to the FFP it has been concluded that UEFA indirectly introduces a system limiting 
the amount that clubs may spend on players’ wages. This can be seen as the introduction of a 
salary cap. The competition law test has shown that UEFA might be under scrutiny if the FFP 
will be challenged. The latter is the case with pending litigation before a Brussels court and a 
complaint before the European Commission. UEFA could pursue the social partners to agree 
on using the FSDC as a platform for the introduction of the FFP and minimizing the threat of 
the outcome of a legal challenge. The FSDC could perform a similar role as the US CBA 
Labour Exemption.  
 
According to the academic debate surrounding the topic of the HGPR it can be concluded that 
the restrictive elements of the rule on the free movement of workers are not proportionate to 
the very limited results as regards the objectives that the rule envisages. There exist 
alternatives that may lead to a similar or better result. Therefore, the level of legal certainty is 
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limited as a legal challenge could lead to an overhaul of the system. The fact that the HGPR 
leads to an impact on the free movement of workers, has a direct connection to the 
employment relationship between the football player and his club. Therefore, it is a topic that 
can be included in the European Social Dialogue. The following chapter analyses how Third 























Third Party Influence and the Activities of Players’ Agents 
Introduction 
 
Third Party Influence (TPI) is the ability for a third party to influence the policy of a club by 
means of owning a share in the future income generated by the transfer of a player before the 
expiry of his contract (economic rights). The current debate about the extent of admissibility 
of TPI was first fuelled by the controversy caused by the signing of Argentinean players 
Carlos Tevez and Javier Mascherano by English Premier League team West Ham United in 
the summer of 2006.
741
 The economic rights of these players were held by a third party. 
 
Players’ Agents have been active in the international football industry since the development 
of modern organized football.
742
 After Bosman the football players experienced more freedom 
in their choice of employer and the value of the contracts became more significant. As a 
consequence the negotiations became more complex and the activities of players’ agents 
increased. This, in combination with the income generated by players’ agents, made FIFA 
decide to regulate the profession. Since the mid-nineties FIFA Players’ Agent Regulations 




Both topics have been criticized by both FIFA and UEFA. That is the reason for examining 
them in a separate chapter. TPI is touched upon in the RSTP
744
 but UEFA has proven to be a 
stronger advocate then FIFA against the use of TPI.
745
 As regards the activities of Players’ 
Agents, FIFA has decided to deregulate the profession.
746
 UEFA has supported a stronger role 
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A deregulation of the Players’ Agent profession and a potential ban on TPI shall impact on 
every stakeholder in football. Therefore, any activity on these topics may encounter a 
reaction, including a potential legal challenge to the alternatives proposed by the football 
governing bodies. 
 
This chapter shall first broadly describe both topics. Whether the FSDC is the right platform 
for providing alternatives to a deregulation (Players’ Agents) or ban (TPI) that could be 
supported by the relevant stakeholders will be analyzed. 
 
Third Party Influence 
 
The topic of third party influence on the policies of football clubs is part of a dynamic debate 
in European and international football.
748
 The discussion centres on the acceptability of third 
party investment in the economic rights of players. The issue first became a topic of debate 
after the transfer of Carlos Tevez and Javier Mascherano from Brazilian club Corinthians to 
London side West Ham United. Corinthians had sold a majority share to football entrepreneur 
Kia Joorabchian. He was the owner of Media Sport Investments (MSI). MSI and another 
company, Just sports Inc. When the players were sold to West Ham United, MSI retained the 
right to receive a percentage of the future value of the player after a sale and, and this was the 
decisive factor for the £5,000,000 fine imposed on West Ham United as it had the decisive 
influence on the future of Tevez and Mascherano by being able to agree or disagree on a loan, 
or definitive transfer. This rigorous agreement between MSI and West Ham also underlined 
that the issue of influence in some cases can be regarded as ‘ownership’.
749
  After this affair 
the Premier League introduced articles in their (and the FA’s) regulations
750
 that would forbid 
the influence of third parties in club policies. 
 
According to the definition of Geey, third party ownership, as it is currently been debated by 
the football stakeholders, 
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“relates to the sale to a third party (e.g. a private investor, another club or a 
company) of a future transfer value. The entity buying the share (or the previous club 
keeping it for a subsequent transfer) believes the player has the potential to be 
transferred for a higher fee than it paid for the transfer share. For the club employing 
the player, the sale of portions of the economic rights helps it balance its books and 





The origins of third party influence
752
 lie in South America. An example shall be given from 
the Brazilian perspective, based on experiences in the football sector. In the Brazilian 
‘favelas’ many youngsters play unorganized football. In these favelas scouts are active that 
invite the boys to play in a team, uconnected to association football. After having selected the 
boys and recognized their talent, the scout introduces the talented boys to a club that 
participates in organized football. By doing this the player will be registered for the first time 
and his official training starts. In order for the player to be registered, a specific card (passe) 
was obligatory for entering the player in the association’s (federação) database. The original 
scout does not receive any financial remuneration for bringing the player to the club.  
Moreover, the club, normally the youth ranks of a lower level club, does not have the means 
to remunerate the scout. For that reason the club will have to invest itself on the acquisition of 
the player as well on his further training. Therefore, as an alternative, the club will offer the 
scout a percentage of the future income it may acquire from the consequent registration of the 
player at a new club.  
 
This system applied in a time where also in Brazil the payment of fees was also still due after 
the player had ended his contract. The payment of fees was therefore not connected to the 
move of the player due to a premature rupture of the contract but through the ‘handing over’ 
or selling of the right to register the player. The registration of the pass generated income and 
by offering a share of the player’s pass to the scout that had brought him to the club, the scout 
was remunerated for his services. He would receive a share of future registration (the 
federative right) if the player would sign for a professional club with the funds to invest in the 
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acquisition of his services.
753
 After the introduction of the revised regulations on football 
contracts and transfer within Brazil, a generic law based on the Brazilian constitution, Lei 
n.9615 de 24 de marco de 1998, better known as the Pelé law the system was brought in 
conformity with the situation  Post Bosman in Europe and the use of dividing shares of the 
player’s passes was abolished.  
 
The economic gain of investment in players shifted from the investment in the federative right 
of the player to the economic right of the player. As it could not be denied that this form of 
investment had created some stability as regards finances in Brazilian football.
754
   
 
This economic right was the source for external investment along the lines of the definition 
above. The source for starting with the investment in economic rights by third parties lie in 
relation to the talent scout registering the player for the first time (the “classic” example), the 
fact that clubs in need of money assign part or their rights on players to third parties and 
acquisition of players by clubs with the help of third party investors due to the club’s lack of 
financial resources.
755
 This phenomenon first came to the surface in the Tevez and 
Mascherano case and has already been used extensively in countries like Spain, Portugal, 
Italy and Greece.
756
 The CAS has also dealt with various cases in which third party influence 
or ownership was a subject.
757
 According to its jurisprudence, CAS states that a club holding 
an employment contract with a player may assign with the player’s consent, the contract 
rights to another club in exchange for given sum of money or other consideration, and those 




After the Tevez and Mascherano case, FIFA introduced Article 18bis in its regulations 
(RSTP), not banning the ownership on the a share of the future gain of the player’s career 
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move but restricting the potential influence that third parties might exercise over the club’s 
freedom to determine its own policies: 
 
“No club shall enter into a contract which enables any other party to that contract or 
any third party to acquire the ability to influence in employment and transfer-related 
matters its independence, its policies or the performance of its teams. The FIFA 
disciplinary committee may impose disciplinary measures on clubs that do not observe 
the obligations set out in this article.”  
 
The negative arguments regarding third party influence are summarized by Purdon thus:  
 
“A third party whose identity is not disclosed cannot be monitored to ensure that they 
have no interests in players of more than one club, possibly raising issues about 
influence over the affairs of more than one club. An owner or benefactor of a club 
might likewise have interests in the players of another club or clubs. The football 





In addition to these arguments related to the integrity and transparency of payments, are those 
related to human rights
760
 This was especially the case if the notion of ‘ownership’ of players 
is used and if contracts regarding the third party investment are in force that effectively limit 
the freedom of the player to choose the club of his preference. Maybe even without the 
player’s consent to the contract or knowledge about a third party to whom he is contractually 
liaised. 
 
There are also advocates of the opposite approach; the benefits of third party investments. To 
the beneficiary clubs investments made by third parties is nothing more than a new form of 
financing and a method of competing with the financially stronger teams or leagues. For clubs 
in competitions not belonging to the Big five leagues, a collaboration with a third party offers 
them the possibility to reach a higher degree of competitiveness. In Portugal and Netherlands 
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the links with clubs and investment funds are openly discussed.
761
 Moreover, a grouping of 
Brazilian clubs have called to the football governing bodies not to ban a system of third party 
investments but to better regulate as the ban would have an impact on the continuation and 




The issue of third party influence / investment / ownership may or may not be allowed. It 
does, in any case, have an impact on the individual employment relation between a club and a 
player. It depends on the contractual clauses of the investment contract between club and third 
party investor
763
 and if the player is aware or not of the third party investor and the extent of 
his influence. The friction with the freedom to conduct a business in the EU also needs to be 
taken into consideration.
764
 Restrictions on this freedom need to be evidence based and 
proportionate as regards the objectives that it envisages to attain. 
 
The Activities of Players’ Agents 
 
The role of agents has been present in the world of football since the first competitions were 
organized and transfers of players started. At the time of amateurism agents were more 
advisors that mediated between player and club in the case that a sensitive issue arose 
between the parties.
765
 These activities turned into a profession when the players’ commercial 
opportunities became more significant when the clubs experienced an increased turnover with 
the development of the broadcasting of sport events after the de-regulation of the media 
sector. The first serious increase in players’ salaries became apparent and the labour market 
for players evolved with this commercial growth to a sector comparable to ‘normal’ 
industries.
766
 After Bosman the use of agents continued to increase.
767
 The limitation on the 
use of EU was abolished therefore the labour market for professional football became a truly 
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EU market. Also, due to the end of the payment of transfer fees and the greater freedom for 
players, the salaries of the players skyrocketed and employment contracts became more 
complex. The fact that the international football market is a complex sector, that the players 
are under the constant attention of the media and the workers are mostly young with no 





FIFA started to regulate the agents from the mid-nineties. The first licenses were given to 
applicants after an interview with employees from the national football associations. The 
applicants also needed to provide proof of good conduct and after a positive interview they 
signed a code of conduct and made a deposit of 200,000 Swiss francs as a bank guarantee. 
After that the agent was free to start his services as a FIFA licensed agent. Due the growth of 
the number of agents and the development of the football industry to a more cross-border 
market after Bosman, FIFA decided in 2001 that a more rigorous regulation of the activities of 
players’ agents was necessary. From this moment on a player’s agent needed to take a written 
examination and instead of a bank guarantee a players’ agent is obliged to take out a liability 
insurance. Specific regulations for players’ agents came into force and the principles of the 
transfer system in 2001 were also relevant for the reform of the PAR in 2008. A reform that 
came after the 2001 regulations became part of a procedure before the European Court of First 
Instance (CFI) in a case that was decided in 2005.
769
 French citizen Laurent Piau filed a 
complaint against the PAR of 1995. Piau questioned the legality of the regulations and FIFA’s 
authority to draft and implement these regulations.  
 
Piau initiated his search for a judgment on the legality of the PAR in 1998. He claimed that 
FIFA infringed the free movement of services by blocking the access to the profession by 
means of a licensing system. Piau also argued that the ability of FIFA to sanction the 
profession without offering a possibility of an appeal should be changed.
770
 After the 
European Commission objected to the PAR to FIFA, FIFA introduced the changes that 
became the basis for the 2008 system. FIFA abolished the necessity to make a deposit as a 
bank guarantee and introduced a compulsory liability insurance instead, it introduced a code 
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of conduct and detailed the methods for remuneration.
771
 Piau was not satisfied and persisted 
in a claim and filed a complaint before the Commission. The Commission only approached 
the issue from the perspective of competition law and it did not detect an infringement.
772
 
Piau went on to litigate before the CFI. The CFI was of the opinion that  
 
“Thus the need to introduce professionalism and morality to the occupation of players’ 
agents in order to protect players whose careers are short; the fact that competition is 
not eliminated by the licence system; the almost general absence (except in France) of 
national rules and the lack of collective organisation of players’ agents are 




The 2008 PAR determine that only licensed agents can carry out the profession. However, 
certain categories of individuals are exempt from the licensing requirement and may act as 
agents regardless: parents, siblings or spouses of players as well as legally authorized 
practicing lawyers are allowed to carry out the activities of an agent without falling under the 
jurisdiction of FIFA. Natural persons not falling under the exempted categories may only take 
the examination at their national association if they have an impeccable reputation and they 
may not, under any condition, hold a position as an official, employee, etc. at FIFA, a 
confederation, an association, a league, a club or any organization connected with such 
organisations or entities. After passing the examination
774
 the agent further needs to take out 
liability insurance and sign a code of professional conduct before receiving his license. 
 
The license is temporary and expires after five years. The agent then needs to take the exam 
again and if he fails the license is suspended until the exam is finally passed. Examinations 
take place once or twice a year on a date set by FIFA.
775
 The agent is further obliged to 
conclude a written contract with the player he represents, meeting further formal requirements 




The agent is allowed to work for players as well as for clubs upon the request of either. In 








 Passing the exam is very difficult. In the Netherlands, a an average of 6% of the participants pass the exam. 
Information obtained via a telephone conversation with Mr. W. Boshuizen from the KNVB. 
775
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776
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accepting such requests, agents need to avoid any (potential) conflicts of interest. In addition, 
the agent is a priori presumed to be guilty of inducing a player to breach his contract if the 
contract is breached prior to the contract’s expiry and without just cause.
777
 The burden of 
proof rests upon the player to establish that he is innocent in order to avoid a sanction. 
Sanctions that may be imposed upon agents for violating the regulations are a reprimand or 
warning, a fine of at least CHF 5000, suspension of the licence for up to 12 months, 
withdrawal of the licence or a ban on taking part in any football-related activity.  
 
The regulations also include the rights and obligations of clubs and players. Clubs may only 
work with licensed agents and have to make reference to the agent in any contract that has 
been negotiated by the agent.
778
 In the context of a player’s transfer, clubs have to ensure that 
they pay agents by means of a lump sum only of which the amount has been agreed in 
advance.
779
 If clubs violate these regulations they can expect to be warned or severely 
punished, with sanctions ranging from fines to deduction of points, transfer bans and even  




Players that use the services of agents may choose to pay the agent by means of a lump sum 
or a fee on a yearly basis. The fee is based on a percentage of the annual income of the player. 
If no agreement is reached concerning the fee, the agent is entitled to receive 3% of the annual 
income of the player, including any sign-on fee.
781
  Players’ agents are not allowed to receive 
an amount, or a share of an amount, that is supposed to be paid between clubs.
782
 These sums 
need to be administered by FIFA through the Transfer Matching System (TMS) and are 
connected to the compensation payments for the training of players, agents are not involved in 
the training of the player. If the player is responsible for a violation of the regulations he can 
be warned or punished by a fine of at least CHF 5000, a match suspension or a ban on taking 
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In 2009 FIFA announced a reform of the licensing system.
784
 The reasons for this reform was 
the fact that FIFA acknowledged that only 25% to 30% of the football transfers are carried out 
by licensed agents.
785
 At the 59
th
 FIFA congress, the members of FIFA agreed on the reform. 
After the congress FIFA established a working group that had as its task to consider a more 
pragmatic approach towards agent regulation. The group consisted of members of the FIFA 
legal department, representatives from FIFPRO and two club representatives.
786
 The EPFL 
and the European Football Agents Association (EFAA) were consulted at a later stage, when 
the first set of regulations were already agreed in concept. 
 
FIFA has changed the focus of their regulations, agents are no longer a part of the FIFA 
system and are therefore not under the control of FIFA. The parties that use the services of the 
agents, the clubs and players, will be responsible for and accountable for the actions of the 
party that they engage as an agent. The licenses will be withdrawn. The agent will disappear 
and the intermediary will be introduced. The regulations on working with intermediaries
787
 
deal with a natural or legal person who, for a fee or free of charge, represents players and/or 
clubs with a view to negotiating an employment contract or represents clubs in negotiations 




The regulations are minimum standards the national associations have to implement at least 
the FIFA standards but are free to go beyond the minimum standards and come up with their 
own national regulations. Clubs and players must act with due diligence when engaging the 
services of agents and they will be responsible for assessing if the agent carries out his work 
in accordance with all relevant regulations of FIFA, national associations and every law that is 
applicable to the activity of the intermediary.
789
 The intermediary will be registered in a 
database at the national association every time that he carries out an activity. All the contracts 
between the intermediary and his client need to be registered. However, there are no formal 
                                                 
784
 A first public statement was made in a presentation by FIFA in-house lawyer Omar Ongaro at the 2009 Globe 
Soccer conference in Dubai on28 December 2009. 
785
 FIFA Media Release, FIFA acts to protect core values, 15 July 2009. The research on which this statement is 
based has not been disclosed, the media release cites FIFA legal director Marco Villiger: “At the present time, we 
estimate only 25 to 30 per cent of all international transfers are conducted via licensed agents. FIFA finds this 
unsatisfactory,” . The evidence to fund this argumentation is unknown, moreover, in this article FIFA states that 
it estimates and this implies that there is no evidence to fund such a statement. 
786
 As presented by FIFA in-house lawyer Omar Ongaro in his speech at the Globe Soccer Dubai Conference, 28 
December 2009. 
787
 At the time of writing the final draft was presented to the stakeholders involved in the discussions and 
negotiation and consultation phase.  
788
 FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries, Definitions. 
789
 FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries, Article 2.  
 
 239 
requirements regarding the content or duration of the contract between the intermediary and 
the player or club that he represents, besides the fact that the parties need to clarify the nature 
of the legal relationship, the way and amount of remuneration, the duration, the methods of 
termination, the signatures of the parties and of the guardian if the player is a minor.
790
 The 




There are no requirements for registration the association needs to be satisfied that the 
intermediary has an impeccable reputation. In particular, the association needs to assess 
whether the intermediary has been convicted of any criminal sentence or financial crime. The 
payments to intermediaries will be disclosed as well as, on request of the association of the 
country where the transfer or service of the intermediary is registered, all other relevant 
contracts, agreements and records between the parties. The associations will make the 
remunerations that are paid to agents publicly available. This openness will relate to a total 
amount spent on intermediary services per club.
792
 FIFA recommends that the total amount of 
remuneration per transaction that act on the player’s behalf should not exceed 3% of the 
player’s basic gross income for the entire duration of the employment contract.
793
 In the case 
that a club employs a player’s agent, the recommendation is that the intermediary’s fee does 
not exceed 3% of the transfer fee paid in connection to the relevant transfer.
794
 In case of 
disputes about the remuneration of the intermediary the arbitration courts (in the case that the 




An acknowledgement of the sometimes difficult situation in which the intermediary may find 
itself, operating for one party but also defending the interest of the other, is found in the 
articles relating to the conflicts of interest. If the parties concerned, player and club, prove that 
there is no conflict of interest, they may engage the same intermediary to negotiate their 
employment contract. They do have to make clear what party will remunerate the agent. The 
regulations contain sanctions on players and clubs that fall under the responsibility of the 
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In general it can be concluded that the agents will no longer be part of the FIFA 
organizational framework and that the first contours shape a system where the profession of 
agents will be a ‘free for all’. The stakeholders, besides FIFA did fear the negative 
consequences and they sought the assistance of the European Commission. The Commission 
had already started to focus on the activities of agents after the White Paper on Sport had 
mentioned the reports of bad practices linked to agents’ activities and the fact that there were, 
next to the ‘umbrella’ FIFA PAR, differing regulations (public and private) applicable to the 
profession of agents. As a result the European Commission carried out an impact assessment 
study to evaluate if Community action was necessary.
797
 
According to the results of the study
798
, despite the fragmented legal framework applicable to 
the activities of sports agents, there are no major obstacles to the free provision of the services 
of agents across the EU. The problems identified by the study are of an ethical nature, such as 
financial crime and exploitation of young players, thus threatening the fairness of sporting 
competitions and the integrity of sportspeople. Concerns also exist about the lack of 
transparency of the financial flows involved. At the same time, several issues related to the 
governance of agents in team sports, and in particular in football, need to be discussed in 
order to improve the existing system. In order to create a discussion with stakeholders about 
these issues and to allow FIFA to present its draft regulations, the European Commission 
appointed a working group consisting of representatives of FIFPRO, EFAA, FIFA, UEFA, 
ECA and EPFL to assist in the organization of a conference on sport agents that took place in 
Brussels in November 2011.  
The general conclusion of the conference was that the European Commission: 
“.recognised the right of self-regulation by the sports movement, an internal market 
directive could not be ruled out if serious problems regarding the free provision of 
services or of establishment came to light. A Recommendation on the basis of Article 
165 TFEU was also a possibility as a way of bringing the different approaches in the 
Member States closer together. Referring to the substantive problems to be addressed 
with a view to some form of standardisation, approximation or harmonisation, he 
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mentioned the transparency of financial transactions, the level of fees, the protection 
of minors and dual agency issues among those on which the conference had provided 
valuable input. With regard to the CEN framework, he noted that this model could 
provide not just a useful platform for further consultation but also an opportunity for 
European and international standardisation in the field of sports agents. He concluded 
by saying that the conference organised by the Commission had marked a starting 
point for ongoing discussions on the important matters at stake, pointing out that an 
inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders was needed and mentioning the future work 
to be carried out by the Expert Group on Good Governance
799
 reporting to the 
Council Working Party on Sport.”
800
 
The expert group on good governance agreed on seven recommendations after a year of 
assessment and interviews with stakeholders.
801
 In general the expert group recommended 
that the current legal framework is appropriate and that the sport stakeholders are fit to best 
regulate their own activities and that the EU can assist. Methods for the supervision of sport 
agents should be aimed at transparency in transactions, protection of (young) players, create 
higher standards for agents, create clear and universal rules with appropriate sanctioning 
systems. The expert group suggests that a system of training of agents and/or certification of 
agents should be created with national and international control on the quality of the activities. 
The expert group promotes the creation of universal minimum standards that could be further 
adapted to the needs of every individual country or confederation.
802
 In relation to the content 
of a regulation the expert group recommends rules relating to the following:
803
 
 “Sports bodies are invited to consider the opportunity of establishing gradual and 
differentiating rules for sports agents taking into account the age of players involved 
in transactions managed by agents/intermediaries: 
 
- Rules on ethics, transparency, conflict of interest, disclosure of information and 
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payment of intermediaries should be the strictest when the player signing a contract 
with the club is a minor (i.e. for under-18 players);  
 
- For transactions involving minor players, it is proposed that particular scrutiny is 
exercised on the credentials of agents/intermediaries, e.g. by requesting proof of 
criminal records or other means of testing the aptitude of agents to work with 
underage players including their ability to provide specific careers advice that would 
be appropriate for the relevant sports discipline; 
 
- Rules on ethics, transparency, conflict of interest, disclosure of information, the 
ability to dispense specific careers advice and payment of intermediaries should also 
be particularly strict when the young player is considered as being in the training 
phase of his/her career (this phase may vary according to the characteristics of each 
sport); 
 
- Although high ethical standards must be maintained at all times, it may be possible 
for certain rules to be made more flexible for agents working with players who can be 
considered in the main stage of the careers (to be determined by each sport in 
accordance with its specificities).” 
 
Conclusion: Players’ Agents Activities 
 
FIFA has opened up the market for the regulation of the activities of agents. The reasons for 
the regulations that have been applicable for almost twenty years are still, or maybe more than 
at the time of previous regulation, applicable to the sector. There is no evidence that the need 
for the protection of (young / minor) players, transparency in transactions and for a certain 
level of quality in relation to the services of the agent, has changed. The regulations of FIFA 
place responsibility for the activities of agents on the shoulders of the clubs and the players. 
Especially for the players this is now a double burden, where they initially needed more 
protection they now loose the protection offered by the PAR, but as a paradox will now be 




The move back from the PAR will make that in the case of a dispute, the agents are no longer 
a party to FIFA. Taking the international aspects of the activities of agents into consideration, 
problems might occur with dispute resolution and enforcement of decisions if disputes will 
solely be treated by civil courts. If the national associations fail to create harmonized system 
then there could be serious friction with the freedom to provide services in the EU. The 
European Commission has presented recommendations for the territory of the EU. The 
stakeholders now need to find the best framework for implementing enforceable rules that are 
in line with the wishes of the stakeholders and in accordance with EU law. 
 
The search for a solution by means of a negotiated settlement is under pressure, as is proven 
by the activities of the Association of Football Agents (AFA). In England the AFA has 
declared that it is prepared to challenge the FIFA Regulations on intermediaries. It bases a 
potential challenge on a breach of European law.
804
 AFA chairman Mel Stein has stated that 
“Our members are not going to support a system which allows unqualified agents to operate.  
We will challenge the regulations in Europe unless the FA agree to make them user-friendly, 
by retaining some sort of qualification and giving currently licensed agents precedence over 
unlicensed intermediaries. The recommendation that agents’ fees should be capped at 3% 
breaches European law. If that is what FIFA recommends, then that is all that clubs will be 
prepared to pay. The whole concept of untrained intermediaries is ill-considered and would 





Social Dialogue as a Forum for Negotiated Settlement 
 
In order to analyse whtether the European Social Dialogue could serve as a potential forum 
for a negotiated settlement and avoidance of legal challenges, it should be confirmed if the 
issues concerned can be characterized as Social Dialogue issues. The Social Dialogue deals 
with employment issues that are relevant and impact on the relation between the employer 
and the worker. Therefore, any issue that has an impact, in a specific sector, on an individual 
that can be qualified as a “worker” under the characteristics of the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice, may be included in the European Social Dialogue. 
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Third Party Influence 
 
It is clear that third party influence is under analysis of UEFA and FIFA. On the contrary, a 
number of clubs have indicated that they are in favour of third party investment in the 
economic rights attached to a player’s transfer. The balance that needs to be found in a 
regulation is the one between preserving the game’s integrity; safeguarding the rights of the 
worker regarding his freedom of movement and the freedom to freely choose the labour he 
wishes; and, finally, the rights of the club to attract the investment that it wishes taking the 
freedom to undertake into consideration. 
 
The European Social Dialogue could be a platform to discuss the issues concerning third party 
investment. Hence, as illustrated, it touches upon the essential elements of a labour relation: 
working under the authority of a third party and salary. As these mixed approaches deal with 
UEFA, workers’ and employers’ issues, the FSDC offers the characteristics for compromise.  
On an EU level the sporting integrity of the game could be introduced by limiting the amount 
of the percentage of the economic right that can be acquired of one player by the third party 
thereby limiting its influence. An issue could also be a quota on a number of players acquired 
through co-investment. Since integrity is one of the direct consequences of transparency, an 
open register administered by the national football association could indicate what party is 
part owner of the economic rights of a player. To promote training of players, a certain 
percentage of a transfer of a player in which a determined threshold amount is owned by a 
third party should be deposited in a fund. The player could be protected by means of a 
compulsory clause in the third party contract revealing the third party, the method and amount 




The stakeholders in professional football have been confronted with the FIFA minimum 
standards concerning the regulations on intermediaries. These standards leave space for the 
national football associations to go beyond these regulations. National football associations 
have to be careful not to create rules that differ too much amongst the Member States in the 
European Union, as the difference in regulation of agents needs to take the free movement of 
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services into consideration. Consequently, such an impediment could additionally lead to a 
restriction of the free movement of workers, as a player may be represented by a malicious 
agent who refuses to place the player in a country where the regulations covering the activity 
of agents is less favourable to the intermediary.  
 
From the perspective of the players, stronger protection is needed. Hence, the market situation 
is similar as was at the time of the Piau case: players need protection in the complex labour 
market of professional football. The regulations on intermediaries offer less protection to the 
players.  
 
Clubs will deal with the negotiation of the employment contract between player and club, 
with the intermediary. Contracts with third party investors could also be introduced and 
negotiated through agents or intermediaries. There is no doubt that the activities of players’ 
agents touch upon employment issues and that the main parties involved are the clubs and the 
players.  
 
Instead of imposing rules on the relevant parties, the stakeholders could be involved in the 
regulation of agents. The European Social Dialogue could be the right forum to discuss issue 
players’ agents and to seek for an enforceable framework for the regulation of the agent 
profession. The possibility of regulating agents through a “strengthened Social Dialogue” has 
already been presented by the Member of European Parliament, Mr. Mavrommatis:  
 
“[the committee considers that players’ agents should have a role in a strengthened 
Social Dialogue in sports, which, in combination with a European licensing system for 
agents, would also prevent cases of improper action by agents.” 
 
The clubs, via the ECA, have stressed that the agents could also regulate themselves such as 
lawyers and notaries in many (EU) countries do. The ECA has pointed to the European 
Football Agents Association (EFAA) to produce a form of self-regulation of agents. 
 
EFAA is a not-for-profit association according to Dutch law founded in 2007.
806
 Members of 
EFAA are national agent associations, including the AFA. Currently there are 11 European 
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associations, including the “big 5 league” countries, represented in the EFAA. EFAA has 
accepted associated members in response to requests from Brazil, Japan, Australia and a 
cooperation of South American countries Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. EFAA’s 
objective is to try to improve the general image of agents. The other goals of EFAA are laid 
down in Article 2 of the organisations’ statutes and focus on creating common ground 
amongst agents in Europe and to support the creation of national agent associations. Article 
2.2 goes on to state that:  
 
“The Association tries to achieve these objectives inter alia by: promoting the 
cooperation, amicable relations and unity of the Member Associations and their 
Members, the FIFA licensed players’ agents; aiding the exchange of information 
between the Member Associations and supplying information about developments that 
are important to the collective and individual position of the Member Associations in 
Europe; promoting the interests of the Member Associations while considering the 
collective affairs important for said Associations in the fields of economics, social 
economics and employment law; promoting and improving the interests of players' 
agents in possession of a FIFA license in all respects while safeguarding the general 
interests of the Member Associations; promoting the co-operation, intermediary 
activities and relations among organisations, sports institutions, professional football 
clubs or any other entities and the individual Member Associations, in particular in 
the field of management, consultancy and all forms of employment in the professional 
sector of football; concluding collective agreements; all other lawful and permitted 




EFAA has been recognized by the European Commission as an official sport stakeholder. The 
European Commission has recognized the work carried out by EFAA and has pushed the 




As was established before, the European Commission has already applied a special regime to 
the European Social Dialogue in football, it was concluded that this special regime may be 
attributed to the specific characteristics of sport. In the case that EFAA would create a form of 
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self-regulation and those principles would be agreed in collaboration with the social partners, 
then it would be possible to establish harmonized rules through the FSDC for a larger number 
of EU countries and avoid any discrepancies with EU law and serve transparency and 
protection of players.  
 
On the basis of the specificity of sport EFAA could be included as an observer to discussions 
on the level of the Social Dialogue, thus allowing it to be part of the discussions and 
preliminary negotiations to create more certainty regarding the exemption of the final 
agreement on agent regulation. Regulating the players’ agents via a collective bargaining 
agreement is in line with the status of players’ agents in the professional sector of United 
States Basketball, where the agent activity has been recognised by both parties at the 





Issues that need to be considered for a harmonized system of regulation of agent activity: 
- International minimum standards as regards quality and registration for agents 
- FIFA recognizes national sanctions and imposes associations to cross-recognize 
sanctions 
- Registration system with quality requirements 
- Straightforward and simple regulation 
- Permanent Education 
- Certification as foundation for quality requirement 
- Code of conduct (self-regulation) 
- Financial transparency 
- Strong enforcement and national control 
- Realistic sanctions 
- Agents fall under jurisdiction of ‘receiving’ country or ‘receiving geographic area’ 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has focussed on TPI and the activities of Players’ Agents. TPI is now common in 
European Football but both UEFA and FIFA have criticized the involvement of third parties 
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in the internal policies of football clubs. UEFA goes further than FIFA as it seeks to 
completely ban TPI. TPI has a direct relation to employment law as it may affect the labour 
relation between a player and his club. TPI contracts may include clauses that impact on the 
way in which a contract may be terminated and it may have an impact on the player’s income. 
Clubs have shown interest in TPI and continue to conclude collaboration with investment 
funds. 
 
In the case of a total ban by UEFA, it is likely that potential legal challenge may arise. UEFA 
could invite the social partners to include the issue of TPI in the FSDC and create a solid basis 
for a regulation of TPI with the consent of the social partners. In that case, threat of legal 
attack from the side of players or clubs is diminished as they have been a party themselves to 
the agreement. A negotiated result could find a balance between the requirements deriving 
from EU labour law, the freedom of clubs to seek for investment and of the integrity of the 
game. Practical issues for regulation may include a maximum percentage of investment in 
economic rights by third parties and an open and accessible administration of TPI. National 
TPI structures would then need to be brought in accordance with the TPI guidelines 
negotiated in the FSDC. 
 
The activities of Players’ Agents are in the process of being deregulated by FIFA. The reasons 
that made FIFA regulate the activities starting from the mid-nineties are, however, still 
applicable in the current market. The deregulation has encountered criticism from football 
stakeholders. FIFA has left the possibility open for national football associations to go beyond 
the minimum requirements for the regulation of intermediaries. If the football associations fail 
to create a system that is harmonized in the EU then a challenge to the underlying system of 
FIFA is realistic as an infringement on the free movement of services seems likely. 
 
The FSDC could be a solid basis for the conclusion of an agreement on the activities of 
players’ agents. First, through the participation of EFAA in a strengthened Social Dialogue 
the consensus included the recognized body of agent representation. A challenge from EFAA 
or from an individual agent is less likely to succeed if EFAA agrees to a form of agent 
regulation. Second, through the negotiation in the FSDC the national associations and/or 
FIFA take away the potential threat of the abuse of a dominant position from a competition 
law perspective. A similar approach as the labour exemption in the US sports’ collective 




The implementation could be guaranteed along the lines of an Annex of the agent regulations 
to the Autonomous Agreement. Implementation on the national level could be introduced via 
regulations of national associations. The stakeholders could introduce rules on the 
certification of agents, agent remuneration, representation contracts, compulsory liability 

































The final chapter of the thesis illustrates the impact of the introduction of the European Social 
Dialogue in European Professional Football. The approach of the conclusions originate from 
the perspectives of (I) the governance of sport and of football in particular (II), the necessity 
for the creation of legal certainty and from (III) the perspective of industrial relations and 
collective bargaining  
 
The conclusions are charted chronologically. 
 
1. The European Social Dialogue as a Form of Supervised Self-Governance (I); 
 
2. The European Social Dialogue as a Forum for Negotiated Settlement (I); 
 
3. The Social Dialogue as Part of the Structured Dialogue in Sport (I); 
 
4. The FSDC as a Source for Legal Certainty (II); 
 
5. The FSDC and the Definition of the Boundaries of Article 165 TFEU: ‘fairness’ and 
‘openness’ (I), (II) and (III); 
 
6. The Evolution of EU  Labour Law by Promoting the Flexibility of Approach and 
Implementation and Enforcement of Negotiation Results through Association 
Regulations (I) and (III); 
 
7. The Evolution of EU Labour Law by Enabling Influence on Labour Relations in 
Candidate and Third Countries (I) and (III); 
 




9. Restructuring the Pyramid – Introduction of the Horizontal Model of Governance or 
Co-Negotiation (I) and (III); 
 
10. Connections with the US Model of Collective Bargaining (I) and (III); 
 
11. Introducing the Labour Exemption in EU Sports Law (I), (II) and (III); 
 
12. Enhancing the Debate on Lex Sportiva (II); 
 
13. The European Social Dialogue as a Venue for the Settlement of Unsolved Issues (I), 
(II) and (III). 
 
The individual conclusions are introduced and embedded in their descriptive context. This 
initial introduction is a summary of the previous chapters, therefore a reference to the chapters 
will be made and only where new issues are introduced a reference is made to the relevant 
sources.  
 
The European Social Dialogue as a Form of Supervised Self Governance  
 
According to Foster, one can find at one side of the regulatory spectrum of sport, and football 
in particular, the pure market model.
810
 Actors favour in this model a submission of sport to 
general laws applicable to every other economic sector. In contrast, the socio-cultural model 




Parrish has developed this approach and created a sports policy subsystem with two rival 
coalitions.
812





According to Foster the advantages of supervised self-government are: 
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1. Sport governing bodies have acquired knowledge and experience in their specific 
sports and this should be respected; 
2. Sport itself will bear the costs of regulation and not the consumer; 
3. Self-regulation implies better compliance. 
 
The European Social Dialogue brings Foster’s model into practice. The FSDC is a form of 
supervised self-governance.
814
 The stakeholders in football, and the participation of UEFA, 
are active in the negotiation about issues that they deem important for organizing their sector. 




The supervision is guaranteed through the role of the European Commission. The 
Commission is on the one hand the facilitator for the debate. On the other hand, the marginal 
test that the Commission carries out and due to its role as the guardian of the Treaty, 




The FSDC is a practical example of supervised self-governance. 
 
The European Social Dialogue as a Forum for Negotiated Settlement 
 
The European professional football sector is part of the football subsystem. In this subsystem 
the actors in professional football are divided into the sporting autonomy coalition and in the 
football business coalition. These coalitions try to overthrow the supremacy of the other in the 
subsystem in order to influence the policymaker’s agenda with the content of its own belief 





In the football subsystem the stakeholders are suffering from a lack of legal certainty. This 
prevents them from organizing their business or from defining their policy objectives in an 
optimal way. The uncertainty of the legal framework that surrounds them goes along with 
potential legal challenges to their decisions. In this hurting stalemate situation both coalitions 
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possess the ability to impose unacceptable costs on each other. A situation of progress is 
therefore disturbed. This is a situation where all the major coalitions share the view that a 




In such a case the coalitions favour a negotiated settlement. However, this negotiated 
settlement is only possible if negotiations take place in the proper forum. According to 
Sabatier a proper forum has as its characteristic that negotiations are conducted in private and 
last for a period of at least six months and that there is a facilitator (policy broker) that is 
respected by all parties and viewed as relatively neutral.
819
 For the professional football sector 
the necessity of legal certainty has been added as a necessary characteristic of a forum for 
negotiated settlement. In the thesis the European Commission and the CAS have been 




The European Commission has introduced the Structured Dialogue with sports’ actors and 
interested parties to encourage the debate on European sport. Within this dialogue four types 
of fora are defined for creating opportunities for sport stakeholders to present and promote 
their policy views. These are the European Sport Forum, specific conferences, thematic 
discussions and the commissioning of sport specific studies.
821
 It was concluded that the 
European Commission is a facilitator for negotiations but it lacks the powers to force 




The CAS is an arbitration court. The onus of an arbitration court, even in the case of CAS as 
the ultimate appeal body in professional sport, is that it provides a solution to a dispute that 
exists between two individual parties. It does not create jurisprudence in the sense of the stare 
decisis principle. The CAS is the end of a route that is characterized by a negative approach, 




The FSDC possesses the characteristics of a professional forum for negotiated settlement. It 
offers a venue for private negotiation and the structures may be used for as long as the social 
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partners intend to use them, at least more than six months, while, the facilitator of the 




The Commission is regarded by all stakeholders as (relatively) neutral. The reason for this is 
that the Commission has as the guardian of the Treaty a task to protect the freedoms of the 
Treaty, but also foster the specific characteristics of sport. It therefore relates to beliefs of both 
coalitions. The Commission can exercise its role as a policy broker. In the FSDC it has done 
this by presenting a compromise agreement to the social partners when a deadlock was 




Finally, the FSDC may serve as the source for creating legal certainty as the agreements 





It can therefore be concluded that the FSDC has the characteristics to serve as a forum for 
negotiated settlement in the light of the definition provided by Sabatier. 
 
The Social Dialogue as Part of the Structured Dialogue in Sport 
 
In the 2007 White Paper on sport the European Commission presented proposals for 
Community action in the field of sport. The overall objective of the White Paper is to give 
strategic orientation on the role of sport in Europe, to encourage debate on specific problems, 
to enhance the visibility of sport in EU policy making and to raise public awareness of the 
needs and specificities of the sector.
827
 The White Paper has as an important aim to illustrate 




The complex nature of sports governance on the EU level means that European sport 
structures are less developed than sport structures at the national and international level. The 
Commission and sport stakeholders agree that the Commission needs to contribute to the 
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European debate on sport by providing a platform for discussion.
829
 The European 
Commission expressed that a structured dialogue with sport stakeholders and the promotion 





The structured dialogue is such a platform. It is a consultation framework that involves 
interested parties in the field of sport such as sport governing bodies, social partners in the 
field of sport and political institutions dealing with sport. The European Commission intends 
to organize the structure dialogue by means of the EU Sport Forum and thematic discussions 




According to the Commission the Social Dialogue can help address common concerns of 
employers and athletes. The Commission places these concerns in the light of the growing 
number of challenges to sport governance. The White Paper emphasizes the Social Dialogue 




The thesis has analysed the outcome of the FSDC: the Autonomous Agreement. The 
Autonomous Agreement deals with minimum standards that need to be included in 
employment contracts between professional football players and their clubs. However, the 
thesis also illustrates that other issues that are connected to the employment relation but go 




The thesis shows that issues deriving from the FIFA RSTP and UEFA regulations could be 
discussed within the FSDC, while TPI and the regulation of the activities of Players’ Agents 
fit within the FSDC structure. The result of negotiations within the FSDC on these issues is 
that, eventually, binding agreements may be concluded.
834
 The FSDC includes other actors 
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By addressing these issues the FSDC may serve as an illustration of the application of EU law 
to sport. Hence, the issues that are discussed within the FSDC are negotiated in the presence 
of representatives of the European Commission.
836
 The marginal test that the European 
Commission is allowed to carry out in relation to the negotiation result serves as a guideline 
on the application of EU law to sport. Similar issues in other sport sectors could follow the 
example set in the FSDC. 
 
In addition, the FSDC may serve as a forum for negotiated settlement of differing views 
between the social partners, ECA, UEFA and it may include FIFA and players’ agents.
837
 
Negotiations take place without much pressure between the stakeholders. This is due to the 
fact that the threat of legal challenge is diminished as a result of the potential to conclude 
binding agreements. This will consolidate and promote amicable relations.  
 
Therefore, the FSDC deals not only with issues directly related to Social Dialogue but also to 
the objectives of the structured dialogue in the sense of the White Paper on Sport. 
 
The FSDC as a Source for Legal Certainty 
 
The application of EU law to the sports sector has been analysed.
838
 The focus of the thesis 
lies on the professional football sector. The actors in the football subsystem are divided into 
the sporting autonomy coalition and the football business coalition.  Both coalitions seek to 
defend their interest based on their beliefs. The sporting autonomy coalition seeks less 
involvement of the EU into their sovereignty. The football business coalition pursues more 
influence in the regulation of the sector and a larger share of the financial benefits of the 





In professional football a deadlock has been reached. This deadlock has been described as a 
hurting stalemate situation: both coalitions have no more options to exploit, or their options 
are diminishing and becoming costly in terms of effort, resources and impact. No more 
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venues are available for them to find a compromise. The threat of litigation remains because 




In order to avoid litigation it should be made possible for the actors in the football subsystem 
to find compromise in an alternative setting. Compromise can be reached if both coalitions 
may rely on the law to enforce their mutual understandings. However, under the current 
setting of EU law the law does not bring certainty. The much desired legal certainty was not 
introduced by means of introducing an article, dealing specifically with sport, in the TFEU. 




The European Social Dialogue is a forum where balanced negotiations can take place. These 
can eventually lead to legal certainty. The FSDC groups the interests of the relevant 
stakeholders in the regulation of professional football: UEFA, ECA, EPFL and FIFPRo. \ 
Issues deriving from the FIFA regulations may be discussed within the FSDC. The 
stakeholders may negotiate about every topic they deem relevant to their sector. Legal 




Agreements in the European Social Dialogue may be implemented in two ways. First, the 
Commission may request the Council to issue a Directive and force the Member States to 
implement the Directive within the laws of their legal system. Second, the agreements may 
also be implemented through procedures common to the Member States. In that case the 
agreements will be implemented in national collective bargaining agreements or similar types 
of agreements. In football it has been defended that the national football associations can 
assist in implementing the regulations in cases where no collective bargaining agreements or 




Issues that are part of the agreements reached in the FSDC are the fruit of a negotiated 
settlement.
844
 Where in the case of litigation the court would have brought legal certainty by 
making a decision, the social partners have now reached a compromise with a similar status. 
The agreement as such shall, most likely, not be subject to legal challenges as it has already 
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reached consensus between  the initially rivalling coalitions. Legal threat could, however, be 
connected to a violation of the agreement.  
 
The sanction on such a violation depends on the source of enforcement of the agreement. In 
the case that the agreement deriving from the FSDC is implemented via a Directive, then the 
civil courts may enforce the agreement and sanction a violation. If the collective bargaining 
agreement is used for implementation, the similar method of enforcement will apply. 
However, in the case that national collective bargaining agreements appoint a national 
(football) arbitration court for the settlement of disputes, these football courts could ensure the 
enforcement. The latter is also the case if the national football associations have implemented 
the FSDC agreement in their standard contracts. 
 
Through this mechanism of negotiated settlement in a friendly and professional arena the 
threat of legal challenge diminishes to an extent that brings legal certainty to the European 
Professional Football Sector. 
 
The FSDC and the Definition of the Boundaries of Article 165 TFEU: ‘Fairness’ and 
‘Openness’ 
 
The sport’s governing bodies, and most important from the perspective of this thesis, UEFA 
lobbied to include sports in the TFEU. It was perceived that a mentioning of sport in the 
Treaty would lead to greater autonomy for sports governing bodies.
845
 However, Article 165 
TFEU does not contain a general exemption for sport. On the contrary, the wording of the 
article leaves space for debate about the extent of the autonomy of sport governing bodies. 
The analysis in this thesis points out that the wording of Article 165 appears to be a 
codification of the existing status quo as regards the application of EU law to sport before the 




UEFA has presented its interpretation of Article 165 TFEU. It is of the opinion that the article 
does not prejudice the autonomy of the sport’s governing bodies’ decision making powers. 
UEFA invites the Commission to reaffirm, or confirm, the need for the centralized and 
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territorial sale of audiovisual rights, the necessity for FFPR, compensation for the training of 
players, the limitation on the transfer of minors, to support measures taken by football 





UEFA could support this view to exclude the application of EU laws on free movement and 
competition on these topics by claiming a connection to the fairness of the competitions. The 
argument would be that a certain restriction on competition or a compensation for the training 
of players is necessary to create a ‘fair’ competition. Although it remains a case-by-case 
analysis the future pushing away from EU law application will be brought under these vague 
terms of Article 165 TFEU. 
 
On the contrary, opponents of UEFA’s view, and advocates of a further application of the free 
movement rules under the TFEU, could support their opposite beliefs by claiming more 
‘openness’ to sport. For example, competitions should not restrict the participation of other 




These two elements of the specific nature of sport articulated in Article 165 TFEU are not 
likely to change the quest for autonomy of the sport governing bodies. The ambiguity with 
regards the scope of the Article remains. However, the FSDC can, at least for football, further 
specify what the meaning of Article 165 entails in practice, and as such be useful to sport 
stakeholders in general. 
 
The social partners and UEFA can make binding agreements in the FSDC. When reaching 
these agreements the social partners may specify what the relation is of these agreements with 
the specificity of sport as articulated in Article 165 TFEU. A first test of the acceptability of a 
potential friction between the agreement and EU law should come to the surface if the 
European Commission, as the guardian of the Treaty but also as the administrative partner of 
the FSDC, agrees with the content of the agreement. In the case of a legal challenge to the 
FSDC it is likely that a Court would accept the interpretation of Article 165 as both sides of 
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the industry have agreed on the extent of the scope in a formal forum and in a binding 
agreement. 
 
As such, the FSDC is important to the future of EU sports law as it further defines the scope 
of the specificity of sport.  
 
Evolution of EU Labour Law by Promoting Flexibility of Approach and 
Implementation and Enforcement of Negotiation Results through Association 
Regulations 
 
The European Commission only allows the establishment of a sectoral Social Dialogue 
committee on the joint request of the social partners. Such a joint request shall only be 
successful in the case that both partners are representative with regards to the industrial sector 
they represent. In its 1993 communication the European Commission has presented the 
criteria that a social partner organization needs to possess before it can be recognized as an 




The organization needs to: 
 be cross-industry, or relate to specific sectors or categories and be organised at 
European level; 
• consist of organisations which are themselves an integral and recognized part of 
Member States’ social partner structures and with the capacity to negotiate 
agreements, and which are representative of all Member States, as far as possible; 
• have adequate structures to ensure the effective participation in the consultation 
process. 
The European Commission has previously shown some flexibility in its approach in other 
sectoral committees.
850
 This flexibility has been expressed in allowing individual membership 
of undertakings of pan-European social partner organisations. When specific representation is 
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required due to the nature of the topic of discussion, organisations with a relatively limited 




The ECA does not meet the criteria for representative social partner organisations as defined 
by the European Commission. It consists of individual members and these members do not 
perform a role on the national level of the Member States in the structure of industrial 
relations. On the contrary, the individual members of the ECA are part of the leagues who are 
members of the EPFL.
852
 Therefore,  ECA members that are based in a European Union 
Member State where a collective bargaining agreement exits on that national level, are de 
facto double represented in the FSDC. Nevertheless, the European Commission has agreed to 
provide the ECA the status of associate party with the same rights as the social partners.  
 
This is different for UEFA which acts as the chairperson for the FSDC. This has happened on 
the request of the social partners, giving UEFA the status of an associate party to the FSDC, 
with the similar rights as the social partners. Decision making, for example, is made through 
consensus voting. However, it has been mentioned that the social partners should be able to 
annul the appointment of UEFA as an associate party. It would go beyond the nature of the 
European Social Dialogue to make it impossible for social partners to reach collective 
agreements if an associate party that lacks the status of a social partner could frustrate 
negotiations in a sectoral committee. 
 
Nevertheless, the participation of UEFA in the FSDC and the agreement of the European 
Commission to this participation can be seen from a different perspective than the 
participation of the ECA. UEFA does not directly represent employers or workers. UEFA 
represent all aspects of European football as a whole.
853
 Therefore, it may be concluded that 
the European Commission has applied the doctrine now articulated in Article 165 TFEU in 
the appointment of UEFA as an associate party. Hence, it can be said that the European 
Commission has taken the specific characteristics of sport and its structures into consideration 
when allowing UEFA in the FSDC. 
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As a consequence another novelty is introduced in the European Sectoral Social Dialogue. 
The characteristic method of implementing the agreements reached in a sectoral committee is 
by the transposition of the autonomous agreement into a directive (erga omnes effect) or by 
means of implementing the EU umbrella agreement via procedures familiar to the social 
partners on the level of the Member States. 
 
In the FSDC the European Commission compromise promoted a ‘mixed approach’. The 
implementation is not completely voluntary but the parties to the agreement (UEFA and the 
social partners, must ensure to use their ‘best endeavours’ to implement the agreement. This 
means that the parties should use the methods that are available to them to assist in the 




This means that in Member States of the EU where no collective bargaining in professional 
football is in place, UEFA could complement the implementation in those countries by 
offering its structures for implementation. As mentioned, UEFA must pursue its national 
member FA’s to implement the articles of the Autonomous Agreement in their regulations 
and the clauses and requirements of the Autonomous Agreement in FA standard employment 
contracts. The use of these standard employment contracts can be imposed on the member 
clubs of the FA or of the FA’s national league. 
 
The effect of the implementation will be similar to implementation by means of the inclusion 
in a collective bargaining agreement. Enforceability of the clauses in the collective bargaining 
agreement may be achieved by means of challenges to violations before civil courts. 
However, it is more likely that the national collective bargaining agreement would include an 
arbitration clause and refer any potential dispute (exclusively) to the arbitration court of the 
national professional football sector. In the case that the Autonomous Agreement is 
implemented via the route of the association and laid down in a standard contract and/or 
association regulations, a violation would be sanctioned via the same arbitration court. 
 
Therefore, a sport specific approach to the participation of UEFA in the FSDC has led to a 
novelty in the European Social Dialogue. Next to methods of implementation and 
enforcement that have been identified by the European Commission, the FSDC in football 
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adds enforcement through sport governing bodies. This method could be introduced in other 
sport sectors that would like to establish a sectoral Social Dialogue committee as well. 
 
Evolution of EU Labour Law by Enabling Influence on Labour Relations in 
Candidate and Third Countries 
 
The role of UEFA as an associate party to the FSDC has been discussed.
855
 The novelty that 
this role brings to the European Social Dialogue is the method of implementation via 
association regulations. The outcome and enforceability is similar to the traditional methods 
of implementation. 
 
UEFA currently has 54 members. It is clear that the membership number of UEFA goes 
beyond the number of Member States of the EU. Therefore, taking into consideration that 
UEFA is a party to the Autonomous Agreement, the scope of the Autonomous Agreement can 
be broader than solely the EU. 
 
In the case that non-EU countries wish to implement the Autonomous Agreement they will be 
free and able to do so on their own initiative or on the request of UEFA.
856
 The latter is to be 
expected, especially in countries with more developed industrial relations. UEFA would 
promote a level playing field amongst their members and a similar approach to employment 
relations would be helpful in that respect. 
 
If UEFA uses the FSDC to implement its FFPR and HGPR in accordance with the 
requirements of EU law, then it will definitely introduce a negotiation result from the FSDC 
beyond the borders of the EU. The FFPR and HGPR objectives of UEFA go beyond the 
territory of the EU. 
 
The participation of UEFA in the FSDC brings EU harmonisation beyond the borders of the 
EU. 
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Redefining the Separate Territories Framework 
 
Parrish has introduced the Separate Territories Approach in 2003.
857
 The origin of the 
Separate Territories Framework lies in the tension between the EU’s regulatory activities on 
the basis of Single Market objectives and the EU’s perspective on the policy objectives for 
sport.
858
 Chapter 2 has detailed the separate territories that have emerged due to the evolution 
of EU sports policy on the basis of judicial intervention by the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice. The separate territories as introduced by Parrish in 2003 are 
sporting autonomy, supervised autonomy and judicial intervention. 
 
With Meca-Medina the first adaptation of the separate territories emerged. With the 
introduction of the doctrine in Meca-Medina the territory of sporting autonomy changed into 
conditional autonomy. This is due to the fact that sports governing bodies now had to prove 
that the contested sport regulation serves a legitimate goal and that the means that are chosen 
to attain that goal are proportionate and understandable to the addressees. Before the 
judgement, the issues in the sporting autonomy territory were exempted of the application of 
EU law due to the specific sport characteristics of these rules. Now no sport rule is exempt 
from EU law per se. 
 
The second impact on the Separate Territories Framework was introduced in 2009.
859
 As an 
extra territory, the European Social Dialogue was introduced. This introduction was then 
depending on the establishment of the FSDC. As described, the official presentation of the 
FSDC occurred in 2008. Issues that were first part of one of the other territories were now 





The thesis adds another element to the Separate Territories Framework. It introduces the 
HGPR and the FFPR to the ESD.
861
 These two issues have been identified as having a 
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connection with employment relations. In addition, the inclusion of these topics in the ESD 
may serve to reduce the potential friction with competition law that UEFA may encounter 
when the FFP are challenged. The adaptation of the FFP via the FSDC could lead to the 
introduction of a salary cap in European Professional Football.  
 
The topics of contractual stability, TPI and the regulation of the activities of player’s agents 
have been introduced to the FSDC. In the case that these issues will be regulated via the 
FSDC this would lead to a positioning within the framework of the European Social Dialogue 
in the Separate Territories Framework. This entails another adaption of this systems. 
 
Restructuring the Pyramid – Introduction of the Horizontal Model of Governance 
or Co-Negotiation 
 
In 1999 the European Commission presented the characteristics of sport in the European 
Union. The European Model of Sport has ever since defined the approach to sport by the 
European Commission and the Court of Justice. According to the Commission, sport in 




- European competitions are characterized by the model of promotion and relegation, 
enabling smaller teams to climb the hierarchy of competition and thus encouraging 
sporting competition and rewarding sporting success; 
 
- Grassroot involvement in sport is fundamental for the European system. Sport depends 
on the participation of volunteers and this participation is key for bringing people 
together and strengthening communities; 
 
- Sport has a cultural role in forging identity and national cultures. This is stressed by 
the organisation of international competitions. Within Europe competition helps to 
safeguard the cultural diversity between Member States; 
 
- Sport in Europe is structured on interdependent levels. The structure has the form of a 
pyramid. On the basic layer the individual clubs are active. Above the clubs the 
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regional federations are active in organizing competition in a particular geographic 
area of a Member State. The regional federations are members of the national 
federations, who, on their turn, are members of a European federation. There is only 
one federation per sport and one national member of that European federation. It is 
argued that a primary function of this pyramid structure is to make it easier to fairly 
distribute the revenues on all levels of sport in order to encourage sport participation 
and competitive balance. Another element of the pyramid model is its impact on sport 
governance. 
 
The top layer of the pyramid, the European Federation of the individual sports discipline, is 
for the most part member of a global federation. In European football UEFA is a member of 
FIFA. Due to the interdependent nature of EU sports, the rules and regulations of FIFA drip 
down to the level of the individual employment relation between the football player and his 
club. 
 
The thesis gives a number of examples deriving from the FIFA and UEFA regulations that 
have an impact on these individual employment relations.
863
 The transfer system contains 
requirements for contract duration and restraints the free movement of workers.  Club 
licensing regulations and nationality quotas impact on the remuneration and working 
conditions of the workers and lead to discrimination on the labour market. At the moment of 
writing there are pending challenges to the legal viability of these regulations. These 
regulations might go beyond the tolerated deviance of EU law under the specificity of sport.   
 
The thesis has placed these regulatory issues in the FSDC. The European Social Dialogue 
may serve as a platform for safeguarding the sports governing bodies from intervention of EU 
law by the European Commission or from an individual litigant before the ECJ. These issues 
are, due to their nature and connection to employment, fit to be placed in collective bargaining 
structures between employers and workers. This ‘double requirement’ dealing with 
admissibility of regulations and the nature of the regulations, impacts on the structure of the 
pyramid model of regulation for European Sport. 
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Where, until now, the model for regulation in EU football has been a top down approach, it 
now changes into a more horizontal form of regulation or co-regulation. This development 
changes the pyramid structure of EU sport governance. 
 
The reason for the change is the empowerment of the clubs and players that previously 
formed the bottom of the pyramid. As a consequence the grip of the governing bodies in 
football, UEFA for the EU, will be undermined. Social Partners may use the FSDC to reach 
agreements outside the regulatory influence of UEFA.  
 
Connections with the US Model of Collective Bargaining 
 
The introduction of the FSDC in professional football is a (further) shift towards the 
Americanization of the European Professional football sector. This is due to the fact that one 
of the characteristics of the US model of sports regulation, collective bargaining, impacts on 
the governance of the professional football industry. 
 
The US model of sport is characterized by a sharp distinction between amateur sports and 
professional sports, the role of schools and colleges, a closed system of competition and an 
extensive system of player restraints regulated by means of a collective bargaining agreement.
 
864
 The commercial merit of the leagues in the major US sport disciplines of American 
football, baseball, basketball and ice hockey derives from the fact that investments in these 
sports is better protected. The leagues are closed systems, they form of a single entity. There 
is no risk for a club to lose its status due to a relegation in a less commercially attractive 
competition. 
 
In 1998 the richest football clubs threatened to organise a ‘breakaway league’. A competition 
outside of the scope of the UEFA regulations and with no threat of relegation. Although this 
can be seen as a shift towards the US model of closed leagues, it has never completely left the 
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drawing table. It served to exert a pressure on UEFA to allow more club involvement in their 




Anderson introduces the viewpoint of the creation of a structure in professional football 
consisting of 32 clubs that are grouped in a European Super League (ESL) under the support 
of UEFA. This ESL could then, as a single entity, conclude collective bargaining agreements 
with the players and regulate issues such as the club licensing system, the FFPR, squad size 
limitation and quasi-salary caps.
866
 This method of collective bargaining could be a potential 







 argues that the European Social Dialogue in football and its impact on governance 
structures may lead to a shift to a Americanization of the EU model of sport. He cites 
Halgreen
869
 when stating that the first CBA’s in US sports in the sixties and seventies only 
concerned minor issues. Only after litigation the CBA’s contained more advanced issues in 
the field of labour such as player restraints. 
 
The thesis has dealt with the introduction of the FSDC in football. In accordance with  the US 
model, the first steps in the FSDC lead to the Autonomous Agreement. The Autonomous 
Agreement consists of minimum requirements that need to be included in the players’ 
standard contracts. However, the thesis explored other topics that could be included in the 
FSDC. Just like in the US, (threat of) litigation concerning these issues may motivate the 
governing bodies FIFA and UEFA to include issues that are now part of their regulatory 
authority in the FSDC in order to avoid potential challenges. At the time of writing, FIFPRo 
has just announced a new challenge to the transfer rules. It therefore seems that a shift 
towards the Americanization of the EU Sports Model seems less unlikely as a settlement of 
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the dispute leading to the legal challenge is preferred in a forum for negotiated settlement 
such as the FSDC instead of a settlement in court. 
 
A difference with the US is that the party that would give away its regulatory power is part of 
the FSDC (UEFA).
870
 It could therefore be argued that the extension of the scope of 
regulation of the FSDC is a stronger step towards the preservation of the EU Model of Sport. 
As it has been argued above, the FSDC could be the venue to further specify the extent of 
application of Article 165 TFEU and with that the specificity of sport. The specificity of sport 
is founded on basic pillars of the European Sports Model.  
 
It can be argued that the evolution of the FSDC has similarities with the US model of 
collective bargaining but that the end results takes the specific position of sport in the EU into 




The Labour Exemption in EU Sports Law 
 
The UEFA regulations have been analysed.
872
 The FFPR have been assessed in the light of 
EU competition law. The competition law ‘test’ as defined by case law is useful in 
determining if a certain set of rules or an agreement falls under the TFEU competition law 




1. Is UEFA, as the designer of the FFP rules, an undertaking?  
2. Does the decision affect trade between Member States? 
3. Is the effect on trade between Member States appreciable? 
4. Does the decision have as its object the restriction or distortion of competition? 
If the answers to these questions are positive, a rule from UEFA falls under the application of 
EU competition law. However, an exemption on the basis of the specific characteristics of 
sport is possible. After Meca-Medina such an exemption is no longer possible per se. It has to 
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be proven that the contested rule has no disproportionate effect  and that it is not limited to 




The inclusion of UEFA regulations on FFPR and HGPR in the FSDC make that an exemption 
which  is more likely to be acknowledged due to the connection to labour law and collective 
bargaining. The ECJ cases Brentjens, Albany, Drijvende Bokken and Pavlov can be regarded 
as a European Union equivalent to Mackey. This makes that certain restrictions are inherent to 
collective agreements. If the social partners both agree to these restrictions then this impacts 
the extent of the applicability EU competition law.  
 
Therefore, if the 101 TFEU ‘test’ is answered positively, an addition to the Meca Medina 
principles is added. The question that needs to be asked before the Meca-Medina principles 
are applied, is if the contested rule is part of an Autonomous Agreement deriving from the 
FSDC. 
 
Enhancing the Debate on Lex Sportiva 
 
A reflection has been made on the role of the CAS in creating Lex Sportiva.
875
 In academic 
debate there exist differing views on the exact meaning of Lex Sportiva. On one side of the 
spectrum there is the view that a distinct body of law has been created, comparable to the Lex 
Mercatoria. The sources for this distinct body are not only the CAS awards but also the 
regulations and decisions of the sport governing bodies and rules of the game, the Lex Ludica. 
The amalgamation of these sources lead to the definition of  a Lex Sportiva in senso lato.  
 
On the other side there is the recognition that the notion of Lex Sportiva remains vague and 
that it should prevent the impact of state and international law on sport structures. 
 
The thesis has posed the viewpoint that Lex Sportiva should be a uniform body of sports law 
that exists over the mosaic landscape of national sports law or general laws that are applied to 
sport. A set of rules regulating a certain sports activity may only be determined to be law if it 
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may be sanctioned and enforced when violated. There exist countries in the European Union 
that have specific sport laws. Lex Sportiva in senso stricto. A few examples are given below.  
 
In Spain there exists the ley del deporte, Ley 10/1990, of 15 October. This is a very elaborate 
sports act that serves as the basic legal ground for further legal regulation of the sports sector. 
The objectives of the state are defined and a Council for Sport is appointed to organise 
sporting issues and to serve as a guardian of the objectives of the act. The act regulates the 
role of the federations, the leagues that are active in organizing professional sports, the legal 
structure of clubs, disciplinary proceedings before arbitration tribunals and the role of the 
National Olympic Committee. Portugal has similar act.
876
 In Italy the Constitution refers the 
role of sports governance and regulation to the State. A specific law for the creation of the 
Italian Olympic Committee (CONI) was first launched in 1942, giving CONI legal personality 
and bringing it under the authority of the Ministry of Tourism and Entertainment. CONI 
received the power  to mandate its members to regulate competitions in their specific 
disciplines.
877
 Italy has a specific act dealing with the employment contract for sportspeople, 




The countries that have a system of regulation of sports by means of generic laws based on a 
Constitution objective are defined as countries with an ‘interventionist system of sports 
regulation’.
879
 These countries are opposite to countries that have a free regulatory system, 
where the associations and federation are not state controlled: ‘non-interventionist system of 
sports regulation’.  
 
The European Social Dialogue has the potential to be the only source in the European Union 
to create an enforceable basic sport act: a Lex Sportiva. The EU has the potential to become 
an interventionist system of sports regulation. The method and process is as follows. 
 
In the case that the social partners would come to an Autonomous Agreement and they would 
request the European Commission to submit a request for a Directive to the Council, then the 
                                                 
876
 For Portugal: Lei de Bases do Sistema Desportivo, Lei no. 1/90, 13 de Janeiro. 
877
 Legge 16 Febbraio 1942, N. 426, Costituzione e Ordinamento Del Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano 
(CONI), G.U. 11 Maggio 1942.  
878
 See for a further elaboration Geukes Foppen, T.(2010), Italian Regulation of Sports Law and its Law n. 91 of 
1981 – A solution for sport related problems in the Netherlands?, in International Sports Law Journal, The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, Vol. 3-4, 2010. 
879




Autonomous Agreement will have to be implemented on the level of the Member States in 
their national laws. This makes that the Autonomous Agreement will have an erga omnes 
effect and that it may serve as a basis for further detailed regulation on the national level of 
the Member States. This would lead to a  Lex Sportiva in senso stricto.   
 
Taking into consideration that UEFA is allowed in the FSDC as an associate party,  de facto it 
has access to create binding laws on the level of the EU. The social partners are able, as 
described above, to use the FSDC to further define the scope of the specificity of sport and of 
the vagueness caused by the reference to ‘openness’ and ‘fairness’ in Article 165 TFEU. It 
can be concluded that the European Social Dialogue, and, in particular, the FSDC, goes 
further in law making than Article 165. The latter misses the source for creating legislation 
and may only come up with incentive measures and support. One of these measures is, as has 
been illustrated, the promotion of the European Social Dialogue as a forum for debate and 
negotiation for sport stakeholders. 
 
In the case that an Autonomous Agreement on the EU level is not transposed in an erga 
omnes Directive than it can be charted under the notion of Lex Sportiva in senso lato. The 
reason for this is that the relevant actors on the national level of the Member States are no 
addressees to the Autonomous Agreement. After a transposition into an enforceable 
agreement on the national level, via the route of implementation in a CBA or via the route of 
the association, it may become enforceable on the national level for the addressees. In that 
case, for that specific sector, Lex Sportiva in senso stricto  is created. 
 
The European Social Dialogue as a Venue for the Settlement of Unsolved Issues 
 
The thesis discusses issues that find their origin in the regulations of FIFA or in the 
regulations of UEFA. Two topics were added. The activity of players’ agents, currently 
regulated by FIFA but in the process of a deregulation procedure, was added. Third Party 
Influence (TPI) has been analysed. TPI is mentioned in the Regulations on the Status and 
Transfer of Players (RSTP) but it deserves a separate approach due to the statements of UEFA 
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In the conclusions below it will first be shortly described what the individual issues are. Then 
the potential or actual legal challenge to the issue will shortly be described. The conclusion 
per individual topic contributes to the overall conclusion: the FSDC as an instrument to 
introduce legal certainty in the European professional sector. 
 
The Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players  
 
The RSTP regulate the administrative procedure connected to the international movement of 
the registration of a professional football player. In addition, the RSTP dictates the method in 
which contracts need to be drafted, it introduced a system of training compensation, it 
promotes contractual stability, pays attention to the protection of minors and refers to  
arbitration tribunals for dispute resolution. 
 
In December 2013 FIFPRo announced that it will challenge the RSTP. There was no 
specification on which elements of the RSTP the challenge would be directed, the general 
objective was to end the infringement of free movement and the implications on human rights. 
The legal threat is realistic as the status of the RSTP is no more than an informal agreement 
between FIFA and the European Commission and examples of EU law infringements would 
require justification on the basis of clear evidence. In Chapter 6 it has been illustrated that a 
number of issues under the RSTP have employment law links and are therefore suitable to be 
placed in the FSDC for negotiation. The issues are: contractual stability, training 
compensation, transfers of minors, contract duration and dispute resolution.  Below some of 
these topics will be addressed in order to propose concrete measures in a FSDC agreement, in 






It has been illustrated that the RSTP promote contractual stability through uncertainty. In the 
case that a player unilaterally breaches his contract before the end of its duration, there is no 
clarity on the amount of compensation that he is obliged to pay. In practice this may lead to a 
situation where a player (Matuzalem) is liable to pay such an unreasonably high amount that it 
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would prevent him from ever being able to pay that sum. In the case of non-payment the 
disciplinary system of FIFA may impose the sanction of banning the player from 
competitions. 
 
The FSDC can be the platform for the re-negotiation of the contractual stability requirements. 
The social partners are apt to find a balance between stability and the rights of workers. The 
FSDC could agree on standard clauses for contract termination and on a calculation method 




The system of training compensation has been introduced in the 2001 agreement on the 
RSTP.  The motivation for the rule was to encourage clubs to train players. Due to the lack of 
feedback of their members, FIFA drafted a compensation system on the basis of its own 
findings. 
 
Two examples have illustrated that in practice the current form of training compensation can 
go beyond the actual training costs that the club that trains the player, has incurred. This 
system may have impact on the free movement of the player. The FSDC may decide on a 
system of training compensation that is evidence based. As detailed in chapter 6, the method 
of renewing contracts with young players may be discussed as currently this method leads to 




In Chapter 6 it has been illustrated that in order to avoid child trafficking a symbiosis between 
association regulations and immigration laws is requested. This would allow the football 
sector to place the transfer of minors in a formal framework that enables better control and 
sanctioning. The FSDC operates on the level of professional football but is also under direct 
influence of EC control and participation and is directly connected to UEFA’s regulations. 
The FSDC could therefore be the right platform to formalize the FIFA regulations on minors 





In conclusion, due to the weak legal status of the RSTP a legal challenge may lead to the 
overhaul of the system. FIFPRo’s challenge of the system may be a method to force FIFA and 
UEFA to move the negotiation of these issues to the venue of the FSDC. Indeed, if the 
stakeholders of the FSDC will be invited to negotiate the RSTP in the FSDC the legal 




The UEFA Club Licensing Regulations and Financial Fair Play Regulations (FFPR) and the 
Home Grown Player Rule (HGPR) have been analysed.  Both issues qualify as topics for 
negotiation within the FSDC.  
 
Currently there is a legal challenge to the FFPR before a Brussels Court. Also, an official 
complaint has been notified to the European Commission. Both actions have been initiated by 
a Belgian football agent, who is advised by Bosman’s lawyer Jean-Louis Dupont. According 
to Dupont the break-even requirement limit the freedom of a club to offer the players the 
salaries they would like to offer. It also limits the freedom of the provision of services. 
 
According to a study that has been commission by the European Commission the restrictive 
elements of the HGPR go beyond the achievements of the rule. On the basis of the findings in 
the report, a legal challenge to the HGPR by a litigant could overhaul the HGPR. 
 
If UEFA would bring both issues under the negotiation of the FSDC that it may profit from 
two advantages. First, a potential infringement of competition law based on the status of 
UEFA as a grouping of undertakings imposing salary cap regulations would be weakened. An 
exemption of competition law would be allowed under the EU labour exemption. Second, 
allowing the issue of the indirect discrimination of workers under the HGPR would be 
accepted more easily if the players themselves, via FIFPRo, would have been involved in the 




Third Party Influence  
 
Stakeholders in European football are actively involved in the debate concerning TPI. UEFA 
is an advocate of a total ban, whereas the ECA and the EPFL from the side of the clubs are yet 
to present their definitive standpoint. FIFA is, at the time of writing, in the middle of an 
elaborate global research on the extent of the potential problems deriving from non-allowed 
influences in club’s policies due to TPI. On the contrary, a number of Brazilian clubs have 
expressed their concern about the intentions to totally ban TPI. FC Porto was present in this 
group.  
 
TPI affects players as well as clubs. It has an impact on employment relations and it may 
therefore be placed within the FSDC. A negotiated settlement would be favoured over legal 
challenges of a potential ban in court.  
 
A system of transparent TPI regulation could involve a maximum on the percentage of third 
party entitlement to the future transfer compensation paid for a player’s move to a new club. 
Also, a database could be made public showing the third party investments and the players 
that are financed through TPI. The FSDC could introduce standards of players’ consent to 
third party investments, guaranteeing a freedom to enforce their rights as workers. The FSDC 
may bring legal certainty and is therefore the right platform to prevent potential legal 
challenges. 
 
The Activities of Players’ Agents 
 
FIFA have been regulating players’ agents since the mid-nineties. Regulation became more 
fierce after Bosman. FIFA has overcome legal scrutiny over its ability to regulate the agents. 
In an ECJ case FIFA’s powers to regulate this profession were confirmed due to the necessity 
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According to FIFA the Player’s Agent Regulations (PAR) have not been successful in 
reaching FIFA’s objectives for regulation. FIFA has therefore decided to deregulate the 
profession, the licensed agent will disappear from the first of February 2015. 
 
According to football stakeholders, and in particular the EFAA, this choice of FIFA may lead 
to potential chaos on the market. Since the entry into force of the PAR the situation with 
regards to player protection and need for financial transparency is still omnipresent. An 
overhaul of the system brings the players in a worse position as they are now. Players’ agents 
may potentially be limited in their freedom to carry out their profession, as the new rules 
curtail their potential clients. 
 
The new rules have not came into force yet. However, due to the fragile method of creation of 
the rules, with a limited amount of stakeholder consultation, a challenge to the new 
regulations is possible. 
 
The FSDC has shown flexibility as regards the collaboration of stakeholders that are no direct 
social partners. In the case of Players’ Agents it should be possible to involve EFAA in 
negotiations about the regulation of agents. In the case that this collective body, recognized by 
the European Commission, consents to the rules agreed in the FSDC, a potential threat of 
litigation diminishes. 
 
Also, the connection to employment issues make that the FSDC could be fit to host 
negotiations about the issue. 
 
The FSDC could be the forum to negotiate new Players’ Agents Regulation and take away the 
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